In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 14-‐‑1875
KEVIN L. HAROLD,
Plaintiff-‐‑Appellant,
v.
CHRISTOPHER C. STEEL and PETERS & STEEL, LLC,
Defendants-‐‑Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:13-‐‑cv-‐‑0173-‐‑TWP-‐‑DML — Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED NOVEMBER 12, 2014 — DECIDED DECEMBER 11, 2014
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. A small claims court in Mar-‐‑
ion County, Indiana, entered a judgment against Kevin Har-‐‑
old for a little more than $1,000. He did not pay, even
though he had agreed to the judgment’s entry. Almost two
decades later Christopher Steel, claiming to represent the
judgment creditor, asked the court to garnish Harold’s wag-‐‑
es. It entered the requested order, which Harold moved to
vacate, contending that Steel had misrepresented the judg-‐‑
2 No. 14-‐‑1875
ment creditor’s identity (transactions after the judgment’s
entry may or may not have transferred that asset to a new
owner) and did not represent the only entity authorized to
enforce the judgment. But he did not contend that the re-‐‑
quest was untimely. After a hearing, a state judge sided with
Steel and maintained the garnishment order in force. Instead
of seeking review within Indiana’s judiciary, Harold filed
this federal suit under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,
contending that Steel and his law firm (Peters & Steel, LLC,
which we do not mention again) had violated 15 U.S.C.
§1692e by making false statements. But the district court
dismissed the suit for want of subject-‐‑matter jurisdiction,
ruling that it is barred by the Rooker-‐‑Feldman doctrine be-‐‑
cause it contests the state court’s decision. 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 43154 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 31, 2014).
More than a decade ago, this court held in Epps v. Credit-‐‑
net, Inc., 320 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2003), that the Rooker-‐‑Feldman
doctrine bars federal suits seeking to recover on a theory that
a debt collector made false statements during state litigation.
The facts of Epps are similar to those of this case, right down
to the location of the state suit: a small-‐‑claims court in Mari-‐‑
on County, Indiana. The only differences are that the sup-‐‑
posed misrepresentations in Epps concerned the amount of
damages rather than the creditor’s identity, and that Epps
dropped his §1692e claim on appeal and relied on a state-‐‑
law theory under the supplemental jurisdiction. The aban-‐‑
donment of the §1692e claim in Epps raises the possibility
that this strategic choice affected federal jurisdiction. Harold
maintains that it does, relying on Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi
Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005). But three years af-‐‑
ter Exxon Mobil this court applied the approach of Epps to a
claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. See Kelley
No. 14-‐‑1875 3
v. Med-‐‑1 Solutions, LLC, 548 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. 2008). Harold
wants us to overrule Kelley and Epps.
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and Dis-‐‑
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462
(1983), hold that the Supreme Court of the United States is
the only federal court that may review judgments entered by
state courts in civil litigation. The Rooker-‐‑Feldman doctrine
applies when the state court’s judgment is the source of the
injury of which plaintiffs complain in federal court. See Exx-‐‑
on Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293; GASH Associates v. Rosemont, 995
F.2d 726, 729 (7th Cir. 1993). Harold insists, however, that
the doctrine does not apply to interlocutory decisions by
state tribunals; he maintains that these may be reviewed by
federal district courts.
Why not? Nothing in the Supreme Court’s decisions sug-‐‑
gests that state-‐‑court decisions too provisional to deserve re-‐‑
view within the state’s own system can be reviewed by fed-‐‑
eral district and appellate courts. The principle that only the
Supreme Court can review the decisions by the state judici-‐‑
ary in civil litigation is as applicable to interlocutory as to
final state-‐‑court decisions. A truly interlocutory decision
should not be subject to review in any court; review is de-‐‑
ferred until the decision is final.
We recognize that the courts of appeals disagree about
the issue. Compare Pieper v. American Arbitration Association,
Inc., 336 F.3d 458, 461–62 (6th Cir. 2003) (applying Rooker-‐‑
Feldman to a federal suit challenging an interlocutory order);
Kenmen Engineering v. Union, 314 F.3d 468, 474 (10th Cir.
2002) (same); Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194,
199 (4th Cir. 2000) (same); and Port Authority Police Benevo-‐‑
lent Association, Inc. v. Port Authority of New York, 973 F.2d
4 No. 14-‐‑1875
169, 178–79 (3d Cir. 1992) (same); with Cruz v. Melecio, 204
F.3d 14, 21 n.5 (1st Cir. 2000) (Rooker-‐‑Feldman doctrine is lim-‐‑
ited to final judgments); Green v. Mattingly, 585 F.3d 97, 102
(2d Cir. 2009) (same, but in dictum). Our decision in Mehta v.
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission, 681 F.3d
885, 887 (7th Cir. 2012), does not choose sides; instead we
observed that the state decision in question was final. Nor
need we resolve the question in this case, again because the
decision is final. United States v. Kollintzas, 501 F.3d 796, 801–
02 (7th Cir. 2007), and United States v. Sloan, 505 F.3d 685, 687
(7th Cir. 2007), are among many opinions holding that gar-‐‑
nishment orders enforcing a judgment are final and appeal-‐‑
able. Indiana follows the same approach. Tipton v. Flack, 149
Ind. App. 129, 134 (1971).
Harold maintains that his claim is independent of the
state court’s decision and thus outside the scope of the Rook-‐‑
er-‐‑Feldman doctrine under Exxon Mobil, which holds that the
doctrine applies only when the state court has caused the
injury of which the federal suit complains. If the state court
just failed to remedy an injury that predated the litigation
(or is independent of it), the Court held, the federal district
judge should apply principles of issue and claim preclusion
under 28 U.S.C. §1738 rather than dismiss for want of juris-‐‑
diction—and under Indiana law decisions of small claims
courts do not have issue-‐‑preclusive effect. See Geico Insurance
Co. v. Graham, 14 N.E.2d 854, 860 (Ind. App. 2014). Harold
insists that the false statements, rather than the state court’s
decision, inflicted the injury of which he complains.
It is easy to imagine situations in which a violation of
federal law during the conduct of state litigation could cause
a loss independent of the suit’s outcome. Suesz v. Med-‐‑1 Solu-‐‑
No. 14-‐‑1875 5
tions, LLC, 757 F.3d 636 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc), illustrates.
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act limits debt collectors
to suits in the “judicial district or similar legal entity” where
the contract was signed or the debtor resides. 15 U.S.C.
§1692i. If a debt collector violates that statute, it inflicts an
injury measured by the costs of travelling or sending a law-‐‑
yer to the remote court and moving for a change of venue,
no matter how the suit comes out.
Harold was not injured in that way, however. He com-‐‑
plains about representations that concern the merits. If
Steel’s client did not own the judgment, then Harold was en-‐‑
titled to a decision in his favor. No injury occurred until the
state judge ruled against Harold. The need to litigate was not
a loss independent of the state court’s decision; costs of liti-‐‑
gation were inevitable whether or not Steel was telling the
truth about his client’s rights—and it should be cheaper to
defeat a false claim than to defeat a true one.
As Harold sees things, the Rooker-‐‑Feldman doctrine does
not apply to the procedures that state courts use to reach de-‐‑
cisions or the evidence that state judges consider. This line of
argument is embarrassed by the fact that Rooker itself arose
from a contention that the state court (at the adverse liti-‐‑
gant’s instigation) had used constitutionally forbidden pro-‐‑
cedures to reach its judgment. Unless Rooker were to be over-‐‑
ruled, there could not be a “procedural exception” to the
Rooker-‐‑Feldman doctrine.
Federal review of the procedures or evidence used in
state court would collapse the distinction between civil and
criminal cases. Collateral review of state criminal judgments
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254 is a search for improper
procedures; most substantive decisions are governed by
6 No. 14-‐‑1875
state law and cannot be reviewed in federal court. See, e.g.,
Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74 (2005); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508
U.S. 333 (1993); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991). If Har-‐‑
old were to prevail in this suit, however, federal courts could
award damages every time a litigant in state court used an
improper procedure or considered evidence that a federal
judge does not think trustworthy. That duplication would
greatly increase the already high cost of civil litigation.
The Rooker-‐‑Feldman doctrine is a matter of statutory in-‐‑
terpretation, not of constitutional command. Congress is free
to authorize federal collateral review of state civil judg-‐‑
ments—though there may be limits to how far national law
can specify procedures that state courts must use, as Judge
Sykes’s concurring opinion in Suesz explains, 757 F.3d at
650–55—but 15 U.S.C. §1692e does not approach the limits of
federal power. Section 1692e forbids debt collectors to tell
lies but does not suggest that federal courts are to review
state-‐‑court decisions about whether lies have been told. Sec-‐‑
tion 1692e does not even hint that federal courts have been
authorized to monitor how debt-‐‑collection litigation is han-‐‑
dled in state courts. Section 1692i (the subject of Suesz) au-‐‑
thorizes federal courts to address one specific aspect of state
debt-‐‑collection litigation; §1692e lacks a parallel reference to
the conduct of litigation in state courts, so the norm from the
Rooker-‐‑Feldman doctrine controls.
Harold might have used §1692e to file a counterclaim in
Indiana and could have appealed within the state system.
He did neither. His federal suit was properly dismissed.
AFFIRMED
Kevin Harold v. Christopher Steel
Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Date filed: 2014-12-11
Citations: 773 F.3d 884
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