IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-1775
Filed December 24, 2014
IN THE INTEREST OF P.B.,
Minor Child,
F.B., Father,
Appellant,
J.B., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Susan Flaherty,
District Associate Judge.
A mother and father separately appeal the termination of their parental
rights to their child. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
Ellen R. Ramsey-Kacena, Cedar Rapids, for appellant-father.
Amy R. Dollash, Office of the State Public Defender, Cedar Rapids, for
appellant-mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant
Attorney General, Jerry Vander Sanden, County Attorney, and Rebecca A.
Belcher, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Angela M. Railsback of Railsback Law Office, Cedar Rapids, attorney and
guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Mullins, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ.
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BOWER, J.
A mother and father appeal the termination of their parental rights to their
child, P.B. They both claim the State did not prove by clear and convincing
evidence their rights should be terminated under Iowa Code sections
232.116(1)(d), (g), and (h) (2013), and the court erred in not allowing the parents
additional time to pursue reunification. The father claims the court erred in
finding the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) did not fulfill its
“reasonable efforts” obligation pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.104(1)(c), and
the court erred in finding termination was in the best interests of P.B. Upon our
de novo review of the record, we find the juvenile court did not err in terminating
the parents’ rights to P.B. and we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
P.B. was born in 2013 at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics
(UIHC). J.B. is the biological mother to P.B. F.B. is the legal father to P.B.
P.B.’s biological father is unknown.1 Shortly after P.B.’s birth, UIHC contacted
the DHS due to their concerns the mother and father were not demonstrating the
ability to understand and respond to the needs of a newborn. A UIHC social
worker provided a report to the DHS stating the parents were frequently absent
from caring for their child for long periods of time. The report also mentioned the
parents’ lack of appropriate baby supplies at home, their mental health
diagnoses, the fact the couple had their parental rights terminated to four other
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We conclude the juvenile court had the statutory authority to terminate the parental
rights of F.B., the legal-but-not-biological father of P.B. See In re J.C., No. 14-0288,
2014 WL 225359, at *8 (Iowa Ct. App. June 25, 2014) (holding a legal-but-not-biological
father is a "parent" within the meaning of Iowa Code Chapter 232).
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children, the fact two of the father’s infant children had been murdered, the
mother’s issues with anger, and the mother’s “unusual social interactions” with
the father. The report also included the medical team’s belief the parents’ lack of
involvement in P.B.’s care would be to the detriment of P.B., and if the parents
behaved in the same fashion once P.B. was home it would be extremely unsafe
for him.
A DHS social worker was assigned to assess the safety and welfare of
P.B. if he remained in the care of his parents. Based on the parents’ history with
DHS, the hospital report, and the social worker’s decision, P.B. was removed
from the parents’ care on March 20, 2013. P.B. was placed with a foster family.
The foster family are relatives of the parents and are already providing care to
two of P.B.’s older siblings. On April 24, an adjudication hearing was held and all
parties agreed P.B. was a child in need of assistance (CINA). On May 31, a
hearing was held on the guardian ad litem’s motion to waive reasonable efforts,
as well as a dispositional hearing. The court granted the parents more time to
work toward reunification.
During the pendency of this proceeding the following services were
offered: referrals for food and housing, parenting classes, family team meetings,
mental health evaluations, parent partner and individual counseling, and family
interaction and visitation. The providers noted continuing concerns with
untreated mental health issues, parenting skills, and the cleanliness of the home.
The parents had difficulty applying the learned parenting skills from one visit to
another. The parents failed to follow through with their mental health needs,
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even though the mother attempted suicide in 2013. The mother attended sixteen
of twenty-nine mental health sessions and the father attended eight of twenty-six.
Although the parents regularly attended visitations, the DHS workers saw little
improvement in their ability to care for a child. Once the parents’ youngest child,
K.B., was born, the DHS began to curtail the parents’ visitations with P.B.
After a mandatory review and permanency hearing was held on
September 27, the State filed a petition for termination of parental rights. A
termination hearing was held on March 28 and 29, 2014. The DHS social worker
and P.B.’s guardian ad litem agreed the parents’ rights should be terminated.
The juvenile court issued an order on October 1, 2014, terminating the parents’
rights to P.B. pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.116 (1)(h) and (g).
The mother and father now appeal. They both claim the State did not
prove by clear and convincing evidence their rights should be terminated under
sections 232.116(1)(g) and (h), and the court erred in not allowing the parents
additional time to pursue reunification. The father claims the court erred in
finding DHS made reasonable efforts concerning P.B. pursuant to section
232.104(1)(c), and the court erred in finding termination was in the best interests
of P.B.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Our review of termination decisions is de novo. In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33,
40 (Iowa 2010). We give weight to the juvenile court’s findings, especially
assessing witness credibility, although we are not bound by them. In re D.W.,
791 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010). An order terminating parental rights will be
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upheld if there is clear and convincing evidence of grounds for termination under
section 232.116. Id. Evidence is “clear and convincing” when there are no
serious or substantial doubts as to the correctness of the conclusions of law
drawn from the evidence. Id.
III. DISCUSSION
Iowa Code chapter 232, concerning the termination of parental rights,
follows a three-step analysis. P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 39. The court must first
determine whether a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) has been
established. Id. If a ground for termination has been established, the court must
apply the best-interest framework set out in section 232.116(2) to decide if the
grounds for termination should result in termination of parental rights. Id. Finally,
if the statutory best-interest framework supports termination of parental rights,
the court must consider if any of the statutory exceptions set out in section
232.116(3) weigh against the termination of parental rights. Id.
A. Grounds for Termination
When the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one
statutory ground, we may affirm the order on any ground we find supported by
the record. D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707. In order to support the termination under
section 232.116(1)(g), the State had to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that (1) the child has been adjudicated a child to be in need of assistance
pursuant to section 232.102, (2) the court has terminated parental rights with
respect to another child who is a member of the same family, (3) the parent
continues to lack the ability or willingness to respond to services which would
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correct the situation, and (4) an additional period of rehabilitation would not
correct the situation.
We agree the State proved by clear and convincing evidence the mother’s
and the father’s parental rights should be terminated under Iowa Code section
232.116(1)(g). The record shows the first two elements of section 232.116(1)(g)
have been met. Therefore we limit our analysis to elements three (respond to
services) and four (rehabilitation).
In its order, the juvenile court provided an exhaustive analysis of the
parents’ history with the DHS. J.B.’s parental rights to her first child, with a
different father, were terminated in 2001 due to her inability to care for the child.
In 2011, three other children were removed from the couples’ care. The reasons
provided for the removal included lack of safe housing, lack of parenting skills,
and unaddressed mental health issues. The DHS provided services to the
parents including protective daycare; in-home services from a Family Safety,
Risk, and Permanency provider; assistance with transportation; and mental
health referrals. Following the removal, the DHS continued to provide assistance
and services to the parents. After over a year of assistance and services by the
DHS, an order was entered terminating the parents’ rights to the three children.
J.B. consented to the termination. F.B. resisted the termination, but termination
was ultimately found to be in the children’s best interest.
After P.B. was born in 2013 and removed from the parents’ care, the DHS
once again provided assistance and services to the parents. The social worker
assigned to the case found the couple had been maintaining stable housing, J.B.
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had a steady income through disability benefits, and F.B. had difficulty
maintaining a job. The couple, however, maintained a regular visitation schedule
with P.B., though concerns remained about the couples’ ability to provide care for
him. Visitation remained supervised due to issues with the amount of small items
on the floor of the parents’ residence that P.B. could put in his mouth, the
parents’ lack of attention to P.B.’s feeding cues, and the distractibility of the
parents during the visitation sessions.
In March 2014, J.B. gave birth to her sixth child, K.D., at Mercy Medical
Center in Cedar Rapids (Mercy). Mercy’s medical staff noted the same issues
with the parents’ care of K.D. as the UIHC medical staff noted about the parents’
care of P.B. Mercy’s social worker contacted the DHS with these fears, and
requested an assessment be completed concerning the safety and welfare of
K.B. if he was released to the care of the parents. The DHS social worker, who
had assessed the parents’ after P.B.’s birth, was assigned to complete the
assessment. The social worker noted the similarities in the report made by UIHC
assessing the parents in 2013, and the report made by Mercy assessing the
parents in 2014. Even though the DHS had been working with the parents for
the past year, the Mercy report showed the same problems remained
unresolved. Based on the social worker’s findings, K.D. was removed from the
parents’ care and placed with a foster family.
The parents’ have participated in DHS provided services and assistance
for several years, which includes the services and assistance provided to the
couple during the termination proceedings for their older children. The record
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shows the same issues with the parents’ ability to provide care for P.B. remain.
When we must determine the future actions of the parent, past behavior is
instructive. In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 2006). We commend J.B. for
finding stable housing and income, but these advances are inadequate to allow
the return of P.B. to the parents’ care. Based on our de novo review of the
record it is clear the mother and father continue to lack the ability or willingness
to respond to services, and further services would not correct the situation. See
Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(g)(3)–(4).
B. Best Interests of the Child.
The father claims termination is not in the best interests of P.B. because
P.B. is bonded to him and P.B. resides with relatives. The father has not shown
these exceptions apply in this case. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3). As the
juvenile court found:
J.B. and F.B.’s ability to safely care for P.B. is not likely to
improve in the near future, particularly if they continue to be
resistive to participating in the mental health treatment that is
necessary for that improvement to occur. Returning P.B. to the
parental home, with this ongoing imminent risk of harm, would be
contrary to his welfare. The parents have received years of
services and supports from the Department of Human Services but
continue to struggle with the same issues, primarily related to their
mental health. Despite years of services, they continue to have
little insight.
....
P.B. is an adoptable child. He is young and personable.
P.B. lives with foster parents/relatives . . . who have adopted his
older sisters . . . . P.B. is well bonded to his sisters and his current
caretakers. [The foster parents] would like to adopt P.B. P.B. is in
need of permanency by way of termination of parental rights and
adoption is in P.B.’s best interests and that none of the exceptions
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to termination as set out in section 232.116(3) apply to these
proceedings.
These findings are readily apparent in the record. “We have repeatedly
followed the principle that the statutory time line must be followed and children
should not be forced to wait for their parent to grow up.” In re N.F., 579 N.W.2d
338, 341 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998); see also Iowa Code § 232.116(2). We agree with
the juvenile court termination is in P.B.’s best interest, and we affirm the court’s
grant of the State’s petition to terminate the mother’s and the father’s parental
rights.
C. Reasonable Efforts
The father claims the DHS did not make reasonable efforts for
reunification. See Iowa Code § 232.102(7). The father’s claims center on his
requests for increased visitation and decreased supervision. As articulated
above, the DHS provided years of services and assistance to the couple, and the
same issues with their ability to provide care remained. The record shows the
DHS provided more than reasonable efforts to the couple.
Encouragingly, we note P.B. still resides with relatives. The DHS social
worker assigned to this case reported P.B. is doing well in his foster home. We
see no reason to disrupt this arrangement. For the reasons listed above, we find
it is in the best interests of the child to terminate the parental rights of the mother
and father.
IV. CONCLUSION
There is clear and convincing evidence that grounds for termination exist
under section 232.116(1)(g), termination of the mother’s and father’s parental
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rights is in the child’s best interests pursuant to section 232.116(2), and no
consequential factor weighing against termination in section 232.116(3) requires
a different conclusion. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of parental rights.
AFFIRMED.