United States v. Stacy Delk

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4557

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

STACY DUNCAN DELK,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Aiken. Margaret B. Seymour, Senior District
Judge. (1:09-cr-01022-MBS-1)

Submitted: December 16, 2014 Decided: December 18, 2014

Before WILKINSON and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James P. Rogers, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellant. John C. Potterfield, Assistant
United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

Stacy Duncan Delk appeals the sentence of three months

of imprisonment followed by twelve months of supervised release

imposed by the district court upon revocation of his probation.

On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no

meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether Delk’s

sentence is plainly unreasonable. Delk was advised of his right

to file a pro se supplemental brief, but has not filed a brief.

Finding no error, we affirm.

Upon a finding of a probation violation, the district

court may revoke probation and resentence the defendant to any

sentence within the statutory maximum for the original offense.

18 U.S.C. § 3565(a) (2012); United States v. Schaefer, 120 F.3d

505, 507 (4th Cir. 1997). The district court has broad

discretion to impose a sentence after revoking a defendant’s

probation. See United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439 (4th

Cir. 2006). Thus, we assume “a deferential appellate posture

concerning issues of fact and the exercise of [that]

discretion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

“We review probation revocation sentences, like

supervised release revocation sentences, to determine if they

are plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d

652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). In conducting our review, “we first

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decide whether the sentence is unreasonable.” Crudup, 461 F.3d

at 438. In doing so, “we follow generally the procedural and

substantive considerations” employed in reviewing original

sentences. Id.

A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if

the district court has considered the policy statements

contained in Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines and the

applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors, id. at 439, and

has adequately explained the chosen sentence. United States v.

Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). A sentence is

substantively reasonable if the court states a proper basis for

concluding that the defendant should receive the sentence

imposed, up to the applicable statutory maximum. Crudup, 461

F.3d at 440. Only if we find a sentence to be procedurally or

substantively unreasonable will we consider whether the sentence

is “plainly” unreasonable. Id. at 439.

Applying our deferential standard of review, we

conclude that Delk’s sentence is not unreasonable, much less

plainly so. Given the facts of this case, we conclude that the

district court did not abuse its broad discretion in sentencing

Delk.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire

record and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We

therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court

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requires that counsel inform Delk, in writing, of his right to

petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further

review. If Delk requests that a petition be filed, but counsel

believes that such a petition would be frivolous, counsel may

move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.

Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on

Delk. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal conclusions are adequately presented in the materials

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

AFFIRMED