AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed December 4, 2014.
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-13-01015-CV
MONTEREY MUSHROOMS, INC. AND CAPROCK CLAIMS MANAGEMENT, LLC,
Appellants
V.
MAJESTIC REALTY CO. AND MCLANE FOODSERVICE, INC., Appellees
On Appeal from the 192nd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DC-12-02702
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices O’Neill, Lang-Miers, and Brown
Opinion by Justice O’Neill
Appellants Monterey Mushrooms, Inc. and Caprock Claims Management, LLC appeal
a no-evidence summary judgment granted in favor of appellees Majestic Realty Co. and McLane
Foodservice, Inc. In three issues, Monterey contends the trial court erred in granting appellees’
motion for summary judgment on its claims for equitable subrogation, unjust enrichment, and
“money had and received.” For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
In 2009, a Monterey employee Leroy Crocker was injured when he slipped and fell on a
patch of ice on property owned by Majestic and operated by McLane. Crocker was acting in the
course and scope of his employment at the time of his injury. Monterey did not subscribe to
worker’s compensation insurance, but instead provided employees with an Employee Injury
Benefit Plan under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Monterey paid
Crocker medical and temporary income benefits through the plan. Monterey later sued appellees
to recover the benefits it paid. Monterey asserted appellees were “primarily liable” for these
payments because they owned or controlled the premises where Crocker was injured. Monterey
alleged claims for equitable subrogation, unjust enrichment, and “money had and received.”
Appellees moved for a no-evidence motion for summary judgment asserting Monterey
had no evidence to show it was liable for Crocker’s injuries, and thus had no evidence to support
any of its claims. In its response to the motion for summary judgment, Monterey did not submit
any summary judgment evidence to raise an issue of fact to show Crocker had a valid claim
against appellees or that appellees were legally liable for Crocker’s injuries. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of appellees.
A no-evidence summary judgment motion is essentially a motion for a pretrial directed
verdict; it requires the nonmoving party to present evidence raising a genuine issue of material
fact supporting each element contested in the motion. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Timpte Indust.,
Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2009). When reviewing a no-evidence summary
judgment, we “review the evidence presented by the motion and response in the light most
favorable to the party against whom the summary judgment was rendered, crediting evidence
favorable to that party if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless
reasonable jurors could not.” Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex. 2006)
(citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005)).
Monterey first asserts the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on its claim for
equitable subrogation. Monterey relies on evidence showing it had a right to subrogation.
According to Monterey, it was not also required to present evidence showing appellees were
liable for Crocker’s injuries because of the equitable nature of the claim. In essence, Monterey
asserts it can recover for payments it made to Crocker even if Crocker himself did not have a
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claim against appellees. Monterey misunderstands the nature of subrogation and the equitable
principals involved.
Contractual subrogation “is created by an agreement or contract that grants [a party] the
right to pursue reimbursement from a third party in exchange for payment of a loss.” In contrast,
equitable subrogation “does not depend on contract but arises in every instance in which one
person, not acting voluntarily, has paid a debt for which another was primarily liable and which
in equity should have been paid by the latter.” Mid–Continent Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
236 S.W.3d 765, 774 (Tex. 2007). The doctrine of equitable subrogation operates to give a party
standing it would otherwise lack to step into the shoes of, and pursue the claims belonging to, a
party with standing. Frymire Engineering Co., Inc. ex rel. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jomar Intern.,
Ltd. 259 S.W.3d 140, 142 (Tex. 2008). Texas courts interpret this doctrine liberally. Id.
But having a right to subrogation, is distinct from the ability to recover under that right.
Mid-Continent Ins. Co.. 236 S.W.3d at 774 -775. In both contractual and equitable subrogation,
the subrogee “stands in the shoes of” the subrogor, “obtaining only those rights held by” the
subrogor against a third party, and subject to any defenses the third party held against the
subrogor. See id.
On appeal, Monterey asserts it presented evidence showing it had a right to subrogation,
but appellees’ motion for summary judgment was directed to whether Monterey had any
evidence it could recover under that right. Absent any evidence that Crocker had a claim against
appellees, Monterey has failed to come forward with a fact issue on its claim. We resolve the
first issue against Monterey.
Monterey next asserts the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of
appellees on its claim for “unjust enrichment.” Unjust enrichment is an equitable principle
holding that one who receives benefits unjustly should make restitution for those benefits. Tex.
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Integrated Conveyor Sys., Inc. v. Innovative Conveyor Concepts, Inc., 300 S.W.3d 348, 367
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied). Unjust enrichment occurs when a person wrongfully
secured or passively received a “benefit” that would be unconscionable to retain. Tex. Integrated
Conveyor Sys., 300 S.W.3d at 367. To prevail, a plaintiff must show that the defendant obtained
a benefit from the plaintiff by fraud, duress, or the taking of an undue advantage. Heldenfels
Bros., Inc. v. City of Corpus Christi, 832 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Tex. 1992). Unjust enrichment is not
an independent cause of action but rather characterizes the result of a failure to make restitution
of benefits either wrongfully or passively received under circumstances which give rise to an
implied or quasi-contractual obligation to repay. Oxford Fin. Walker v. Cotter Properties, Inc.,
181 S.W.3d 895, 900 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.).
Monterey’s claim for unjust enrichment is premised on its contention that appellees
received a benefit from Monterey’s payments to Crocker. Even if we could agree a claim for
unjust enrichment could rest on this type of “benefit,” we conclude Monterey failed to present
any evidence to show appellees received any such benefits. Appellees only benefitted from the
Monterey’s payments to Crocker if appellees were liable for those payments. But Monterey
presented no summary judgment evidence to raise a fact issue on this element. Therefore, we
resolve the second issue against Monterey.
In its third issue, Monterey asserts the trial court erred in granting appellees’ no-evidence
motion for summary judgment on its claim for “money had and received.” A claim for money
had and received “belongs conceptually to the doctrine of unjust enrichment.” Edwards v. Mid–
Continent Office Distributors L.P., 252 S.W.3d 833, 837 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied)
(quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Smith, 946 S.W.2d 162, 164 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, no writ)).
To prevail, a plaintiff must show that a defendant holds money which in equity and good
conscience belongs to the plaintiff. Id. It is not premised on wrongdoing, but seeks to determine
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to which party, in equity, justice, and law, the money belongs. Id. Here, Monterey presented no
evidence that appellees’ received any money or benefits belonging to Monterey. Therefore, the
trial court properly granted summary judgment on this claim. We resolve the third issue against
Monterey.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/Michael J. O'Neill/
MICHAEL J. O'NEILL
JUSTICE
131015F.P05
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
MONTEREY MUSHROOMS, INC. and On Appeal from the 192nd Judicial District
CAPROCK CLAIMS MANAGEMENT, Court, Dallas County, Texas
LLC., Appellants Trial Court Cause No. DC-12-02702.
Opinion delivered by Justice O'Neill.
No. 05-13-01015-CV V. Justices Lang-Miers and Brown
participating.
MAJESTIC REALTY CO. and MCLANE
FOODSERVICE, INC., Appellees
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that appellees MAJESTIC REALTY CO. and MCLANE
FOODSERVICE, INC. recover their costs of this appeal from appellants MONTEREY
MUSHROOMS, INC. and CAPROCK CLAIMS MANAGEMENT, LLC.
Judgment entered this 4th day of December, 2014.
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