Case: 14-12000 Date Filed: 12/11/2014 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-12000
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cr-00326-JEC-JSA-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
VICTOR COVERA-PENALOZA,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(December 11, 2014)
Before WILSON, JORDAN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Victor Covera-Penaloza appeals his 23-month sentence, imposed after he
pled guilty to re-entering the country after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1326(a), (b)(2). On appeal, Covera-Penaloza argues that his sentence was
unreasonable because (1) the guideline range was based primarily on a felony
conviction that occurred almost 20 years ago; (2) he had no other felony
convictions and the remainder of his criminal history, which was mainly for DUI
and simple battery, stemmed from his untreated alcohol dependency; (3) his
reasons for re-entering the country were to be with his family and work; and (4) he
had a history of being a hard worker.
We review the reasonableness of a sentence under an abuse-of-discretion
standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46, 128 S. Ct. 586, 594 (2007). We
review the sentence’s substantive reasonableness under the totality of the
circumstances. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1190–91 (11th Cir. 2008).
We are obliged to remand for resentencing if left with the definite and firm
conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing
the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of
reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case. Id. at 1191. A court’s
unjustified reliance on any one § 3553(a) factor may be a “symptom of an
unreasonable sentence,” and a sentence may be substantively unreasonable when
the court fails to consider pertinent § 3553(a) factors. Id. at 1191–92.
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The party who challenges the sentence bears the burden of showing that the
sentence is unreasonable in light of the record and § 3553(a) factors. United States
v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010). “A court of appeals may apply a
presumption of reasonableness to a district court sentence within the Guidelines.”
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 338, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2457 (2007).
Additionally, a sentence imposed well below the statutory maximum penalty is an
indicator of a reasonable sentence. See United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319,
1324 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (holding that defendant’s sentence was
reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum penalty).
The § 3553(a) factors include the need for the sentence to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for
the offense, deter criminal conduct, and protect the public from the defendant’s
future criminal conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). Other factors include the nature
and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s history and characteristics, the
kinds of sentences available, the applicable guideline range, the pertinent policy
statements of the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted
sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to victims. Id.
§ 3553(a)(1), (3)–(7). Finally, the statutory maximum term of imprisonment for an
alien whose removal was subsequent to a conviction for the commission of an
aggravated felony is 20 years’ imprisonment. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2).
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Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we
affirm.
The sentence was substantively reasonable, based on the totality of
circumstances. See Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1191. In imposing the sentence, the district
court did not unjustifiably rely on Covera-Penaloza’s aggravated felony from 1993.
Rather, the court’s explanation for the sentence made it clear that the sentence
length was due, in large part, to Covera-Penaloza’s continued disrespect for the
law and the danger his criminal conduct posed to the public. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2). Given (1) Covera-Penaloza’s criminal history, which included
numerous DUI convictions committed after he illegally re-entered the country;
(2) that the sentence was within the applicable guideline range; and (3) that the
sentence was well below the statutory maximum penalty, his 23-month sentence
was substantively reasonable. See Talley, 431 F.3d at 788; Gonzalez, 550 F.3d at
1324. Accordingly, we affirm the sentence as reasonable.
AFFIRMED.
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