Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any Dec 18 2014, 8:27 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
TIMOTHY J. BURNS GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
BRIAN REITZ
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
LARRY WHITE, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A02-1405-CR-356
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Gary Miller, Judge
Cause No. 49G21-1403-CM-11126
December 18, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
SHARPNACK, Senior Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Larry White appeals his conviction in a bench trial of Invasion of Privacy as a Class
A misdemeanor.
We affirm.
ISSUE
The sole issue for our review is whether there is sufficient evidence to support
White’s conviction.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In July 2013, the Marion Superior Court issued an Ex Parte Order for Protection
enjoining White from having contact with Sheila Jackson. Indianapolis Metropolitan
Police Officer Matthew Earley served White with the protective order in August 2013.
Officer Earley explained the contents of the order to White and informed him the order
would not expire until July 2015.
In March 2014, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer Justin Henry was
dispatched to Jackson’s residence. When Officer Henry arrived at the residence, he saw
White walk across Jackson’s front yard. In White’s presence, Jackson told the officer the
police were contacted regarding White’s violation of the protective order. White did not
question the validity of the protective order at that time. Officer Henry arrested White,
who was charged with Invasion of Privacy and Trespass.
At trial, White testified that he did not know he was violating a protective order that
day because Jackson told him the protective order had been dismissed. The trial court
convicted White of Invasion of Privacy. White appeals.
2
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
White argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction. In
reviewing a trial court’s judgment for sufficiency of the evidence, this Court will affirm
the decision of the trial court if the probative evidence and reasonable inferences to be
drawn therefrom could allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005). On appeal, we
do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Fields v. State, 679
N.E.2d 898, 900 (Ind. 1997). Rather, we look only to the evidence and reasonable
inferences supporting the judgment to determine whether the trier of fact could reasonably
reach the conclusion. Id. If there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting a
conviction, this Court will not set the judgment aside. Id.
To convict White of Invasion of Privacy, the State had to prove that White
knowingly or intentionally violated a protective order. See Indiana Code § 35-46-1-15.1
(2010). White’s sole contention is that he did not knowingly violate the protective order
because he believed it was no longer in place. However, our review of the evidence reveals
that Officer Earley explained the contents and expiration date of the order to White. Before
the order expired, White returned to Jackson’s house, and the police were called. When
Officer Henry arrived, in White’s presence, Jackson told him that the police were called
regarding White’s violation of the protective order. White did not question the validity of
the protective order at that time.
White’s argument that he did not knowingly violate the order because he believed
it was no longer in place is nothing more than an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence,
3
which we cannot do. See Fields, 679 N.E.2d at 900. There is sufficient evidence to support
White’s conviction.1
Affirmed.
RILEY, J., and KIRSCH, J., concur.
1
White’s reliance on Tharp v. State, 942 N.E.2d 814 (Ind. 2011), is misplaced. There, the Indiana Supreme
Court reversed Tharp’s Invasion of Privacy conviction because Tharp had not received adequate notice of
the protective order. Here, Officer Early notified White about the protective order and explained its terms
shortly after it was issued. There is no notice issue in this case.
4