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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JAMES WHITE
Appellant No. 1851 EDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 31, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0009507-2012
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., and STABILE, J.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED DECEMBER 15, 2014
Appellant, James White, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, following his
negotiated guilty plea to one count of escape.1 We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows.
Appellant was committed to a Department of Corrections prerelease facility
in Philadelphia. On the night of July 12, 2012, Appellant checked out of the
facility with a pass that allowed him to leave temporarily to work. Appellant
failed to return to the prerelease facility at the required time. He was
arrested on July 25, 2012. On May 31, 2013, Appellant entered a negotiated
guilty plea to escape. On the same date, the court sentenced Appellant to a
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18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5121(a).
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term of six (6) to twelve (12) months’ incarceration. The court also granted
immediate parole. Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal and a voluntary
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement on June 26, 2013.2
Appellant raises two issues for our review:
WAS NOT APPELLANT’S GUILTY PLEA INVALID WHERE,
DURING THE PLEA COLLOQUY, THE TRIAL COURT FAILED
TO ADVISE HIM THAT HE WAS PRESUMED INNOCENT
UNTIL PROVEN GUILTY AND THAT HE HAD A RIGHT TO A
JURY TRIAL WHERE APPELLANT INDICATED TO THE
COURT THAT HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE NATURE OF
THE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HIM?
DID NOT COUNSEL’S FAILURE EITHER TO OBJECT TO THE
DEFECTIVE PLEA COLLOQUY OR TO FILE A MERITORIOUS
MOTION TO WITHDRAW APPELLANT’S GUILTY PLEA
CONSTITUTE FACIAL INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL, AND IS NOT THAT CLAIM REVIEWABLE ON
DIRECT APPEAL?
(Appellant’s Brief at 3).
In his first issue, Appellant argues the trial court failed to inform him
during the oral plea colloquy that he had the right to a jury trial and he was
presumed innocent until proven guilty. Appellant asserts the court neither
asked him whether he knew he had these rights nor ascertained whether he
understood them. Appellant contends he was reluctant to plead guilty; he
emphasizes his previous rejection of the Commonwealth’s plea offer and his
statements to the court that he wanted to “fight the case.” (Appellant’s
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2
Appellant had representation during the plea proceedings, and he is
currently represented by new counsel on appeal.
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Brief at 10). Appellant also points to his statement at a status hearing that
he did not understand the nature of the proceedings. According to
Appellant, the court failed to clear up his confusion and fully explain the
rights Appellant would surrender by pleading guilty. Appellant claims he
“felt defeated” and simply resigned to plead guilty, telling the court “I’m
tired; I’m beat.” Id. at 14 (citing N.T. Guilty Plea, 5/31/13, at 6). Appellant
concludes his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and
this Court should permit him to withdraw the plea. We cannot agree.
Initially, we observe:
A defendant wishing to challenge the voluntariness of a
guilty plea on direct appeal must either object during the
plea colloquy or file a motion to withdraw the plea within
ten days of sentencing. Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1),
(B)(1)(a)(i). Failure to employ either measure results in
waiver. Commonwealth v. Tareila, 895 A.2d 1266,
1270 n.3 (Pa.Super. 2006). Historically, Pennsylvania
courts adhere to this waiver principle because “[i]t is for
the court which accepted the plea to consider and correct,
in the first instance, any error which may have been
committed.” Commonwealth v. Roberts, [352 A.2d
140, 141 (Pa.Super. 1975)] (holding that common and
previously condoned mistake of attacking guilty plea on
direct appeal without first filing petition to withdraw plea
with trial court is procedural error resulting in waiver;
stating, “(t)he swift and orderly administration of criminal
justice requires that lower courts be given the opportunity
to rectify their errors before they are considered on
appeal”; “Strict adherence to this procedure could, indeed,
preclude an otherwise costly, time consuming, and
unnecessary appeal to this court”).
Commonwealth v. Lincoln, 72 A.3d 606, 609-10 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal
denied, ___ Pa. ___, 87 A.3d 319 (2014) (holding defendant failed to
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preserve challenge to validity of guilty plea where he did not object during
plea colloquy or file post-sentence motion to withdraw plea).
Further, withdrawal of a guilty plea after sentencing requires “a
showing of prejudice on the order of manifest injustice…. A plea rises to the
level of manifest injustice when it was entered into involuntarily,
unknowingly, or unintelligently.” Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794
A.2d 378, 383 (Pa.Super. 2002) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure mandate that pleas
be taken in open court, and require the court to conduct an on-the-record
colloquy to ascertain whether a defendant is aware of his rights and the
consequences of his plea. Commonwealth v. Hodges, 789 A.2d 764
(Pa.Super. 2002). Specifically, the court must affirmatively demonstrate the
defendant understands: (1) the nature of the charges to which he is
pleading guilty; (2) the factual basis for the plea; (3) his right to trial by
jury; (4) the presumption of innocence; (5) the permissible ranges of
sentences and fines possible; and (6) the judge is not bound by the terms of
the agreement unless he accepts the agreement. Pa.R.Crim.P. 590
Comment; Commonwealth v. Watson, 835 A.2d 786 (Pa.Super. 2003).
Nevertheless, “nothing in [Rule 590] would preclude the use of a written
colloquy that is read, completed, signed by the defendant, and made part of
the record of the plea proceedings. This written colloquy would have to be
supplemented by some on-the-record oral examination.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 590
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Comment. See also Commonwealth v. Rush, 909 A.2d 805 (Pa.Super.
2006) (holding defendant entered guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily
where he acknowledged in written colloquy that he understood his rights to
trial by jury and presumption of innocence, and he confirmed during court’s
oral examination that he signed written colloquy and understood its
contents); Commonwealth v. Morrison, 878 A.2d 102 (Pa.Super. 2005)
(holding court’s failure to delineate elements of charges at oral colloquy did
not invalidate otherwise knowing and voluntary guilty plea where defendant
executed written colloquy wherein he admitted he was advised of offenses
outlined in criminal information, which detailed elements of those offenses).
Pennsylvania law presumes a defendant who entered a guilty plea was
aware of what he was doing, and the defendant bears the burden of proving
otherwise. Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, 523 (Pa.Super.
2003). A defendant who decides to plead guilty is bound by the statements
he makes while under oath, “and he may not later assert grounds for
withdrawing the plea which contradict the statements he made at his plea
colloquy.” Id. “This Court evaluates the adequacy of the guilty plea
colloquy and the voluntariness of the resulting plea by examining the totality
of the circumstances surrounding the entry of that plea.” Muhammad,
supra at 383-84. “[T]he law does not require that [a defendant] be
completely satisfied with the outcome of his decision to plead guilty.” Rush,
supra at 810. A guilty plea will be deemed valid if an examination of the
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totality of the circumstances surrounding the plea shows that the defendant
had a full understanding of the nature and consequences of his plea such
that he knowingly and intelligently entered the plea of his own accord. Id.
at 808.
Instantly, Appellant lodged no objection to the validity of his guilty
plea during the oral plea colloquy and failed to file a post-sentence motion to
withdraw the plea. Therefore, Appellant’s challenge to the voluntariness of
his guilty plea is waived. See Lincoln, supra.
Moreover, the record shows Appellant executed a written plea colloquy
indicating he entered the negotiated guilty plea voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently. In the written colloquy, Appellant acknowledged, inter alia, the
following consequences of pleading guilty:
I do not have to plead guilty, even if I committed the
crimes. I have an absolute right to plead not guilty and
have a trial. I can have a jury trial or, if I give up my jury
trial rights, I can have a trial by a judge alone. When I
plead guilty, I give up my right to have a trial. If I went to
trial, I would have all the rights listed below plus others.
I am presumed to be innocent. …
To convict me, the District Attorney must prove more than
that I probably committed the crimes. The District
Attorney has to prove me guilty “beyond a reasonable
doubt.” A reasonable doubt is the kind of doubt which
would cause a normal, reasonable person to hesitate or
halt or refuse to take any action at all in something very
important to them.
* * *
My lawyer has fully explained to me that I have a right to a
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jury trial. Nobody can take that right away from me. At a
jury trial, twelve (12) people, all from Philadelphia, would
be on the jury and hear the facts of my case.
If all twelve were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt
that I was guilty, I would be found guilty.
If all twelve were not convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that I was guilty, I would be found not guilty.
If all twelve could not agree, I would not be convicted,
although I might have another trial before a different jury.
I can help pick my jurors. Each juror would be questioned
to make sure they would be fair. I can keep anyone off
the jury who is shown to the judge to be unfair.
* * *
If I plead guilty, I give up my right to a jury trial, and I
also give up my right to have a trial by a judge who would
decide the case alone without a jury.
(Written Guilty Plea Colloquy, 5/31/13). Appellant also acknowledged he
could be imprisoned for up to seven years and fined $15,000.00, if convicted
of the current charge; plea counsel explained to him the elements of the
offense; and the court was not obligated to accept the plea agreement.
During the oral plea colloquy, the following exchange took place between
Appellant and the court:
THE COURT: I have in front of me the written guilty plea
colloquy form. I see that you have signed the bottom of
page three. Did you do that after you went through pages
one, two, and three with your attorney and understood all
the rights you were giving up by not going to trial?
[APPELLANT]: Yes.
(N.T. Guilty Plea, 5/31/13, at 4). Notwithstanding his comments that he
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was “tired” and “beat” and “need[ed] to have this resolved,” Appellant
unequivocally stated he could read and write the English language; he was
not under the influence of drugs or alcohol; he made the decision to plead
guilty of his own free will; he fully discussed the case and his decision to
plead guilty with plea counsel; and he was satisfied with plea counsel’s
representation. The Commonwealth’s attorney then stated the factual basis
for the plea agreement. Thus, the court made the written colloquy part of
the record of the plea proceedings and supplemented it with an adequate
on-the-record oral examination. The court’s reference to the written plea
colloquy was sufficient to confirm that Appellant understood he was
presumed innocent and he was giving up his right to a jury trial. See
Pa.R.Crim.P. 590; Rush, supra; Morrison, supra. Based on the totality of
the circumstances, the record shows Appellant had a full understanding of
the nature and consequences of his plea and voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently entered the plea.3 See Rush, supra; Muhammad, supra.
In his second issue, Appellant argues plea counsel was ineffective for
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3
Appellant’s statements of confusion about the case bore no relation to the
plea proceedings. Appellant made these statements at an earlier status
hearing. In fact, the court held the status hearing to answer Appellant’s
questions about the case. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court
continued the case to allow Appellant an opportunity to confer with counsel
and decide how to proceed. The oral and written plea colloquies confirm
Appellant understood the nature and consequences of his decision to plead
guilty at the time he entered the plea, two weeks after the status
hearing.
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failing to object to the defective plea colloquy or file a motion to withdraw
the guilty plea. Appellant contends this claim is reviewable on direct appeal
because counsel’s ineffectiveness is clear from the record. Appellant further
asserts counsel’s deficient representation excuses the waiver of Appellant’s
claim that he did not enter a knowing and voluntary plea. Appellant
concludes plea counsel’s ineffectiveness entitles Appellant to withdraw his
guilty plea. We decline to address this claim.
“[A]s a general rule, a [defendant] should wait to raise claims of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel until collateral review.”
Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48, 67, 813 A.2d 726, 738 (2002).
“[A]ny ineffectiveness claim will be waived only after a petitioner has had
the opportunity to raise that claim on collateral review and has failed to avail
himself of that opportunity.” Id.
Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized two
very limited exceptions to the general rule in Grant regarding the
appropriate timing for review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims:
First, we appreciate that there may be extraordinary
circumstances where a discrete claim (or claims) of trial
counsel ineffectiveness is apparent from the record and
meritorious to the extent that immediate consideration
best serves the interests of justice; and we hold that trial
courts retain their discretion to entertain such claims.
Second, with respect to other cases and claims…where the
defendant seeks to litigate multiple or prolix claims of
counsel ineffectiveness, including non-record-based claims,
on post-verdict motions and direct appeal, we repose
discretion in the trial courts to entertain such claims, but
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only if (1) there is good cause shown, and (2) the unitary
review so indulged is preceded by the defendant’s knowing
and express waiver of his entitlement to seek PCRA review
from his conviction and sentence, including an express
recognition that the waiver subjects further collateral
review to the time and serial petition restrictions of the
PCRA.
Commonwealth v. Holmes, 621 Pa. 595, 598-99, 79 A.3d 562, 563-64
(2013) (internal citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
Instantly, Appellant failed to raise his ineffectiveness claim before the
trial court, and the claim is not apparent from the record. Additionally,
Appellant does not seek to litigate multiple or prolix claims of ineffectiveness
accompanied by an express waiver of his entitlement to seek PCRA review.
Thus, neither Holmes exception applies to Appellant’s case. See id.
Absent these exceptions, the general rule in Grant applies. See Holmes,
supra at 620, 79 A.3d at 576 (stating ineffective assistance of counsel
claims are to be deferred to PCRA review, and should not be reviewed on
direct appeal). Thus, pursuant to Grant, we dismiss Appellant’s
ineffectiveness of counsel claim but without prejudice to Appellant to raise it
in a timely petition for collateral relief. See Grant, supra at 69, 813 A.2d
at 739. Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/15/2014
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Com. v. White, J.
Combined Opinion