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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-11660
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 0:14-cv-60791-RSR
TERESA TAYLOR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JEANETTE RANDOLPH,
11129,
LATONYA PHILIPS,
12523,
JUDGE M. KAPLAN,
JUDGE R. FEREN,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(December 11, 2014)
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Before MARTIN, ANDERSON, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Teresa Taylor, a pro se litigant, appeals from the district court’s sua sponte
orders dismissing her 42 U.S.C. ' 1983 complaint raising claims against Judge M.
Kaplan, Judge R. Feren, Jeanette Randolph, and Latonya Philips. Dismissals were
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim.
This case touches on family law, and domestic violence, and state court
orders. Taylor claims that she and her child’s fundamental rights were violated
based on child-custody proceedings and child well-being decisions made by Judge
Feren and Judge Kaplan and by Broward Sheriff’s Office and Child Protective
Service employees, Jeanette Randolph and Latonya Philips. On appeal, Taylor
argues that the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution should apply
and that the district court erred by dismissing her claims against the judges. Taylor
also argues that the district court erred in dismissing her 42 U.S.C. ' 1983
complaint against Randolph and Philips for failure to state a claim. The dismissals
were made by means of a written opinion, setting out reasons and authorities. We
see no reversible error.
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We review a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction de novo.
Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir. 2009). We also review a
dismissal for failure to state a claim de novo. Timpson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870,
872 (11th Cir. 2008).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine * provides that federal courts, other than the
United States Supreme Court, lack subject-matter jurisdiction to review final
judgments of state courts. Liedel v. Juvenile Court of Madison Cnty., 891 F.2d
1542, 1545 (11th Cir. 1990). Furthermore, federal courts “may not decide federal
issues that are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a state court’s judgment.” Id.
We have applied Rooker-Feldman specifically to bar district courts from
reviewing judgments in child-custody proceedings. See Goodman v. Sipos, 259
F.3d 1327, 1332-33 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that Rooker-Feldman clearly applied
where injunction of state child-custody actions was sought and also where damages
were sought for matters intertwined with state court custody actions). We have
also determined those officers and other government personnel acting pursuant to,
or in concert with, child-custody or child well-being proceedings fall within the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine because their acts are inextricably intertwined with state
court judgments. See id., 259 F.3d at 1334.
*
Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16, 44 S.Ct. 149, 150, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923), and
D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476-82, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 1311-15, 75 L.Ed.2d
206 (1983).
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We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Taylor’s claims for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. Taylor essentially argues that Judges Feren and Kaplan
acted improperly when making rulings about child-custody and child-protection
orders. She further argues that Philips’s and Randolph’s visits to her home to
check on her child’s well-being were improper. The district court correctly
concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the protection orders
because a ruling would constitute direct interference with final state-court
judgments. If Philips’s and Randolph’s visits were made pursuant to court order,
the district court correctly concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over
the visits: any ruling would constitute interference with the state-court custody and
well-being determinations. If Randolph and Philips acted independently of the
state-court custody proceedings, the district court correctly dismissed Taylor’s
complaint for failure to state a claim against defendants Randolph and Philips.
We will dismiss a case for failure to state a claim if the complaint on its face
fails to put forth sufficient factual matter and legal basis for the court to draw a
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable. Wooten v. Quicken Loans, Inc.,
626 F.3d 1187, 1196 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). Bare factual allegations that
a defendant has acted in a harmful manner or formulaic recitation of legal elements
are not enough. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50. We construe pro
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se pleadings liberally, but we will not act as counsel for any party. GJR Invs. v.
Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other
grounds by Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937. “Where a complaint pleads facts
that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line
between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotations omitted).
We affirm the dismissal of the complaint against Randolph and Philips for
failure to state a claim. The complaint was a narrative about Randolph’s and
Philips’s acts that provided no indication Taylor was entitled to relief. Taylor’s
later filings assert the same facts accompanied by a long listing of constitutional
amendments. Although we construe liberally pro se complaints, we cannot
conclude that a claim exists from this bare list of facts or laws.
AFFIRMED.
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