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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 13-AA-518
ASEFU ALEMAYEHU, PETITIONER,
V.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL BOARD, RESPONDENT.
On Petition for Review of an Order
of the District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board
(CMP00321-11)
(Argued November 13, 2014 Decided December 31, 2014)
Richard J. Bianco for petitioner.
Jason Lederstein, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Irvin B. Nathan,
Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and
Loren L. Alikhan, Deputy Solicitor General, were on the brief, for respondent.
Before THOMPSON and MCLEESE, Associate Judges, and NEWMAN, Senior
Judge.
Opinion for the court by Associate Judge THOMPSON.
Opinion by Associate Judge MCLEESE, concurring in part and dissenting in
part, at page 19.
THOMPSON, Associate Judge: Petitioner Asefu Alemayehu appeals from the
February 27, 2013, decision of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board revoking her
2
Retailer‘s Class CT license to serve alcoholic beverages, and from the Board‘s
April 17, 2013, order denying Petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration. Petitioner
contends that the Board‘s decision should be vacated (1) because the Board‘s
decision-making was inappropriately tainted after Board members heard her offer
in compromise and (2) after they learned that she also faced a pending
investigation in another matter; (3) because she lacked the English proficiency
required to understand the Board proceeding and to make a knowing waiver of her
rights (the ―language issue‖); and (4) because the penalty of revocation was not
commensurate with the nature of the charged offense. For the reasons discussed
below, we reverse and remand.
I. Background
According to the Notice of Status and Show Cause Hearing issued to
Petitioner on May 9, 2012, an Alcoholic Beverage Regulation Administration
investigator visited Petitioner‘s restaurant at approximately 3:49 am on Tuesday,
July 5, 2011. From outside, the investigator watched someone lock the restaurant‘s
front door and observed several individuals inside holding beer bottles. Upon
entering the restaurant, the investigator witnessed approximately twenty
individuals consuming alcoholic beverages. The investigator approached
3
Petitioner, the owner of the restaurant, who told him that ―she was unaware of the
time.‖ The relevant District of Columbia statute required that, on the weekday in
question, alcohol consumption on the premises stop at 2:00 am. D.C. Code § 25-
723 (b) (2001); see also 23 DCMR § 705.9.
At the first Show Cause Hearing, held on December 12, 2012, Petitioner was
represented by Wendell Robinson. Robinson told the Board that he had just
realized that Petitioner did not speak English well enough to understand his advice
or explanations.1 He said that Petitioner had ―indicated she could understand
[him]‖ during their meetings, and he had taken her at her word, even though she
sometimes displayed a ―look of bewilderment.‖ However, the day before the
hearing, Robinson‘s associate met with Petitioner and, with the aid of an
interpreter, discovered that Petitioner was ―[un]aware that she could lose her
license and not be able to reapply for five years.‖ This result indicated to
Robinson that Petitioner had overstated her ability to understand their previous
conversations. In light of his need to properly prepare and advise his client again,
now with the assistance of an interpreter, Robinson requested a continuance. At no
point during this hearing did Robinson mention the District of Columbia
1
Ms. Alemayehu speaks Amharic.
4
Interpreter Act, D.C. Code § 2-1902 (c) (2001). The Board granted the
continuance request.
At the second Show Cause Hearing, held on January 9, 2013, Petitioner was
represented by Andrew Kline. Kline and Assistant Attorney General Fernando
Rivero presented to the Board an offer in compromise,2 under which Petitioner
would pay a $3,000 fine, be subject to a 10-day suspension of her license, and
submit an application for transfer of her license within 60 days.3 Kline explained
that allowing Petitioner to ―move on from this business‖ through a license transfer
2
See 23 DCMR § 1604.5, which provides that:
The Board may, in its discretion, accept from both (1) the
licensee or permittee and (2) the Office of the
Corporation Counsel or the prosecuting entity an offer in
compromise and settlement to resolve the charges
brought at the show cause hearing by the District of
Columbia against the licensee. An offer in compromise
and settlement may be tendered to the Board at any
time prior to the issuance of a decision by the Board on
the contested matter.
3
See generally D.C. Code §§ 25-405, 25-316 (2001) (governing the process
of voluntary transfer of licensed establishment to a new owner); see also D.C.
Code § 25-405 (e) (2001) (providing that ―[i]f the Board finds that the licensee is
in violation of this title or regulations promulgated under this title, the Board shall
deny the application for transfer‖).
5
was ―a very important component of the offer, given the investigative history‖4 and
―other factors,‖ including the fact that ―[t]here is another investigative matter in the
pipeline[.]‖ Rivero also referred to the ―pipeline‖ matter, explaining that the
pending ―case concern[ed] an incident that took place in July of [2012].‖ At this
point, a Board member interjected, cautioning his colleagues not to consider the
existence of pending cases when ruling on the offer in compromise, as ―the fact
that there is something in the pipeline is irrelevant to this case.‖
Before ruling on the offer in compromise, Board member Jones, sua sponte,
asked Kline whether his client needed an interpreter, recalling that the previous
Show Cause hearing was continued because ―there was a concern about a
translator . . . being necessary or required[,]‖ as ―it wasn‘t clear that the licensee
clearly understood all the nature of the discussions that were being had between
her and her counsel[,]‖ and Petitioner possibly ―wasn‘t in the position to clearly
understand all the discussions that were being had by us as a Board[.]‖ The Board
member sought to ―establish on the record that no translator is necessary[.]‖ The
Board Chair asked Kline to address the issue. Kline responded:
4
Petitioner was appearing before the Board for her fourth primary-tier
offense. Her previous offenses were adjudicated on September 25, 2008, May 6,
2009, and April 14, 2010. The dates of her previous offenses were September 11,
2007, January 18, 2009, and February 7, 2009.
6
The only way that I can address that is I have spent a
great deal of time with Ms. Alemayehu. I‘m satisfied
that she understands the terms of the deal. I‘m happy to
have her answer any questions that the Board may have,
so that the Board might be satisfied. . . . [I]n this case,
given the time that I have spent with her in our review of
the offer and other considerations, I don‘t have a question
in my mind at this point.
Board member Alberti pressed Kline on this point, resulting in the following
exchange:
Member Alberti: But what I‘m not hearing from you is if
we were to not accept this [offer in compromise], the
question is, still in my mind which you haven‘t
addressed, would your client understand English well-
enough to understand the proceedings that we would be
having? Because that‘s the real question here, Mr. Kline.
Mr. Kline: Yes.
...
I beg your indulgence. Ms. Alemayehu is willing to
make a statement that she does understand what is going
on and understands the nature of the proceeding and will
understand what is going on here. . . . I can tell you with
respect to this offer [in compromise] and the discussions
and preparations, I‘m comfortable. . . .
Chairperson Miller: -- would your client be able to
participate in the hearing?
Mr. Kline: Yes.
7
The Board never asked Petitioner to make a statement on the record. After
Board member Alberti expressed satisfaction with Kline‘s assurances, the Board
proceeded to discuss and then reject both the original offer in compromise and an
amended offer in compromise proposed by Kline, in which the fine was increased
to $4,000.
The Show Cause Hearing immediately followed. Kline told the Board in his
opening statement that he would ―stipulate to the facts that are asserted in the
notice,‖ as his client sought only to ―address the appropriate penalty to be served.‖
In light of this stipulation, the government waived opening statements, presented
no evidence, and did not give a closing. In Kline‘s closing, he reminded the Board
that Petitioner intended to transfer her license; observed that it was clear that
Petitioner ―had difficulty running‖ her business; and said that Petitioner ―t[ook]
responsibility for the violation,‖ which was why she did not ―put[] the Government
to its proof.‖
In its February 27, 2013, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order
(―Order‖), the Board found that Petitioner violated D.C. Code § 25-723 (b), which
proscribes serving alcohol after 2:00 am on weekdays. The Board revoked
Petitioner‘s license, explaining that it did so both pursuant to its ―discretionary
8
revocation powers‖5 and as mandated by D.C. Code § 25-830 (c)(3) (2012 Repl.).6
The Board also denied a Motion for Reconsideration filed on Petitioner‘s behalf by
her original attorney, Mr. Robinson, who argued inter alia that, because of the lack
of an Amharic interpreter at the Show Cause Hearing, Petitioner ―was unable to
make a knowing and intelligent agreement to stipulate[] to the charges[.]‖
Petitioner timely appealed.
II. Analysis
5
The Board cited D.C. Code § 25-823 (2012 Repl.) (providing that ―[t]he
Board may fine, as set forth in the schedule of civil penalties established under §
25-830, and suspend, or revoke the license of any licensee during the license
period‖ for violations of law).
6
At the time of the Board‘s Order, then-recently amended D.C. Code § 25-
830 (c)(3) read: ―A licensee found in violation of a primary tier offense for the 4th
time within 4 years shall have the license either revoked or fined no less than
$30,000 and suspended for 30 consecutive days.‖ Omnibus Alcoholic Beverage
Regulation Emergency Amendment Act of 2012, D.C. Law 19-597, 60 D.C. Reg.
1001, 1012 (Feb. 1, 2013) (―Emergency Act‖) (effective January 14, 2013 – April
14, 2013); see also Omnibus Alcoholic Beverage Regulation Amendment Act of
2012, D.C. Law 19-310, 60 D.C. Reg. 3410, 3422 (Mar. 15, 2013) (making
permanent the language passed in the Emergency Act, effective May 1, 2013). In
its Order, the Board quoted the earlier version of the statute, which provided that
―[a] licensee found in violation of a primary tier offense for the fourth time within
4 years shall have the license revoked.‖ D.C. Code § 25-830 (c) (2012 Repl.).
9
We ultimately dispose of this case on the basis of the language issue, but
briefly address the other issues Petitioner has raised, which otherwise could be
issues again on remand.
A. The Board’s Having Heard the Offer in Compromise
Asserting that the Board acted as ―both the mediator and the fact-finder‖
when it heard her offer in compromise, rejected it, and then moved directly on to
the Show Cause Hearing, Petitioner suggests that the Board thereby became a
biased decision-maker. We reject this argument. First, the record does not support
Petitioner‘s assertion that, through the offer in compromise, she ―stipulated to
many facts which she could have disputed‖ in the Show Cause Hearing. In reality,
when proposing the offer in compromise, Petitioner‘s attorney acknowledged
Petitioner‘s history of three previous primary-tier violations, the existence of which
was not in dispute, and mentioned the ―pipeline‖ investigation, but did not stipulate
to the facts of the July 2011 incident until after the Board had denied the offer in
compromise.7 Before moving on to the Show Cause Hearing, the Board heard
7
Moreover, the Board did not act as a mediator. A mediator ―tries to help
disputing parties reach an agreement.‖ Black‘s Law Dictionary 1120 (10th ed.
2014). That was not the Board‘s role; it was presented with an offer in
(continued…)
10
merely that Petitioner sought to settle her case. This desire did not mean that she
admitted guilt, as her actions could have been fueled by any number of motives,
including an intention to quickly sell her business.
Second, the Board‘s ―mixing of [investigatory, prosecutorial, and
adjudicative] functions . . . is a necessary part of the administrative scheme and
does not per se violate due process.‖ James Bakalis & Nickie Bakalis, Inc. v.
Simonson, 434 F.2d 515, 518 (D.C. 1970) (citation omitted). A petitioner
contending that an agency board was inappropriately biased by the exercise of
another function ―must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those
serving as adjudicators[.]‖ Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). Petitioner
has not carried this burden. Park v. District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage
Control Bd., 555 A.2d 1029, 1032 (D.C. 1989) (―[I]t is not per se improper for an
official who holds two governmental positions, . . . to become involved in both the
investigation and determination of the same case.‖).8
(…continued)
compromise that has been negotiated between Petitioner‘s attorney and the Office
of Attorney General.
8
Petitioner also contends that her rights were violated when the Board
learned that she faced an additional investigation for an alleged violation that
occurred in July 2012. Her argument boils down to an assertion that the Board
violated the D.C. Administrative Procedure Act — and her procedural rights
(continued…)
11
B. The Language Issue
Petitioner contends that she should have been provided with an interpreter at
the hearing, basing her claim on D.C. Code § 2-1902 (c), which provides that an
agency conducting an administrative proceeding ―shall appoint a qualified
interpreter upon the request of [a] communication-impaired‖ party or witness.
D.C. Code § 2-1902 (c). The record belies Petitioner‘s argument that she
requested an interpreter for the Show Cause Hearing. We therefore reject the
argument that § 2-1902 (c) applied in the way Petitioner has argued.
Section 2-1902 (c) also provides, however, that ―[w]henever a
communication-impaired person is a party or a witness in an administrative
(…continued)
thereunder — by admitting and then considering irrelevant evidence. See D.C.
Code § 2-509 (b) (2001) (providing that agency bodies are instructed to ―exclude
irrelevant . . . evidence‖). We reject this argument as well. An agency does not
admit irrelevant evidence to the record merely by hearing of its existence. Nor
does an adjudicator become impermissibly ―tainted‖ merely by hearing irrelevant
evidence. The burden is on Petitioner to ―overcome the presumption that the
Board members acted fairly‖ in deciding her case. Park, 555 A.2d at 1032.
Petitioner cannot meet that burden as to the January 9, 2013, Show Cause Hearing
because a Board member promptly reminded his colleagues that they should not
consider a future case when ruling upon a current one, and there is no indication
anywhere in the hearing transcript or the Board‘s Order that the Board did anything
other than follow those cautionary words.
12
proceeding . . . ,‖ the agency conducting the proceeding ―may appoint a qualified
interpreter . . . .‖ D.C. Code § 2-1902(c) (emphasis added). It thus vests the Board
with discretion to appoint an interpreter for a communication-impaired party.
Discretionary authority must be reasonably exercised in conformance with the
purpose of the authorizing statute. See In re D.H., 666 A.2d 462, 470 (D.C. 1995).
Because the Council of the District of Columbia (―Council‖) passed the Interpreter
Act ―in order to vindicate the constitutional [due process] rights‖ of individuals
who cannot speak or understand English, Ramirez v. United States, 877 A.2d 1040,
1043 (D.C. 2005), the Board was required to exercise its discretion as to whether to
appoint an interpreter in a way that protected Petitioner‘s due process rights. We
conclude that the Board‘s effort fell short.
To be sure, it is by no means clear from the record that Petitioner was or is a
communication-impaired person within the meaning of the Interpreter Act. We do
not suggest but also cannot discount the possibility of gamesmanship, i.e., that
Petitioner raised the language issue only after seeing the severe penalty the Board
imposed in order to get a second bite at the apple. We also recognize that
Petitioner was not a newcomer to Board processes, having had three earlier
primary-tier offenses adjudicated. But here, Board members themselves, having
been apprised by Petitioner‘s original counsel of her apparent lack of
13
understanding of his advice given in English, expressed concern about whether
Petitioner was able to understand and would be able to participate in the
proceedings if the matter went to hearing. In his detailed answer to the Board‘s
inquiry, Petitioner‘s attorney Kline expressed satisfaction that Petitioner
understood ―the terms of the deal‖ — i.e., the terms of the offer in compromise.
He gave a one-word answer (―Yes‖), however, when a Board member asked
whether Petitioner would be ―able to participate in the hearing‖ if the Board did
not accept the offer in compromise. Then, when the hearing commenced moments
later, Mr. Kline short cut the proceeding by immediately stipulating to the charged
violation. Petitioner did not participate at all, and, not having spoken during the
hearing, said nothing that evidenced her ability to participate and understand.
Moreover, although Kline suggested that Petitioner was willing to make a
statement to the Board ―that she does understand what is going on and understands
the nature of the proceeding and will understand what is going on here[,]‖ the
Board declined the invitation (which would have imposed a very slight burden)
and asked Petitioner no questions. If, as her original counsel suggested, Petitioner
had limited English proficiency and, in fact, could not understand the exchanges
between Kline and the Board, ―then the [hearing], to [her], [was] no more than ‗a
babble of voices.‘‖ Ko v. United States, 722 A.2d 830, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
14
(quoting United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 388 (2d Cir.
1970)). Having heard contrary representations from Petitioner‘s different attorneys
and having received a very limited assurance from attorney Kline, the Board
lacked a firm factual foundation on which to determine whether it needed to
exercise its discretion to appoint an interpreter. See Johnson v. United States, 398
A.2d 354, 364 (D.C. 1979) (explaining that determinations committed to the fact-
finder‘s discretion require ―rational acts of decision-making[,]‖ and that ―[a]n
informed choice among the alternatives requires that the [decision-making] be
based upon and drawn from a firm factual foundation‖).
In this circumstance, Petitioner is entitled to a remand for the Board to
determine, first, whether she was communication-impaired at the time of the Show
Cause Hearing and, if the Board determines that she was, to the opportunity for a
new hearing (with an interpreter as necessary).9 We recognize that, to date,
Petitioner has not suggested what defense(s) she might have to the charged
infraction. However, if she was unable to understand the January 9, 2013, hearing,
9
If the Board finds that Petitioner was not communication-impaired at the
time of the January 9, 2013, Show Cause Hearing, it may reinstate its finding that
Petitioner committed the charged infraction.
15
she is at least entitled to put the government to its proof during a Show Cause
Hearing in which she is able to understand the proceedings.
Further, Petitioner may be entitled to an opportunity to persuade the Board to
impose a fine of at least $30,000 and a 30-day suspension, as specifically
authorized by amended § 25-830 (c)(3), rather than revocation.10 We say ―may‖
because, as discussed at oral argument, there is an issue as to whether the Board
had discretion to impose such a fine in lieu of revoking Petitioner‘s license. As
noted supra in note 6, by the time the Board issued its Order in February 2013, §
25-830 (c)(3) had been amended to prescribe such a fine and suspension as an
alternative penalty for a fourth primary-tier offense within four years. However,
without acknowledging or explicitly considering whether it should give effect to
the amended § 25-830 (c)(3), the Board imposed the sole penalty — license
revocation — that was mandated by the superseded § 25-830 (c)(3). While it is
true that the Board also based the revocation penalty on its ―discretionary . . .
powers,‖ if the additional option prescribed by amended § 25-830 (c)(3) was
applicable and the Board did not consider it, it did not properly exercise its
10
At oral argument, modifying the argument made in Petitioner‘s brief that
the revocation penalty was not commensurate with the charged violation,
Petitioner‘s counsel contended that the Board should have considered imposing
this less severe (in Petitioner‘s estimation) penalty.
16
discretion. See Johnson, 398 A.2d at 365 (explaining that to exercise its discretion
in a rational and informed manner, the trier of fact must be aware of the ―range of
permissible alternatives‖).
A variety of considerations are relevant to determining whether amended §
25-830 (c)(3) was applicable. ―[W]here the legislature has determined to give
retroactive effect to a new law that it considers salutary, actions that are still
pending and have not been reduced to judgment raise no concern with applying a
new provision that attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its
enactment.‖ Holzsager v. District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd.,
979 A.2d 52, 57 n.5 (D.C. 2009) (internal quotation marks, bracket, ellipsis, and
citation omitted). But if the Council did not ―expressly prescribe[] the [amended]
statute‘s proper reach,‖ Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994),
resort must be had to other principles that are relevant to whether a statutory
amendment should be applied to a pending case. Holzsager, 979 A.2d at 56-57.
One general rule, ―in matters where one of the parties is a public entity charged
with administering a regulatory program for the benefit of a community‖ and ―the
new legislation is intended to redound to the benefit of all,‖ is that ―the law in
effect shall be given force.‖ Id. at 57 (internal quotation marks omitted). But there
are also ―the canon that ‗[a] statute imposing a new penalty . . . will not be
17
construed as having a retroactive effect;‘ and the countervailing rule that
‗[r]emedial statutes are to be liberally construed and if a retroactive interpretation
will promote the ends of justice, they should receive such construction.‘‖
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 263 n.16 (citation omitted).
Petitioner appears to regard the 2013 amendment to § 25-830 (c)(3) as
remedial legislation that affords licensees the opportunity for a less severe penalty
for a fourth primary-tier violation. By contrast, the relevant legislative history
suggests that the Council viewed the amendment as ―[e]stablish[ing] a stricter
penalty for a fourth primary tier offense within four years[,]‖11 language that may
support an interpretation that amended § 25-830 (c)(3) created a new penalty that
should not be applied to an infraction that pre-dated it. Respondent‘s brief
suggests that the Board was not bound to apply amended § 25-830 (c)(3) because,
at the time of its Order, the Board had not yet promulgated a conforming
regulation. See Respondent‘s Brief at 21 n.7 (―The prior rule that was operative
for this case only allowed for revocation.‖).12
11
D.C. Council Committee on Human Services, Report on B19-824 at 24
(Nov. 8, 2012).
12
The basis of this argument appears not to be the (wholly) untenable
suggestion that agency regulations can ―trump‖ a statute, but the perhaps less
untenable suggestion that D.C. Code § 25-830 (g) defers the effective date of
(continued…)
18
The Board did not explicitly consider any of the foregoing points. We
conclude that ―[i]n accordance with our usual practice, we [should] not attempt to
[decide the issue of the retroactive effect of amended § 25-830 (c)(3)] before the
agency charged with administering [the statute] has done so[.]‖ Brown v. District
of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 83 A.3d 739, 751-52 (D.C. 2014). ―The
interpretation . . . should be made, in the first instance, by the agency.‖ Id. at 752
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We direct that, if the Board‘s
finding that Petitioner violated D.C. Code § 25-723 (b) is reinstated, or, if the
Board finds after a new hearing that she violated § 25-723 (b), then the Board must
determine whether the amended § 25-830 (c)(3) applies to Petitioner‘s case. If the
Board determines that the amended version does apply, then, in fashioning a
sanction, the Board must consider as one option whether it should impose a fine of
at least $30,000 in lieu of revoking Petitioner‘s license.
The matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
(…continued)
statutorily established fines by providing that ―[t]he schedule [of fines established
by the Council] and any [Board] amendments to the schedule[, which are
authorized by § 25-830 (f),] shall be published in the District of Columbia Register
and promulgated by the procedure adopted under § 25-211 (e).‖ D.C. Code § 25-
830 (g).
19
So ordered.
MCLEESE, Associate Judge, concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part:
I agree with the court that the Board‘s ruling in this case was not tainted by
the Board‘s awareness that petitioner Alemayehu had offered to settle the case and
faced an investigation in another matter. I also agree with the court that the case
should be remanded for the Alcohol Beverage Control Board to determine whether
petitioner Alemayehu is a communication-impaired person within the meaning of
the local statute governing the appointment of interpreters in judicial and
administrative proceedings, D.C. Code § 2-1901 et seq. (2012 Repl.). I write
separately on the latter point to provide a brief explanation of my reasoning. First,
at the December 2012 show-cause hearing before the Board, an interpreter
translated the proceedings for Ms. Alemayehu. At the same hearing, Ms.
Alemayehu‘s attorney represented to the Board that his client did not understand
English well enough to understand his advice and explanations. Taken together,
these circumstances put the Board on notice of substantial grounds for concern that
Ms. Alemayehu was a communication-impaired person. Cf., e.g., United States v.
20
Tapia, 631 F.2d 1207, 1209-10 (5th Cir. 1980) (where defendant had benefit of
interpreter at arraignment, trial court erred by failing to inquire about defendant‘s
need for interpreter in later proceedings). Second, even in the absence of a request,
the Board had discretion to appoint an interpreter for Ms. Alemayehu in connection
with the subsequent proceedings before the Board. D.C. Code § 2-1902 (c). Third,
in light of the grounds for concern, the Board was obliged to inquire into whether
Ms. Alemayehu was a communication-impaired person. Cf., e.g., Luna v. Black,
772 F.2d 448, 451 (8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (―When a trial court is put on notice
that there may be some significant language difficulty, the court should determine
whether an interpreter is needed . . . .‖) (internal quotation marks omitted). Fourth,
simply accepting the reassurance given by Ms. Alemayehu‘s new attorney was not
an adequate inquiry, given the prior use of an interpreter and the conflict between
the new attorney‘s reassurance and the representations of previous counsel. At a
minimum, the Board should have inquired directly of Ms. Alemayehu. Cf., e.g.,
Bates v. United States, 834 A.2d 85, 95-96 (D.C. 2003) (trial court abused
discretion by failing to conduct further inquiry on issue of juror bias; given conflict
between testimony of one witness and proffer of counsel as to testimony of another
witness, trial court was required to hear directly from latter witness and to conduct
whatever other inquiry was needed in order to have ―firm factual foundation‖ for
ruling).
21
I respectfully dissent from the court‘s disposition of petitioner‘s belated
contention that, in revoking Ms. Alemayehu‘s license, the Board abused its
discretion by failing to consider the potential applicability of a 2013 amendment to
D.C. Code § 25-830 (c)(3) (in cases involving licensee‘s fourth primary-tier
violation, permitting Board to suspend license and impose substantial fine, rather
than revoking license). Ms. Alemayehu apparently never brought that amendment
to the Board‘s attention. Nor did Ms. Alemayehu rely on that amendment in her
brief in this court, instead simply arguing in a conclusory manner that license
revocation was an unreasonably harsh sanction. The Board did mention the
amendment in its brief in this court, arguing that the amendment was inapplicable.
Ms. Alemayehu did not file a reply brief. It was not until oral argument in this
court that Ms. Alemayehu first contended that the Board erred by failing to
consider the 2013 amendment. Under well settled principles, this court normally
would not consider a claim raised so belatedly. See, e.g., D.C. Library
Renaissance Project/West End Library Advisory Grp. v. District of Columbia
Zoning Comm’n, 73 A.3d 107, 124 n.9 (D.C. 2013). I see no extraordinary
circumstances justifying a departure from these well settled principles. To the
contrary, any assumed error by the Board in failing to consider the 2013
amendment would clearly be harmless, given that the Board expressly concluded,
22
in the exercise of its discretion, that revocation rather than fine or suspension was
the proper sanction. I understand that, at the time the Board reached that
conclusion, the Board may not have been considering the possibility of a fine as
large as would be permissible under the 2013 amendment. But I see no reason to
suppose that the Board would have been inclined in this case to forgo revocation in
favor of suspension and a larger fine. Rather, in revoking Ms. Alemayehu‘s
license, the Board explained that Ms. Alemayehu had ―shown she cannot comply
with the law, and that she has no regard for public safety, or the quality of life of
residents.‖ Under the circumstances, remanding to require the Board to consider
the potential applicability of the 2013 amendments would be unwarranted even if
Ms. Alemayehu had properly presented this issue to the Board and to this court.
Cf., e.g., Le Chic Taxicab Co. v. District of Columbia Taxicab Comm’n, 614 A.2d
943, 945 (D.C. 1992) (per curiam) (remand warranted ―only if substantial doubt
exists whether the agency would have made the same ultimate finding with the
error removed‖) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In sum, I would remand for the Board to determine whether Ms. Alemayehu
is a communication-impaired person. If so, the Board would have to conduct new
proceedings, and in that setting the Board could appropriately consider the
potential applicability of the 2013 amendments. But if Ms. Alemayehu is not a
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communication-impaired person, then in my view the Board should be permitted to
reinstate the prior order in its entirety.