UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4587
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
FREDDIE JACKSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge.
(4:13-cr-01015-RBH-1)
Submitted: December 22, 2014 Decided: December 30, 2014
Before WYNN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed in part, dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Michael A. Meetze, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Florence,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Alfred William Walker Bethea,
Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Freddie Jackson appeals his conviction and the sixty-
month sentence imposed following his guilty plea to possession
with intent to distribute and distribution of cocaine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (2012). On
appeal, Jackson’s counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no
meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether the
district court fully complied with Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11 in accepting Jackson’s guilty plea. Counsel also
questions whether Jackson’s sentence is reasonable; however, he
concedes that we do not have jurisdiction to consider that
issue. Jackson was advised of his right to file a pro se
supplemental brief but did not file one. Finding no meritorious
grounds for appeal, we affirm Jackson’s conviction. To the
extent that Jackson seeks to appeal his sentence, we dismiss
that portion of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Jackson first questions whether the district court
erred in accepting his guilty plea. Our review of the plea
hearing reveals that the district court substantially complied
with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 in conducting the
plea colloquy and committed no error warranting correction on
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plain error review. * See United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d
517, 532 (4th Cir. 2002). Thus, the court did not err in
accepting Jackson’s knowing and voluntary guilty plea.
Turning to the appeal of Jackson’s sentence, counsel
correctly observes in the Anders brief that we lack jurisdiction
to consider such an appeal because Jackson entered a guilty plea
pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C). The
federal statute governing appellate review of a sentence limits
the circumstances under which a defendant may appeal a sentence
to which he stipulated in a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement to
claims that the district court imposed the sentence “in
violation of law . . . [or] as a result of an incorrect
application of the sentencing Guidelines.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(a)(1)-(2), (c) (2012); see United States v. Calderon, 428
F.3d 928, 932 (10th Cir. 2005). Here, Jackson’s sentence was
less than the applicable statutory maximum, see 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(C), was not based upon the Sentencing Guidelines,
and was the sentence for which he bargained. Thus, review of
his sentence is precluded by § 3742(c).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
*
We decline to sua sponte enforce Jackson’s waiver of
appellate rights in the plea agreement. See United States v.
Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005).
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appeal. We therefore affirm Jackson’s conviction and dismiss
the appeal to the extent that he seeks review of his sentence.
This court requires that counsel inform Jackson, in writing, of
his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Jackson requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Jackson. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal conclusions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART
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