UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 01-10289
FACUNDO OCHOA,
Petitioner-Appellant,
VERSUS
JANIE COCKRELL, Director, Texas Department of
Criminal Justice, Institutional Division,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth Division
(4:00-CV-1644-Y)
May 10, 2002
Before GARWOOD and DENNIS, Circuit Judges, and LITTLE,* District
Judge.
PER CURIAM:**
The issues in this appeal from the denial of habeas relief are
*
Chief Judge of the Western District of Louisiana, sitting by
designation.
**
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
1
whether the state prosecutor violated the petitioner’s Fifth
Amendment rights by commenting on his failure testify and, if so,
whether any resulting error was harmless. We need not decide the
first question because we hold that the prosecutor’s comments did
not “have a substantial or injurious effect or influence” on the
petitioner’s conviction regardless of whether they violated the
Fifth Amendment. The district court’s order is therefore affirmed.
I. Facts and Procedural History
On March 10, 1998, petitioner Facundo Ochoa was tried in a
Texas state court for aggravated assault of a child and indecency
with a child.1 The victim was the daughter of Ochoa’s longtime
sporadic girlfriend, Debbie Ortiz. Ortiz, Ochoa, and the victim
were living with Ochoa’s mother at the time in question.
During trial, the victim testified in detail about how Ochoa
molested her twice over the span of a month. The first attack
occurred in December 1995, when the victim was eleven years old.
The victim was sleeping on the couch when she awoke to Ochoa
fondling her breasts and buttocks. While she was still in a
slumber, Ochoa removed her sweat pants and panties, pushed her legs
apart, and forced his penis far enough into her vagina for it hurt.
The victim testified that she was scared and that she pulled her
legs together. Ochoa stopped and left the room when the victim
1
See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §§ 21.11, 22.021 (Vernon 1994).
2
moved, but after a few minutes, he returned and began fondling her
and licking her neck. He then forced his penis into her mouth. It
was approximately 1:30 a.m. and the victim could smell beer on
Ochoa’s breath.
The second incident occurred in January of 1996. It was late
in the evening, and Ochoa was alone with the victim while her
mother was out running an errand. Once again, Ochoa began rubbing
the victim’s breasts while she was sleeping on the living room
couch. The victim testified that when her mother returned from
her errand, Ochoa stopped what he was doing and left the room.
When Ms. Ortiz walked into the living room, she found her daughter
on the couch crying; the daughter then revealed that Ochoa had been
molesting her.
The next morning, Ms. Ortiz brought her daughter to her
mother’s house and contacted Child Protective Services (CPS). The
case was assigned to Nora DeWitt, a CPS investigator. Ms. DeWitt
arranged for the child to have an examination on February 5, 1996,
at a children’s medical center. The victim was examined by a CARE
unit, which is a group of medical professionals specializing in
forensic pediatrics. Dr. Jan Leah Lamb, who headed the CARE team
that examined the victim, testified in detail about her
qualifications and the procedures for determining if a patient has
been sexually molested. Although she found no physiological
evidence of abuse, Dr. Lamb testified that in her opinion, the
victim had been molested. She explained that due to the anatomy of
3
the vagina and the time that had lapsed between the assault and the
examination, the lack of trauma to the victim’s vagina did not rule
out molestation. In fact, Dr. Lamb testified that there is no
physical evidence of sexual abuse in most child abuse cases.
CPS investigator Nora DeWitt also concluded that Mr. Ochoa had
molested the victim. As part of her investigation, Ms. DeWitt
interviewed the victim, Ms. Ortiz, and Mr. Ochoa. In light of the
CARE evaluation and her own investigation, Ms. DeWitt closed this
case finding “reason to believe that abuse had occurred.”2
Finally, the state presented evidence that Mr. Ochoa admitted
to engaging in indecent acts with the victim. The victim’s mother
testified that when she confronted Mr. Ochoa with her daughter’s
allegations, he responded that “he had to do what he had to do. He
couldn’t get it from me, [so] he was going to get it from her.”
Ms. Ortiz further testified that Mr. Ochoa specifically admitted to
fondling her daughter’s breasts, but denied penetrating her.
The essence of the petitioner’s defense was that the victim
fabricated the molestation story to win her mother’s attention and
that the lack of physical evidence discredited any claims of
penetration. Mr. Ochoa’s strongest witness was Christina Martinez,
Ochoa’s fifteen-year-old step-niece who was friends with the victim
2
Ms. DeWitt testified that when closing a child abuse case, CPS
investigators classify the case in one of three ways: “One is
reason to believe that abuse occurred, one being ruled out that
abuse did not occur, and one of unable to be determined if abuse
occurred or not.”
4
during the time in question. Ms. Martinez testified that the
victim told her that Mr. Ochoa had molested her. But when Martinez
made clear that the allegation was nothing to joke about, the
victim retracted her allegation stating that she was “just playing”
and that “[n]othing really happened.”
According to the petitioner, the victim was starved for
attention from her mother and her home life was unstable.
Witnesses testified that Ms. Ortiz would leave her daughter home
alone while she was out all night and that Ms. Ortiz and Mr. Ochoa
frequently engaged in violent arguments. Ms. Ortiz testified that
she has regularly warned the victim since she was six-years-old not
to let men make sexual advances toward her. The petitioner’s
theory was that Ms. Ortiz put the idea of making an outcry into the
victim’s head by frequently warning her about men and that the
victim made the outcry hoping to gain the attention of her absentee
mom. The lack of physical evidence, the petitioner argued, further
undermined the state’s case and discredited Dr. Lamb’s conclusion
that the victim had been assaulted.
Despite the petitioner’s pleas, however, the jury convicted
Mr. Ochoa on both counts, and he was sentenced to two concurrent
prison terms of fifty-five years each. On direct appeal, the state
appellate court affirmed Ochoa’s conviction and sentence, and the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused his petition for
discretionary review. Mr. Ochoa then filed a state application for
habeas corpus relief; the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied
5
the petition without written order.
On September 28, 2000, Mr. Ochoa filed a petition for habeas
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the Northern District of Texas.
The district judge referred the case to a magistrate judge, who
issued findings, conclusions, and a recommendation that habeas
relief be denied. On February 7, 2001, the district court issued
its order adopting the magistrate judge’s findings and
recommendations, and granted summary judgment denying the petition
for writ of habeas corpus.
The petitioner later filed an application for certificate of
appealability (COA) in the district court, but the COA was denied.
On May 19, 2001, however, Mr. Ochoa filed an application for a COA
in this court. We granted Mr. Ochoa’s application for COA on July
19, 2001, to review “whether his Fifth Amendment right was violated
at trial when the prosecutor commented about his failure to
testify, and whether any error was harmless.”
II. Analysis
To obtain habeas relief, a petitioner must either demonstrate
that the state court’s decision “was contrary to . . . clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States,” or “involved an unreasonable application of . . .
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
6
of the United States.”3 A state court’s decision is “contrary to”
clearly established federal law if it “arrives at a conclusion
opposite to that reached by th[e] [Supreme] Court on a question of
law or if the state court decides a case differently than this
Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.”4 A
state court’s decision makes an “unreasonable application” of
federal law “if the state court identifies the correct governing
legal principle from th[e] [Supreme] Court’s decisions but
unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s
case.”5 Although a district court may look to our rulings to
support its decision as to whether the state court unreasonably
applied federal law, “the focus of the habeas inquiry remains
conflict with federal law established by the Supreme Court.”6 A
state court’s determinations of factual issues are presumed correct
and the applicant bears the burden of rebutting the presumption
with clear and convincing evidence.
A. Comment on the Failure to Testify.
The petitioner claims that he is entitled to habeas relief
because the state prosecutor violated his Fifth Amendment rights by
3
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000).
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Ledford v. Thomas, 275 F.3d 471, 474 n.2 (5th Cir. 2001).
7
commenting on his failure to testify. Prosecutor Barbara Medley
made the following allegedly unconstitutional comments during
closing arguments:
PROSECUTOR: Now, there’s also nothing in [the jury
charge] that says how many witnesses you have to hear.
There’s no requirement that you hear any more than one
witness or base your decision based [sic] on more than
one witness’[s] testimony.
Just because a defendant chooses to commit a crime
with no witnesses around doesn’t mean that he gets a free
ride, okay? If you believe everything that [the victim]
said beyond a reasonable doubt, you can base your
decision solely on her testimony.
DEFENSE: Objection on the comment on failure to testify.
THE COURT: I didn’t so interpret, but I will instruct
Counsel not to refer to the Defendant not testifying.
PROSECUTOR: I won’t, Your Honor.
DEFENSE: Can I have a ruling on my objection, please?
THE COURT: I’ll overrule your objection.
PROSECUTOR: You watched her. You can judge her
credibility. With any witness that you saw, you can
believe everything they say or none of what they say or
you can believe some of it and not believe some of it.
You are the sole judge of the credibility of every single
witness.
And you saw that child get up there. You saw how
she told you what happened. You heard her say how
difficult it was. And pay attention to the details in
what she told you and how that fits into the whole scheme
of things.
But we also brought you more than that. We also
brought you her mother, which told you that this
Defendant made some admissions to you.
And Defense counsel is absolutely right. You can
[sic] absolutely cannot consider the fact that the
Defendant did not testify.
8
DEFENSE: Comment on failure to testify.
THE COURT: Overruled.
PROSECUTOR: You cannot hold that against him. But you
also cannot speculate about any evidence that you did not
hear. You must base your decision –
DEFENSE: Comment on failure to testify, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
PROSECUTOR: You must base your decision solely on the
evidence that you did hear and judge the credibility of
the evidence that you did hear.
On direct review, the state appellate court found no constitutional
violation in the prosecutor’s remarks. Relying primarily on Texas
appellate court decisions, the court held that the comments were
appropriate because they merely recited the trial judge’s
instructions and did not draw attention to information that only
the petitioner could have provided.7
In Griffin v. California, the Supreme Court held that a state
prosecutor may not comment on a defendant’s failure to testify at
trial: “[T]he Fifth Amendment, in its direct application to the
Federal Government and in its bearing on the States by reason of
the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids either comment by the prosecution
7
Ochoa v. Texas, No. 2-98-134-CR, slip op. at 3-4 (Tex.
App.–Fort Worth April 9, 1999, pet. denied) (“The prosecutor’s
statement sought to affirm that, indeed, [Ochoa] does have a right
not to testify and that the jury could neither hold that against
him nor hypothesize on what he might have said. That is consistent
with the jury’s instructions during voir dire and in the jury
charge. The prosecutor did not rhetorically ask why [Ochoa] did
not testify or call attention to evidence that could only be
supplied by [Ochoa].”).
9
on the accused’s silence or instructions by the court that such
silence is evidence of guilt.”8 We have clarified that “[t]he test
for determining whether the prosecutor’s remarks were
constitutionally impermissible is: (1) whether the prosecutor’s
manifest intent was to comment on the defendant’s silence or (2)
whether the character of the remark was such that the jury would
naturally and necessarily construe it as a comment on the
defendant's silence.”9
In United States v. Johnston,10 this court held under similar
circumstances that a prosecutor’s comment on the defendants’
failure to testify constituted a Fifth Amendment violation.
Similar to the prosecutor’s comments in the present case, the
prosecutor in Johnston took it upon himself to paraphrase the
court’s instruction on the failure to testify:
[The jury charge] reminds you that a defendant has the
right not to testify. That is constitutional right. It
is yours. It is mine. It is theirs. Please value it.
I do. Don’t take into consideration the fact that
whether or not anyone testified in this case is
inappropriate.
But what you also can’t do in a situation like this
is go back into that jury room and make up a story for
them. That is impermissible by law. You can’t play
“what if.” You can’t say, “Well, if they testified,
well, maybe they would have explained this. Maybe they
would have said that.” That’s not allowed and that’s
8
380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
9
U.S. v. Grosz, 76 F.3d 1318, 1326 (5th Cir. 1996) (internal
quotes and citations omitted).
10
127 F.3d 380, 398 (5th Cir. 1997).
10
fair.11
The court found it irrelevant that the prosecutor was restating the
district court’s instruction not to consider the defendants’
failure to testify as evidence of their guilt. Regardless of the
intent or legal accuracy of the statement, the court found that it
had the effect of focusing the jury’s attention on the defendants’
failure to testify.12 The Johnston panel also took issue with the
prosecutor’s claim that the jury could not speculate on what the
defendants might have said. The panel reasoned that this claim
impermissibly penalized the defendants for opting not to testify
and noted that nothing prohibits the jury from “theorizing in their
own minds as to a defendant’s version of the facts in the absence
of testimony from the defendant.”13
Despite the similarities between this case and Johnston, it is
not clear that the state court unreasonably applied Supreme Court
precedent in holding that prosecutor Medley’s statements did not
violate Ochoa’s Fifth Amendment rights. In United States v.
Robinson,14 the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor’s direct
comment on the defendant’s failure to testify did not violate the
Fifth Amendment because it was responsive to the defendant’s
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
485 U.S. 25, 32 (1988).
11
argument that the government never gave him an opportunity to
respond to the charges against him. The court explicitly rejected
the idea that any direct comment on the defendant’s failure to
testify constitutes error. Rather, the court explained that
Griffin only prohibits prosecutors and judges “from suggesting to
the jury that it may treat the defendant’s silence as substantive
evidence of guilt.”15 Other post-Griffin Supreme Court cases also
suggest that the Court has taken a narrower view of Griffin,
prohibiting only “adverse comments” on a defendant’s failure to
testify.16
Thus, whether there was a constitutional violation in this
case is a close question. Under a broad reading of Griffin and
under our factually similar holding in Johnston, the prosecutor’s
statements appear to make an impermissible comment on the
petitioner’s failure to testify. The prosecutor’s statements that
the jury “cannot consider the fact that [Ochoa] did not testify”
and that the jury “cannot speculate about any evidence that you did
not hear” were direct comments on Ochoa’s failure to testify and
focused the jury’s attention on the issue. Johnston, however, is
15
Id. (quoting Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 319 (1976)).
16
See, e.g., Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 298 (1981)
(“[T]he Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments bar only adverse comment on
a defendant’s failure to testify, and that ‘a judge’s instruction
that the jury must draw no adverse inference of any kind from the
defendant’s exercise of his privilege not to testify is a “comment”
of an entirely different order.’”) (quoting Lakeside v. Oregon, 435
U.S. 333, 339 (1978)); Palmigiano, 425 U.S. at 319.
12
a circuit court decision and does not constitute “clearly
established law as determined by the Supreme Court.” There is a
colorable argument under Robinson and other more recent Supreme
Court cases that the prosecutor’s comments were permissible because
they were not “adverse comments” on Ochoa’s failure to testify;
i.e., the prosecutor did not suggest that Ochoa’s failure to
testify was evidence of his guilt.
We need not resolve this close question of constitutional law
in order to decide this case. As discussed below, we hold that the
prosecutor’s comments were harmless regardless of whether they
violated Ochoa’s Fifth Amendment rights.
B. Harmless Error.
Even if there were a Fifth Amendment violation, Ochoa is not
entitled to habeas relief if the error was harmless. The Supreme
Court has instructed that the standard for establishing harmless
error on collateral review is “less onerous” on the state than it
is on direct review.17 In Brecht v. Abrahamson, the Court held that
in a habeas case, an error is harmless unless it “had a substantial
and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s
verdict.”18 To obtain relief under this standard, a habeas
petitioner must show that the error resulted in “actual
17
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 636-38 (1993).
18
Id. at 637.
13
prejudice.”19 Because we determine that Ochoa has not established
actual prejudice under Brecht, he is not entitled to habeas relief.
This circuit’s opinion in United States v. Palmer20 provides
the appropriate framework for deciding on direct review whether to
reverse the defendant’s conviction for improper prosecutorial
argument. Under Palmer, three factors are relevant to the inquiry:
“(1) the magnitude of the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor’s
remarks, (2) the efficacy of any cautionary instruction by the
judge, and (3) the strength of the evidence supporting the
conviction.”21 Although under Brecht the petitioner must make an
even stronger showing of prejudice than a defendant on direct
appeal, the Palmer analysis is nonetheless instructive.
Under the first prong, we consider the magnitude of the
prejudicial effect of the prosecutor’s remarks “in the context of
the trial” and attempt “to elucidate their intended effect.”22 In
the context of this case, the prosecutor’s statements probably had
little prejudicial effect because defense counsel raised Ochoa’s
failure to testify before the prosecution did. The prosecutor’s
reference to Ochoa’s failure to testify came only after Ochoa’s
attorney prematurely raised the issue. In context, it is clear
19
Id.
20
37 F.3d 1080 (5th Cir. 1994).
21
Id. at 1085.
22
Id.
14
that the prosecutor’s comments immediately preceding the
defendant’s first objection made no reference to Ochoa’s failure to
testify. The defense attorney’s “[o]bjection on the comment on
failure to testify” alerted the jury to the fact that Ochoa did not
testify and elicited an instruction from the judge that emphasized
the fact. Thus, by the time the prosecutor actually remarked on
the failure to testify, the issue was already before the jury.23
The Supreme Court acknowledged the relevance of this point in
Lockett v. Ohio.24 In Lockett, the defendant argued that the
prosecutor made indirect references to his failure to testify by
repeatedly stating that his involvement in a conspiracy was
“unrefuted” and “uncontroverted.”25 The Court held that there was
no reversible error because the defendant’s attorney drew the
jury’s attention to his failure to testify before the state did:
Lockett’s own counsel had clearly focused the jury’s
attention on her silence, first, by outlining her
contemplated defense in his opening statement and,
second, by stating to the court and jury near the close
of the case, that Lockett would be the “next witness.”
When viewed against this background, it seems clear that
the prosecutor’s closing remarks added nothing to the
impression that had already been created by Lockett’s
refusal to testify after the jury had been promised a
23
We do not mean to suggest that the prosecution has carte
blanche to discuss inadmissible evidence any time a defendant
raises a premature objection. In the context of this case,
however, and in light of the innocuous nature of the prosecutor’s
comments, we believe that he prosecutor’s comments had little
practical effect on the conviction.
24
438 U.S. 586, 595 (1978).
25
Id.
15
defense by her lawyer and told that Lockett would take
the stand.26
Furthermore, there is no indication that the prosecution
intended to present Ochoa’s failure to testify as evidence of his
guilt. In the context of the state’s closing arguments, the
prosecutor’s comments are merely responsive to defense counsel’s
premature objection. Thus, in light of the prosecution’s benign
intent, coupled with the fact that the defense counsel put Ochoa’s
failure to testify at issue before the state did, we believe that
the prosecutor’s comments had little prejudicial effect on Ochoa’s
conviction.
As to the second prong of the Palmer analysis, the trial court
issued two cautionary instructions relevant to this case. During
closing arguments, the district judge instructed the prosecutor in
the presence of the jury “not to refer to the Defendant not
testifying.” Furthermore, the jury charge states that the jury
“must not refer to or discuss any matters not in evidence.” We
have no reason to assume that the jury did not heed the trial
court’s instructions.27 Moreover, when an objection to a jury
charge is not properly preserved, the instruction must be clearly
26
Id.
27
See Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 340 & n.11 (1978) (“As
this Court has remarked before: ‘[W]e have not yet attained that
certitude about the human mind which would justify us in . . . a
dogmatic assumption that jurors, if properly admonished, neither
could nor would heed the instructions of the trial court . . . .’”)
(quoting Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 294 (1937)).
16
erroneous and prejudicial to warrant reversal.28 Ochoa raises no
objection to the court’s cautionary instruction or the sufficiency
of the jury charge. Thus, the second Palmer prong also points to
the harmlessness of any potential error.
In examining the third prong, we find convincing evidence
supporting Ochoa’s conviction. As stated above, the victim
emotionally recounted the details of both molestations. She was
duly cross-examined and the jury had the opportunity to judge her
credibility. The jury also heard from the victim’s mother, Debbie
Oritz, who found the victim crying on the couch immediately after
the second sexual assault. Ms. Ortiz also testified that Ochoa
admitted to assaulting her daughter because Ms. Ortiz was not
satisfying his libido. Finally, two professionals having extensive
experience with child abuse cases concluded that Mr. Ochoa abused
the victim. Although there was no physical evidence of trauma to
the child’s genitalia, Dr. Lamb explained that the lack of physical
evidence is common and that it is neither exculpatory nor
inculpatory of sexual abuse.
In light of our Palmer analysis, Mr. Ochoa has not established
that the statements in question “had a substantial and injurious
effect or influence” on his conviction. Each of the three Palmer
factors weighs against a finding of “actual prejudice.” Thus, any
potential error created by the prosecutor’s reference to Ochoa’s
28
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734-35 (1993).
17
failure to testify was harmless under the standard announced in
Brecht v. Abrahamson.
III. Conclusion
This case presents a close question of whether the prosecutor
improperly commented on Mr. Ochoa’s failure to testify in his own
defense. Regardless of whether the statements constitute a
violation of Fifth Amendment right that no person “shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,”
any such violation was harmless under Brecht v. Abrahamson. Mr.
Ochoa therefore has not established a right to habeas relief. The
district court’s ruling is AFFIRMED.
18
Ochoa v. Cockrell
Combined Opinion