NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted January 6, 2015
Decided January 7, 2015
Before
DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge
RICHARD D. CUDAHY, Circuit Judge
JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge
No. 14‐1982
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appeal from the United States District
Plaintiff‐Appellee, Court for the Central District of Illinois.
v. No. 12‐20060‐01
STANCE D. STRONG, Michael P. McCuskey,
Defendant‐Appellant. Judge.
O R D E R
Stance Strong was caught selling crack cocaine to a police informant in Kankakee,
Illinois, and later pleaded guilty to distributing crack cocaine. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
The court sentenced him below the guidelines range to 60 months’ imprisonment, the
statutory minimum. See id. § 841(b)(1)(B). Strong filed a notice of appeal, but his attorney
asserts that any argument would be frivolous and seeks to withdraw under Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Counsel has submitted a brief that explains the nature of
the case and addresses the issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to
involve. Strong has not responded to our invitation to comment on counsel’s motion.
See CIR. R. 51(b). Because the analysis in the brief appears to be thorough, we limit our
No. 14‐1982 Page 2
review to the subjects that counsel has discussed. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774,
776 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).
First counsel explains that Strong has no interest in challenging his guilty plea
and thus appropriately omits discussion about the adequacy of the plea colloquy and the
voluntariness of the plea. See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012);
United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002).
Counsel considers challenging the length of Strong’s sentence but properly
concludes that to do so would be frivolous. Strong admitted that the count of conviction
involved at least 28 grams of crack, making his 60‐month prison term the statutory
minimum, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B), well less than the correctly calculated guidelines
range (63 to 78 months based on a total of 167.5 grams and corresponding to an offense
level of 25, see U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(c)(6) (2013), 3E1.1(a), (b), and Strong’s three
criminal‐history points, see id. § 4A1.1(c), 4A1.2(c)(1)). A below‐guidelines sentence is
presumptively reasonable. United States v. Shamah, 624 F.3d 449, 460 (7th Cir. 2010).
Counsel next considers arguing that Strong should have received relief under the
“safety valve,” which allows a sentence below the statutory minimum for certain
nonviolent drug offenses. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. But counsel rightly
notes that Strong’s three criminal‐history points made him ineligible for a sentence
below the statutory minimum, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1); U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(1); Dorsey v.
United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2337 (2012), so any argument about the safety valve would
be frivolous.
The motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.