J-S77022-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
ERIC GRIGGS
Appellant No. 382 EDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order January 9, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-1202811-1997
BEFORE: STABILE, J., JENKINS, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED DECEMBER 22, 2014
Appellant, Eric Griggs, appeals pro se from the order entered in the
Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed his petition
filed for relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We
affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows.
During the summer of 1997, Appellant and his coconspirator, Darien
Roderick, robbed several neighborhood bars in Philadelphia. A review of the
testimony of witnesses revealed the crimes had a similar modus operandi.
Roderick would enter the bar and order a shot or request change. Shortly
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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thereafter, he would leave the bar only to return a few moments later with
Appellant and another co-conspirator. Together, the men would rob the
bartender and patrons at gunpoint before ordering everyone to the floor. On
September 5, 1997, Appellant and Roderick were arrested in Roderick's
vehicle. A search of the vehicle revealed $815 in a case, a gold bracelet, a
gold chain, and a pistol.
On June 14, 1999, a jury found Appellant guilty of robbery, 2 violation
of the uniform firearms act,3 and conspiracy4 with respect to the robberies at
Frosty's Saloon, Gallagher's Sports Bar, and the Sunset Café. On July 28,
1999, Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 25 to 70 years’
imprisonment. He appealed his judgment of sentence on August 17, 1999.
This Court affirmed his judgment of sentence on May 9, 2001. Because
Appellant did not file a petition for allowance of appeal to our Supreme
Court, his judgment of sentence became final thirty days after this Court’s
affirmance, on June 9, 2001. See Commonwealth v. Swartzfager, 59
A.3d 616 (Pa.Super.2012) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3)) (“A judgment is
deemed final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary
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2
18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a).
3
18 Pa.C.S. § 6106.
4
18 Pa.C.S. § 903.
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review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.”).
On February 12, 2002, Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel. The PCRA court denied this petition on July
13, 2004, and this Court affirmed on January 11, 2006.
On January 15, 2009, Appellant filed a “petition to vacate judgment.”
The court treated this petition as Appellant’s second PCRA petition and, on
November 23, 2011, issued notice pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 of its
intention to dismiss the petition as untimely. On December 12, 2011,
Appellant filed a response to the Rule 907 notice, claiming he had not filed a
PCRA petition but, rather, a habeas corpus petition. The court determined
that his petition was a PCRA petition and dismissed it as untimely on January
9, 2014. On January 24, 2014, Appellant filed a notice of appeal. On
February 18, 2014, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of
errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant
complied the next day.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN [ITS] ORDER THAT
DISMISSED [APPELLANT’S] HABEAS CORPUS PETITION AS
AN UNTIMELY FILED PCRA PETITION?
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR BY FAILING TO REVIEW AND
ADDRESS THE MERITORIOUS CLAIM OF A VIOLATION OF
THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE OF THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION?
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DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR BY FAILING TO REVIEW AND
ADDRESS THE MERITORIOUS CLAIM OF A DUE PROCESS
VIOLATION AS IT RELATES TO THE SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT?
Appellant’s Brief at 6.
Regarding Appellant’s contention that his petition should be considered
a habeas corpus petition, and not a PCRA petition, we observe:
It is well-settled that the PCRA is intended to be the sole means
of achieving post-conviction relief. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542;
Commonwealth v. Haun, [32 A.3d 697] ([Pa.]2011). Unless
the PCRA could not provide for a potential remedy, the PCRA
statute subsumes the writ of habeas corpus. [Commonwealth
v.] Fahy, [737 A.2d 214,] 223–224 [Pa.1999];
Commonwealth v. Chester, [733 A.2d 1242] (Pa.1999).[5]
Issues that are cognizable under the PCRA must be raised in a
timely PCRA petition and cannot be raised in a habeas corpus
petition. See Commonwealth v. Peterkin, [722 A.2d 638]
([Pa.]1998); see also Commonwealth v. Deaner, 779 A.2d
578 (Pa.Super.2001) (a collateral petition that raises an issue
that the PCRA statute could remedy is to be considered a PCRA
petition). Phrased differently, a defendant cannot escape the
PCRA time-bar by titling his petition or motion as a writ of
habeas corpus.
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 465-66 (Pa.Super.2013).
Although Appellant purports to file a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, his claims for relief fall within the purview of the PCRA, because (1)
he is currently serving a term of imprisonment, and (2) he alleges
constitutional violations that either undermine the reliability of the truth-
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5
Abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726
(Pa.2002).
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seeking process or nullify the trial court’s jurisdiction over the proceedings.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9543 (a). Therefore, the lower court properly treated
Appellant’s alleged habeas corpus petition as a PCRA petition, and issued its
order as a denial of PCRA relief. See Taylor, supra (treating appellant’s
writ of habeas corpus as a PCRA petition).
Our review of a PCRA court’s decision “is limited to examining whether
the PCRA court’s findings of fact are supported by the record, and whether
its conclusions of law are free from legal error.” Commonwealth v.
Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 131 (Pa.2012). Before addressing the merits of
Appellant’s claims, we must first consider the timeliness of his PCRA petition,
because it implicates the jurisdiction of both this Court and the PCRA court.
Commonwealth v. Williams, 35 A.3d 44, 52 (Pa.Super.2011) (citation
omitted), appeal denied, 50 A.3d 121 (Pa.2012). “Pennsylvania law makes
clear that no court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA petition.” Id.
To “accord finality to the collateral review process[,]” the PCRA “confers no
authority upon this Court to fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the PCRA
timebar[.]” Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 983 (Pa.2011). With
respect to jurisdiction under the PCRA, this Court has further explained:
The most recent amendments to the PCRA...provide a
PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent petition,
shall be filed within one year of the date the underlying
judgment becomes final. A judgment is deemed final at
the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary
review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of
time for seeking the review.
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Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076, 1079 (Pa.Super.2010)
(citations and quotations omitted), appeal denied, 20 A.3d 1210 (Pa.2011).
This Court may review a PCRA petition filed more than one year after the
judgment of sentence becomes final only if the claim falls within one of the
following three statutory exceptions, which the petitioner must plead and
prove:
§ 9545. Jurisdiction and proceedings
* * *
(b) Time for filing petition.–
(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a
second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one
year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes final,
unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves that:
(i) the failure to raise the claim was the result of
interference by government officials with the
presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution
or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or
laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period
provided in this section and has been held by that court
to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Further, if a petition pleads one of these
exceptions, the petition will not be considered unless it is “filed within 60
days of the date the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9545(b)(2).
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Here, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on June 9, 2001.
He filed his PCRA petition on January 15, 2009, almost eight years later.
Thus, Appellant’s PCRA petition is patently untimely.
Appellant attempts to invoke the governmental interference exception
to the PCRA time bar by arguing that the criminal information was defective
or missing completely, and that his efforts to obtain it were thwarted by
governmental officials. The trial court reasoned as follows:
Given that [Appellant] failed to demonstrate that
government officials obstructed the presentation of his
claims; failed to offer after-discovered evidence which was
previously unknown to him and could not have been
obtained by the exercise of due diligence; and failed to
[allege] a violation of a constitutional right recognized
after the one-year limitation and held to apply
retroactively, it was clear to this [c]ourt that [Appellant’s]
filing was untimely and that there was no jurisdiction to
address the jurisdictional claim that [Appellant] set forth….
Trial Court Opinion, dated March 4, 2014, at 5. In effect, Appellant failed to
explain how government officials obstructed the presentation of his evidence
or why he did not bring this claim in a timely manner. Therefore, the trial
court properly denied Appellant’s PCRA petition as untimely. Accordingly, we
affirm.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/22/2014
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