Having considered the parties' arguments and the record on
appeal, we do not believe that the Board's decision to deny appellant
unemployment benefits is supported by substantial evidence. Id. In
particular, appellant takes issue with the Board's finding that "there is no
evidence in the record to establish that the attorney was performing
fraudulent acts while working with the claimant." We agree with
appellant that this finding was erroneous, as appellant produced evidence
directly supporting her contention in that regard. Moreover, the tenor of
appellant's testimony demonstrates that it was appellant's concern over
participating in the supervising attorney's alleged misconduct, combined
with that attorney's reaction to appellant voicing those concerns, which led
appellant to quit. Thus, in light of the foregoing, we conclude that the
Board's decision to deny appellant unemployment benefits was not
supported by substantial evidence. We therefore
REVERSE the district court order denying appellant's petition
for judicial review AND REMAND this matter to the district court so that
it may remand the matter to the Board for further proceedings consistent
with this order.
J.
C INA-0
Cherry
J.
HARDESTY, J., dissenting:
I would affirm the district court's order denying appellant's
petition for judicial review because I believe the majority has misapplied
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this court's standard of review. This court, like the district court, reviews
the Board's decision "to determine whether it is supported by substantial
evidence, which is evidence that a reasonable mind could find adequately
upholds a conclusion." Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Bundley, 122 Nev. 1440,
1445, 148 P.3d 750, 754 (2006). This court likewise gives deference to the
Board's fact-based legal conclusions regarding whether a person is entitled
to unemployment compensation. Id. Here, the sole question presented to
the Board was whether appellant had "good cause" for quitting her
employment. The Board defined that term as "reasons so urgent and
compelling that [the employee] had no reasonable alternative to quitting,
and that [the employee] exhausted reasonable recourse prior to leaving
her job." Appellant has not taken issue with this definition, and the
undisputed evidence demonstrated that appellant quit her job
immediately following an encounter with her supervising attorney that
was unrelated to appellant's concerns regarding that attorney's alleged
misconduct. The undisputed evidence further demonstrated that
appellant declined an opportunity to discuss her concerns with a third
attorney at the time she decided to quit. Because this evidence is
reasonable to support thefl Board's conclusion that appellant lacked good
cause for quitting, I respectfully dissent.
tiarc J.
Hardesty
cc: Hon. Janet J. Berry, District Judge
Irene D. Flippen
State of Nevada/DETR
Washoe District Court Clerk
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