IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-30997
DAVID JAMES EDWARDS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
K STEWART,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana, Baton Rouge
01-CV-429-D
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May 10, 2002
Before SMITH, BENAVIDES, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
David James Edwards (“Edwards”), a Louisiana prisoner, appeals
the dismissal for failure to state a claim of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983
in forma pauperis action against K. Stewart (“Stewart”), a
Lieutenant at Hunt Correctional Center. We review the dismissal
de novo, taking all of the plaintiff's factual allegations as true.
See Clay v. Allen, 242 F.3d 679, 680 (5th Cir. 2001).
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Edwards alleges that on July 8, 2000, while restraining
another prisoner, Stewart told Edwards that he would be next.
Shortly afterwards, without provocation, Stewart attacked him.
While Edwards was in his cell, Stewart sprayed him with “pepper
gas” and said “I told you I was going to get you.” Stewart left
for a few minutes. Upon his return, he ordered Edwards to come to
the bars to be restrained. Edwards complied, and, after
restraining him, Stewart sprayed Edwards with the remainder of the
pepper gas. Subsequently, Stewart ordered that the cell door be
opened, grabbed Edwards, pushed him, and then hit him on the back
of the head several times with the spray can, causing Edwards to
fall to the floor. While Edwards was on the floor covering his
face, Stewart hit him several more times with the can, causing cuts
to Edwards’ fingers. Stewart then kicked Edwards on the neck, head
and chest while he lay on the floor, causing Edwards to suffer from
neck pain and headaches. Edwards alleges that the kicking
continued until other officers arrived and stopped Stewart.
Edwards’ alleged injuries consisted of neck pain, headache,
light abrasions and cuts to his thumb and two of the fingers on his
right hand, and superficial lacerations to his right ear. He
received treatment for his injuries at the infirmary.
Edwards filed a complaint in forma pauperis. He alleged that
Stewart had used excessive force against him in violation of the
2
Eighth Amendment, and asserted state law claims for assault,
battery, and negligence. Adopting the magistrate judge’s report
and recommendation which found that Edwards had failed to allege
that he sustained more than de minimis physical injury as a result
of Stewart’s alleged actions, the district court dismissed Edwards’
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), without prejudice to
the state law claims.
DISCUSSION
The core inquiry in evaluating an excessive force claim is
“whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992). Where, as is the case
here, the plaintiff alleges that the force was applied maliciously
and sadistically to cause harm “there is no categorical requirement
that the physical injury be significant, serious, or more than
minor.” Gomez v. Chandler, 163 F.3d 921, 924 (5th Cir. 1999)
(emphasis added). Nonetheless, de minimis uses of force are
excluded from constitutional recognition. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9.
The magistrate’s report and recommendation, which the district
court adopted, concluded that Edwards’ alleged injuries were de
minimis. Consequently, the district court found that Edwards’
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allegations did not satisfy the requirement of a showing of
physical injury under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).1
In finding that Edwards’ injuries were de minimis, the
magistrate judge relied on Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191 (5th
Cir. 1997). In Siglar, we applied the principles set out in
Hudson, holding that “well established Eighth Amendment standards
guide our analysis in determining whether a prisoner has sustained
the necessary physical injury to support a claim for mental or
emotional suffering. That is, the injury must be more than de
minimus, [sic] but need not be significant.” Id. at 193. Given
that the plaintiff’s injuries in that case consisted of a sore,
bruised ear, for which Siglar did not seek medical treatment, and
which had resulted from a corrections officer twisting his ear, we
found that his injuries were de minimis and affirmed the dismissal
of his claims. Id. at 194.
But in Gomez we found that the plaintiff had alleged more than
de minimis physical injury where he had suffered “cuts, scrapes,
contusions to the face, head and body” as a result of being knocked
down, punched and kicked. 163 F.3d at 924-25. Significantly, in
Gomez, unlike in Siglar, the plaintiff had received medical
treatment for his injuries. Id. at 924. In our analysis of
1
This section provides that “[n]o Federal civil action may be brought
by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for
mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing
of physical injury.”
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whether the injuries were de minimis, we also took into account
that the character of the attack on Siglar’s person “was obviously
far briefer and of a character far less intense and less calculated
to produce real physical harm than that here.” Id.
The plaintiff’s alleged injuries in this case are comparable
to the injuries in Gomez and much more severe than the injuries
alleged in Siglar. Edwards’ alleged injuries consist of cuts to
his fingers and thumb, headache, neck pain, and lacerations to the
ear, and he received medical treatment for the injuries. Moreover,
Edwards’ injuries allegedly resulted from a highly intense attack
that was likely to produce serious physical harm: Edwards alleges
that he was repeatedly pushed to the floor, kicked, and beaten with
a can, in addition to being sprayed with pepper gas. Given these
factual allegations, it cannot be said as a matter of law that
Edwards’ injuries were de minimis.
CONCLUSION
Because, taking Edwards’ factual allegations as true, his
injuries were more than de minimis, the district court erred in
dismissing his federal claims. Consequently, we REVERSE the
district court’s order, and REMAND for further proceedings. Of
course, we express no view on the ultimate merit of the case.
5