J-S79029-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
RALPH C. JONES
Appellant No. 1075 EDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order March 7, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-1016092-1975
BEFORE: ALLEN, OLSON and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
JUDGMENT ORDER BY OLSON, J.: FILED DECEMBER 30, 2014
Appellant, Ralph C. Jones, appeals from the order entered on March 7,
2014 dismissing his petition filed under the Post-Conviction Relief Act
(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
On September 6, 1977, Appellant was sentenced to 60 to 120 years’
imprisonment for various offenses committed during a robbery at United
Vending Company. See generally Commonwealth v. Jones, 43 A.3d 513
(Pa. Super. 2012) (unpublished memorandum). On July 29, 2013, Appellant
filed this, his third, counseled PCRA petition. On December 20, 2013, the
PCRA court issued notice pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal
Procedure 907 of its intent to dismiss the petition. On March 7, 2014, the
PCRA court dismissed the petition. This timely appeal followed.
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S79029-14
On appeal, Appellant concedes that his petition is patently untimely
and that his petition does not satisfy any of the statutory exceptions to the
PCRA’s timeliness requirement. Courts lack jurisdiction over untimely PCRA
petitions that do not satisfy a timeliness exception. See Commonwealth v.
Callahan, 101 A.3d 118, 121–122 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted).
Appellant argues, however, that the PCRA’s timeliness requirement is
unconstitutional as it permits innocent individuals to be incarcerated. Our
Supreme Court has rejected this claim. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638, 642–643 (Pa. 1998). McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133
S.Ct. 1924 (2013), the case cited by Appellant, does not change the
constitutionality of the PCRA’s timeliness requirement as McQuiggin dealt
with federal habeas corpus proceedings and not state collateral review
proceedings. Thus, the PCRA court correctly determined that Appellant’s
PCRA petition was time-barred.
Alternatively, Appellant argues he is entitled to habeas corpus relief.
Our Supreme Court has held, however, that all claims cognizable under the
PCRA, such as Appellant’s, must be brought under the PCRA and not through
habeas corpus proceedings. E.g., Commonwealth v. Eller, 807 A.2d 838,
842–843 (Pa. 2002). Accordingly, the PCRA court correctly treated
Appellant’s petition as a request for relief under the PCRA and dismissed the
petition as time-barred.
Order affirmed.
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J-S79029-14
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/30/2014
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