UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4510
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM LEE EBENSTEIN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:13-cr-00461-CCE-1)
Submitted: December 17, 2014 Decided: December 19, 2014
Before WILKINSON and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mark E. Edwards, EDWARDS & TRENKLE, PLLC, Durham, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney,
Anand P. Ramaswamy, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
William Lee Ebenstein appeals the downward variance
sentence imposed by the district court after he pled guilty to
receiving child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252A(a)(2)(A), (b)(1) (2012). On appeal, he contends his
sentence is substantively unreasonable. We affirm.
We review a criminal sentence for reasonableness using
“a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 28, 41 (2007). Because Ebenstein asserts no
procedural error, we consider whether the sentence is
substantively reasonable, “tak[ing] into account the totality of
the circumstances” and giving due deference to the district
court’s decision. Id. at 51. We presume on appeal that a
sentence “within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range
is [substantively] reasonable.” United States v. Louthian, 756
F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 421 (2014).
Ebenstein bears the burden to rebut this presumption “by showing
that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) [(2012)] factors.” Id.
Here, the district court reasonably determined that a
sentence of 144 months, a seven-month downward variance from the
low end of the Guidelines range, was appropriate based on its
thorough, individualized assessment of Ebenstein’s case in light
of his arguments and the § 3553(a) factors. Based on a totality
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of the circumstances, we conclude that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in imposing the chosen sentence.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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