Wilson Mutual Insurance Company v. Robert Falk

2014 WI 136

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.: 2013AP691 & 2013AP776
COMPLETE TITLE: Wilson Mutual Insurance Company,
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,
v.
Robert Falk and Jane Falk,
Defendants-Appellants,
State of Wisconsin Department of Natural
Resources, Lee
Laatsch, Michael Jante, Jessica Jante, Ruth
Hetzel, Jeff
Wiedmeyer, Kimber Wiedmeyer, Paul Lorge, Tammy
Lorge, Paul
Wilkins, Addicus Jante and Trilogy Health
Insurance Inc.,
Defendants.
------------------------------------------------
Wilson Mutual Insurance Company,
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,
v.
Robert Falk, Jane Falk, State of Wisconsin
Department of
Natural Resources, Lee Laatsch, Ruth Hetzel,
Paul Wilkins
and Trilogy Health Insurance, Inc.,
Defendants,
Michael Jante, Jessica Jante, Jeff Wiedmeyer,
Kimber Wiedmeyer, Paul Lorge, Tammy Lorge and
Addicus Jante,
Defendants-Appellants.

REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
(Reported at 352 Wis. 2d 461, 844 N.W.2d 380)
(Ct. App. 2014 – Published)
PDC No.: 2014 WI App 10

OPINION FILED: December 30, 2014
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT: September 12, 2014

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT: Circuit
COUNTY: Washington
JUDGE: Todd K. Martens

JUSTICES:
CONCURRED: BRADLEY, J., concurs. (Opinion filed.)
 DISSENTED: ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents. (Opinion filed.)
NOT PARTICIPATING: PROSSER, J., did not participate.

ATTORNEYS:
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs
by Ryan R. Graff and Nash, Spindler, Grimstad & McCracken LLP,
Manitowoc. Oral argument by Ryan R. Graff.

For defendants-appellants Robert and Jane Falk, there was a
brief by Ronald R. Ragatz and DeWitt Ross & Stevens S.C.,
Madison. Oral argument by Ronald R. Ragatz.

For defendants-appellants-respondents Michael Jante,
Jessica Jante, Addicus Jante, Jeff Wiedmeyer, Kimber Wiedmeyer,
Paul Lorge, and Tammy Lorge, there was a brief by Ryan J. Hetzel
and Hetzel & Nelson, LLC, West Bend. Oral argument by Ryan J.
Hetzel.

An amicus curiae brief was filed by Laura A. Foggan and
Wiley Rein LLP, Washington, D.C.; and Robert C. Burrell, Joshua
B. Cronin, and Borgelt, Powell, Peterson & Frauen, S.C.,
Milwaukee, on behalf of Complex Insurance Claims Litigation
Association.

An amicus curiae brief was filed by Timothy M. Barber and
Axley Brynelson LLP, Madison, on behalf of Wisconsin Insurance
Alliance.

2
 2014 WI 136
NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further
editing and modification. The final
version will appear in the bound
volume of the official reports.
No. Error! Reference source not found.
(L.C. No. 2011CV1448)

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT

Wilson Mutual Insurance Company,

Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,

v.

Robert Falk and Jane Falk,

Defendants-Appellants,

State of Wisconsin Department of Natural FILED
Resources, Lee

Laatsch, Michael Jante, Jessica Jante, Ruth DEC 30, 2014
Hetzel, Jeff
Diane M. Fremgen
Clerk of Supreme Court
Wiedmeyer, Kimber Wiedmeyer, Paul Lorge, Tammy
Lorge, Paul

Wilkins, Addicus Jante and Trilogy Health
Insurance Inc.,

Defendants.

----------------------------------------------

Wilson Mutual Insurance Company,

Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,

v.

Robert Falk, Jane Falk, State of Wisconsin
Department of
Natural Resources, Lee Laatsch, Ruth Hetzel,
Paul Wilkins

and Trilogy Health Insurance, Inc.,

Defendants,

Michael Jante, Jessica Jante, Jeff Wiedmeyer,
Kimber

Wiedmeyer, Paul Lorge, Tammy Lorge and Addicus
Jante,

Defendants-Appellants.

REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Reversed and

cause remanded.

¶1 MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J. We review a published

decision of the court of appeals1 reversing the Washington County

circuit court's order granting declaratory judgment in favor of

Wilson Mutual Insurance Company ("Wilson Mutual").2 The circuit

court concluded that Wilson Mutual had no duty to defend or

indemnify Robert and Jane Falk ("the Falks") against allegations

that in 2011 they negligently spread manure3 on their property
1
Wilson Mut. Ins. Co. v. Falk, 2014 WI App 10, 352 Wis. 2d
461, 844 N.W.2d 380.
2
The Honorable Todd K. Martens, presiding.
3
The injured parties further alleged that nitrates and
bacteria from the cow manure were also found in their wells.

2
 No. Error! Reference source not found.

and thereby polluted their neighbors' wells because the Wilson

Mutual policy contained an exclusion for pollution.4 The court

of appeals reversed, concluding that a reasonable farmer would

consider cow manure to be "liquid gold" and not a pollutant when

applied to a farm field. Wilson Mut. Ins. Co. v. Falk, 2014 WI

App 10, ¶¶1, 3, 352 Wis. 2d 461, 844 N.W.2d 380.

¶2 Three issues are presented for our consideration:

1) whether a pollution exclusion in Wilson Mutual's General Farm

Coverage Liability policy excludes coverage for harm caused by

the seepage of cow manure into wells; 2) whether the Farm

Chemicals Limited Liability Endorsement provides coverage for

physical injury to property caused by the seepage of cow manure

into wells; and 3) whether the incidental coverages section of

Wilson Mutual's General Farm Coverage Liability policy provides

indemnity coverage for and a duty to defend against harm caused

by the seepage of cow manure into wells.

4
The circuit court concluded Wilson Mutual had no duty to
defend or indemnify the Falks because "[a] reasonable person in
the position of the Falks would understand cow manure to be
waste," and thus the pollution exclusion excluded coverage. The
circuit court further concluded (1) the Farm Chemicals Liability
Endorsement did not provide coverage because the endorsement was
designed to cover injury to property caused by chemicals, and
manure is not a chemical; (2) the endorsement "covers only
physical injury to property;" thus, "it would not cover any
injures to Addicus Jante" and would not cover "contamination of
water in the wells" because the policy excludes coverage from
loss of use damages;" and (3) "even if contamination of well
water did qualify as physical injury to property" the "costs of
clean up, new wells, replacement water, [and] remediation are
all the types of costs specially covered by the" exclusion.

3
 No. Error! Reference source not found.

¶3 We hold that the pollution exclusion clause in Wilson

Mutual's General Farm Coverage Liability policy issued to the

Falks unambiguously excludes coverage for well contamination

caused by the seepage of cow manure. First, we conclude that

cow manure falls unambiguously within the policy's definition of

"pollutants" when it enters a well. Second, we conclude the

Farm Chemicals Limited Liability Endorsement likewise excludes

coverage for "physical injury to property" resulting from

pollutants. Finally, we conclude that the "Damage to Property

of Others" clause under the incidental coverages section

provides incidental coverage up to $500 for each unique well

that has allegedly been contaminated by the Falks' manure, and

Wilson Mutual has a duty to defend. Accordingly, the decision

of the court of appeals is reversed, and we remand to the

circuit court for further proceedings consistent with our

holding.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶4 The Falks are owners and operators of a dairy farm in
West Bend, Wisconsin, located in Washington County. Paul

Wilkens, Karen Wilkens, Lee Laatsch, Ruth Hetzel, Michael Jante,

Jessica Jante, Addicus Jante, James Wiedmeyer, Kim Wiedmeyer,

Paul Lorge, and Tammy Lorge (collectively the "injured parties")

are all neighbors of the Falks.

¶5 In early 2011, the Falks spread liquid cow manure onto

their farm fields for the purpose of fertilization. In an

attempt to safely apply the manure, the Falks obtained a
nutrient management plan prepared by a certified crop agronomist
4
 No. Error! Reference source not found.

and approved by the Washington County Land and Water

Conservation Department.

¶6 In a letter dated May 23, 2011, the Wisconsin

Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") informed the Falks it

had received several well contamination complaints from the

Falks' neighbors. The DNR investigated the matter and concluded

that manure from the Falks' farm leeched into and contaminated

wells owned by the injured parties. The contamination made the

injured parties' private wells unusable and the water

undrinkable. The injured parties alleged that manure, nitrates,

and bacteria, including E. coli,5 seeped into their wells.

Additionally, Addicus Jante, a minor, claimed that he contracted

bacterium avium6 from drinking the contaminated water and, as a

result, was hospitalized and underwent surgery.

¶7 The DNR used grant money to provide temporary clean

water to Laatsch and Hetzel and to replace their wells. The DNR

subsequently requested reimbursement from the Falks for these

expenses. The Lorges, Jantes, and Wiedmeyers did not qualify

5
"Escherichia coli (abbreviated as E. coli) are a large and
diverse group of bacteria. Although most strains of E. coli are
harmless, others can make you sick. Some kinds of E. coli can
cause diarrhea, while others cause urinary tract infections,
respiratory illness and pneumonia, and other illnesses." E.
Coli (Escherichia coli), Ctrs. for Disease Control,
http://www.cdc.gov/ecoli/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2014) (emphasis
omitted).
6
Bacterium avium is a pulmonary disease. Mycobacterium
avium Complex, Ctrs. for Disease Control, (Oct. 12, 2005)
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/mycobacteriumavium_t.
htm.

5
 No. Error! Reference source not found.

for a DNR grant, and had to pay out of pocket. The Wilkens paid

out of pocket to replace their well and do not seek repayment

from the Falks.

¶8 Wilson Mutual sold two farmowner policies to the

Falks, the first insuring the period from April 10, 2010, to

April 10, 2011, and the second insuring the period from April

10, 2011, to April 10, 2012. The policies were identical in all

material respects and we therefore will refer to the policies

collectively as "the Wilson Mutual policy." The Wilson Mutual

policy was titled: "Personal Liability Coverage (Farm)" and was

designed for owners and operators of farms.

¶9 The Wilson Mutual policy excluded general liability

coverage for both "bodily injury" and/or "property damage"

"which results from the actual, alleged, or threatened

discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release, or escape of

'pollutants' into or upon land, water, or air." The policy

stated:

"We" [Wilson Mutual] do not pay for a loss if one or
more of the following excluded events apply to the
loss, regardless of other causes or events that
contribute to or aggravate the loss, whether such
causes or events act to produce the loss before, at
the same time as, or after the excluded event.
. . .

l. "bodily injury" or "property damage" which results
from the actual, alleged, or threatened discharge,
dispersal, seepage, migration, release, or escape of
"pollutants" into or upon land, water, or air . . .
¶10 "Pollutant" is defined earlier in the policy as: "any
solid, liquid, gaseous, thermal, or radioactive irritant or

6
 No. Error! Reference source not found.

contaminant, including acids, alkalis, chemicals, fumes, smoke,

soot, vapor, and waste. 'Waste' includes materials to be

recycled, reclaimed, or reconditioned, as well as disposed of."

¶11 In addition to general liability coverage, the Wilson

Mutual policy also included an endorsement for "Farm Chemicals

Limited Liability" and an "Incidental Coverages" section.

¶12 The Farm Chemicals Endorsement reads, in relevant

part:

Farm Chemicals Limited Liability. "We" pay those sums
which an "insured" becomes legally obligated to pay as
damages for physical injury to property if:

1. The injury is caused by the discharge, dispersal,
release, or escape of chemicals, liquids, or gases
into the air from the "insured premises". The injury
must be caused by chemicals, liquids, or gases that
the "insured" has used in the normal and usual
"farming" operation; and

2. The chemicals, liquids, or gases have not been
discharged, dispersed, or released from an aircraft.
. . .

Physical injury does not include indirect or
consequential damages such as loss of use of soil,
animals, crops, or other property or loss of market.

This coverage does not apply to physical injury to
property arising out of "farming" operations that are
in violation of an ordinance or law.

This coverage does not apply to any loss, cost, or
expense arising out of any requests, demands, orders,
claims, or suits that the "insured" or others test
for, monitor, clean up, remove, contain, treat,
detoxify, neutralize, or in any way respond to or
assess the effects of pollutants, chemicals, liquids,
or gases.

7
 No. Error! Reference source not found.

¶13 "Damage to Property of Others" under the incidental

coverages section reads, in relevant part:

1. Damage to Property of Others—Regardless of an
"insured's" legal liability, "we" pay for property of
others damaged by an "insured", or "we" repair or
replace the property to the extent practical, with
property of like kind or quality. "Our" limit for
this coverage is $500 per occurrence.
¶14 On December 5, 2011, Wilson Mutual filed a declaratory

judgment motion in the Washington County circuit court against

the Falks, the injured parties, and the DNR to determine whether

the Wilson Mutual policy covered the manure contamination

alleged by the DNR and the injured parties. On August 29, 2012,

Wilson Mutual filed a motion for declaratory judgment claiming

it had a duty to neither defend the Falks, nor provide coverage

with respect to the injured parties' well contamination. On

October 2, 2012, the Falks filed a motion for summary judgment,

arguing that Wilson Mutual had a duty to defend and indemnify

the Falks against claims arising from the alleged groundwater

contamination.

¶15 On January 23, 2013, the circuit court issued a

decision and order granting Wilson Mutual's motion for

declaratory judgment, concluding that the Wilson Mutual policy

did not provide coverage for the Falks' manure contamination.

Based on dictionary definitions of "waste" and "pollutant," the

trial court determined that manure is unambiguously a pollutant.

The circuit court explained:

Indeed, [spreading manure] is a form of recycling—one
of the actions performed on "waste," a named pollutant

8
 No. Error! Reference source not found.

as defined in the Policies. . . . Many substances
serve useful purposes in many contexts, yet can be
characterized as pollutants in another. Bleach cleans
and disinfects a countertop; yet when poured into a
stream it is deadly to the fish living in the water.
DDT was an effective pesticide; yet it poisoned
raptors who ate rodents exposed to it. . . . A
reasonable person in the position of the Falks would
understand cow manure to be waste.
¶16 The circuit court also found that the Farm Chemicals

Limited Liability Endorsement did not apply because "the

Endorsement was designed to cover injury to property caused by
chemicals, not manure." "A reasonable person in the position of

the Falks would not have understood cow manure to be a

chemical." Moreover, "the endorsement covers only physical

injury to property, so it would not cover any injuries to

Addicus Jante." Likewise, "contamination of the water in the

wells does not qualify as physical injury to property, but is

instead, 'indirect or consequential damages such as loss of

use.'" Finally, the circuit court concluded "even if

contamination of well water did qualify as physical injury to

property" the "costs of clean up, new wells, replacement water,

[and] remediation are all the types of costs specially covered
by the" exclusion. The circuit court did not address whether

the incidental coverages section provided coverage.

¶17 On March 22, 2013, both the Falks and the injured

parties appealed this decision. On December 11, 2013, the court

of appeals reversed the circuit court's judgment and concluded

that manure was not a pollutant. Falk, 352 Wis. 2d 461, ¶3.
The court of appeals reasoned that precedent required the court

9
 No. Error! Reference source not found.

"to 'consider the nature of the substance involved' [in order]

to determine whether a pollution exclusion precluded coverage."

Id., ¶13 (quoting Langone v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2007 WI

App 121, ¶17, 300 Wis. 2d 742, 731 N.W.2d 334). The court

recognized that, based on the insurance policy's language alone,

manure might be a "pollutant" because manure can be both an

irritant and a contaminant. Id., ¶10. However, "[the] supreme

court has instructed that we must do more than rely on this

'undeniably broad' and 'virtually boundless' language, 'for

there is virtually no substance or chemical in existence that

would not irritate or damage some person or property.'" Id.

(quoting Hirschhorn v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2012 WI 20, ¶30,

338 Wis. 2d 761, 809 N.W.2d 529).

¶18 Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded manure is

not a pollutant because manure "has long been a normal and

necessary part of the operation of a dairy farm," and to a

reasonable farmer manure is "liquid gold." Id., ¶¶1, 15. "Used

improperly, both manure and milk can cause irritation or
contamination. The fact that milk can cause irritation or

contamination in certain circumstances does not equate to a

reasonable person defining milk as a 'pollutant.' A reasonable

farmer likewise does not see manure as either 'waste' or a

'pollutant.'" Id., ¶3. The court of appeals did not address

any other issues because its determination that the Falks'

manure is not a pollutant was dispositive. Id., ¶17.

¶19 Wilson Mutual petitioned this court for review, which
we granted on April 17, 2014.
10
 No. Error! Reference source not found.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶20 The interpretation of an insurance contract is a

question of law that this court reviews independently. Siebert

v. Wis. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 2011 WI 35, ¶28, 333 Wis. 2d 546, 797

N.W.2d 484.

III. DISCUSSION

¶21 We first consider whether the pollution exclusion

contained in the Wilson Mutual policy unambiguously excludes

coverage for well contamination caused by the seepage of cow

manure, and conclude that it does. We then address whether the

Farm Chemicals Limited Liability Endorsement also excludes

coverage, and conclude that it does as well. Finally, we

examine whether the incidental coverages section provides

indemnity coverage and a duty to defend and conclude that it

does. We therefore reverse the court of appeals.

A. The Pollution Exclusion Contained in the Wilson Mutual

Policy's General Farm Liability Coverage Excludes Coverage.

¶22 This case requires us to interpret the pollution
exclusion clause as it applies to manure and identify whether

manure is a pollutant within the meaning of the Wilson Mutual

pollution exclusion.

i. Applicable Legal Principles

¶23 Our goal in interpreting an insurance policy is to

ascertain and carry out the parties' intentions. Id., ¶31. "To

that end, we interpret policy language according to its plain

and ordinary meaning as understood by a reasonable person in the

11
 No. Error! Reference source not found.

position of the insured." Hirschhorn, 338 Wis. 2d 761, ¶22

(citations omitted).

¶24 Terms or phrases in an insurance contract are

ambiguous only "if they are fairly susceptible to more than one

reasonable interpretation." Id., ¶23; Peace ex rel. Lerner v.

Nw. Nat'l Ins. Co., 228 Wis. 2d 106, 121, 596 N.W.2d 429 (1999).

If policy language is ambiguous, the contract will be narrowly

construed against the insurer as its drafter.7 State Farm Mut.

Auto. Ins. Co. v. Langridge, 2004 WI 113, ¶46, 275 Wis. 2d 35,

683 N.W.2d 75. However, an ambiguity exists only where a policy

is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. Id.,

¶48. We will not embrace any plausible interpretation created

by an insured for the purposes of litigation. Hirschhorn, 338

Wis. 2d 761, ¶23. Similarly, "[t]he mere fact that a word has

more than one dictionary meaning, or that the parties disagree

about the meaning, does not necessarily make the word ambiguous

if the court concludes that only one meaning applies in the

context and comports with the parties' objectively reasonable
expectations." Ruff v. Graziano, 220 Wis. 2d 513, 524, 583

N.W.2d 185 (Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Sprangers v. Greatway Ins.

Co., 182 Wis. 2d 521, 537, 514 N.W.2d 1 (1994)). Likewise, the

7
This is known as the doctrine of contra proferentem.
Contra proferentem is Latin for "against the offeror," and means
that when "interpreting documents, ambiguities are to be
construed unfavorably to the drafter." Black's Law Dictionary
337 (9th ed. 2009); see also Donaldson v. Urban Land Interests,
Inc., 211 Wis. 2d 224, 230, 564 N.W.2d 728 (1997).

12
 No. Error! Reference source not found.

fact that different courts have come to different conclusions

regarding a term in a policy does not render a term ambiguous,

or else "only the first interpretation by a court would count."

Peace, 228 Wis. 2d at 136.

¶25 Absent a finding of ambiguity, this court will not

apply the rules of construction to rewrite the language of an

insurance policy to bind an insurer to a risk which it did not

contemplate and for which it did not receive a premium.

Hirschhorn, 338 Wis. 2d 761, ¶24. As such, an insurance

policy's pollution exclusion clause is ambiguous if a reasonable

insured could expect coverage. Langone, 300 Wis. 2d 742, ¶21.

ii. The Occurrence for Which the Falks Seek Coverage is the

Seepage of Manure into Wells.

¶26 In determining whether coverage exists under an

insurance policy, we follow three steps. First, we must examine

the facts of the insured's claim to determine whether the policy

makes an initial grant of coverage. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v.

Am. Girl, Inc., 2004 WI 2, ¶24, 268 Wis. 2d 16, 673 N.W.2d 65.
The analysis ends there if the policy clearly does not cover the

claim. Id. Second, if the claim triggers an initial grant of

coverage we examine whether any of the policy's exclusions

preclude coverage. Id. Third, if an exclusion precludes

coverage, we analyze exceptions to the exclusion to determine

whether any reinstate coverage. Id.

¶27 Coverage is triggered by an occurrence. We determine

an insurer's duty to defend "by comparing the allegations of the
complaint to the terms of the insurance policy." Estate of
13
 No. Error! Reference source not found.

Sustache v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 87, ¶20, 311

Wis. 2d 548, 751 N.W.2d 845. In doing so, we focus on the

nature rather than the merits of the claim. Id. Thus,

identifying the occurrence is important because there must be an

occurrence under the policy for there to be coverage and the

policy's language controls what constitutes an "occurrence."

Plastics Eng'g Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 WI 13, ¶30,

315 Wis. 2d 556, 759 N.W.2d 613.

¶28 The Falks do not seek coverage for the over

application of cow manure to their farmland. Rather, the Falks

seek coverage for each unique well that has been contaminated.

Therefore, the occurrence is not the spreading of manure as

fertilizer; rather, there was an occurrence each time a unique

well was contaminated by manure.

¶29 The Wilson Mutual policy's General Farm Liability

Coverage defined an occurrence as "an accident, including

repeated exposures to similar conditions, that results in

'bodily injury' or 'property damage' during the policy period."
"Bodily injury" was defined in the policy as "bodily harm to a

person and includes sickness, disease, or death." "Property

damage" was defined as "physical injury to tangible property.

This includes loss of use." The Wilson Mutual policy further

states "'we' pay, up to 'our' 'limit,' all sums for which an

'insured' is liable by law because of 'bodily injury' or

'property damage' caused by an 'occurrence' to which this

coverage applies." Thus, for there to be an occurrence, there

14
 No. Error! Reference source not found.

must be an accident resulting in "bodily injury" or "property

damage."

¶30 The Wilson Mutual policy does not define "accident."

When a policy does not define a term, we look to the term's

common, everyday meaning. U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ace Baking Co.,

164 Wis. 2d 499, 505, 476 N.W.2d 280 (Ct. App. 1991). The

common definition of an "accident" is "'[a]n unexpected,

undesirable event' or 'an unforeseen incident' which is

characterized by a 'lack of intention.'" Doyle v. Engelke, 219

Wis. 2d 277, 289, 580 N.W.2d 245 (1998) (quoting The American

Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 11 (3d ed. 1992)).

The unexpected and undesirable event for which the Falks seek

coverage is well contamination.

¶31 The conclusion that the occurrence here is the well

contamination is in accord with our precedent. In Plastics, an

insurance policy defined "occurrence" as "an accident, including

continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in

bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended
from the standpoint of the insured." Plastics, 315 Wis. 2d 556,

¶12. In Plastics, the insurance company argued that the

manufacture and sale of asbestos-containing products without

warning constituted one occurrence regardless of the number of

people injured by the asbestos. Id., ¶29. The insured argued

there was an occurrence each time a person was exposed to the

asbestos-containing products. Id. We held the occurrence was

not the manufacture, sale, or installation of the asbestos-
containing products. Id., ¶31. Rather, we explained there was
15
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an occurrence under the policy each time a unique person was

exposed to the asbestos because without exposure, no bodily

injury could take place. Id., ¶¶29, 31.

¶32 Wisconsin is in the jurisdictional majority in

defining an occurrence as unexpected or unintended resultant

damage.8 Indeed, Couch on Insurance states that the majority of

jurisdictions follow the rule that "[t]here is an occurrence

when the insured did not expect or intend the resultant damage."

9 Steven Plitt et al., Couch on Ins. § 127:4 (3d ed. 2008).

Here, the accident that resulted in "bodily injury" and

"property damage" was the seepage of manure9 into the neighboring

wells. Seepage into the water supply was neither expected nor

8
E.g., Wakefield Pork, Inc. v. Ram Mut. Ins. Co., 731
N.W.2d 154, 159 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007), review denied, (Aug. 7,
2007) (holding that where a policy defined an occurrence as
something unintentional, and the insured clearly did not intend
to harm its neighbors or their property by the pig manure odors,
which emanated from the insured's farm, the damage from the
odors was an "accident" and thus an "occurrence" under the
policy).
9
Manure application can cause excess nitrates to form. The
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") has warned that the
amount of nitrates in the ground water that result from manure
"can reach unhealthy levels. Infants up to three months of age
are particularly susceptible to high nitrate levels and may
develop Blue Baby Syndrome (methemoglobinemia), an often fatal
blood disorder." What's the Problem?, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
http://epa.gov/region9/animalwaste/problem.html (last updated
June 2, 2011) [hereinafter What's the Problem?]. The most
common pathogens of concern that can result from livestock
manure are E. Coli, campylobacter, salmonella, and
cryptosporidium. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Literature Review of
Contaminants in Livestock and Poultry Manure and Implications
for Water Quality 13, 25 (July 2013) [hereinafter Literature
Review].

16
 No. Error! Reference source not found.

intended. The Wilson Mutual policy defined an "occurrence" as

"an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to

similar conditions, that results in 'bodily injury' or 'property

damage' during the policy period." This language is nearly

identical to that in Plastics, and we see no reason why the same

analysis should not apply here. Further, the Falks admit in

their brief that they neither "expected nor intended" their

manure to get into the groundwater. In other words, the well

contamination was an accident.10

¶33 We conclude the Wilson Mutual policy makes an initial

grant of coverage because the exposure of manure to each unique

well constituted an occurrence under the Wilson Mutual policy.

Am. Girl, 268 Wis. 2d 16, ¶24. Further, as we conclude in

subsection C below, five occurrences took place: each time there

was "property damage" to a unique well, there was an occurrence.

iii. The Pollution Exclusion Bars Recovery for Manure in a Well.

¶34 After identifying the five unique occurrences, we must

determine whether an exclusion precludes coverage. Id. ("If the
claim triggers the initial grant of coverage in the insuring

agreement, we next examine the various exclusions to see whether

any of them preclude coverage of the present claim."). We need

to determine only whether manure is a pollutant at the point it

entered the injured parties' wells. The injured parties

10
Had the Falks sought coverage for harm to the fields as a
result of manure over-application, then the occurrence would
have been over-application on the field.

17
 No. Error! Reference source not found.

suffered no harm until the manure seeped into their wells;

therefore, the grant of coverage arose at that point. Wilson

Mutual argues the General Farm Liability Coverage pollution

exclusion precludes coverage. When analyzing whether a

pollution exclusion precludes coverage we first must determine

whether the substance——in this case manure——is unambiguously a

pollutant within the policy's definition. Hirschhorn, 338

Wis. 2d 761, ¶25; Peace, 228 Wis. 2d at 119. We conclude that a

reasonable insured would consider manure that seeped into a well

to unambiguously be a pollutant.

¶35 Then we must determine whether the alleged loss

resulted from the "discharge, release, escape, seepage,

migration or dispersal" of the substance under the plain terms

of the pollution exclusion clause. Hirschhorn, 338 Wis. 2d 761,

¶25; Peace, 228 Wis. 2d at 119; Donaldson v. Urban Land

Interests, Inc., 211 Wis. 2d 224, 229, 564 N.W.2d 728 (1997).

The circuit court implicitly found that the alleged loss so

resulted when it concluded that "the pollutant exclusion to the
Policies applies to the cow manure spread on the Falks' property

which allegedly contaminated the aquifer which supplied water to

the Defendants." The pollution exclusion could not apply

without such a finding. Peace, 228 Wis. 2d at 119; Donaldson,

211 Wis. 2d at 229. None of the parties have contested or

appealed this aspect of the circuit court's decision to either

this court, or the court of appeals; and as in Preisler v. Gen.

Cas. Ins. Co., 2014 WI 135, ¶30, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __,
there does not appear to be any dispute that this requirement
18
 No. Error! Reference source not found.

has been satisfied.11 See Waushara Cnty. v. Graf, 166 Wis. 2d

442, 451, 480 N.W.2d 16 (1992) (concluding that arguments not

specifically raised on appeal will not be considered or

decided).

¶36 As such, the sole disputed issue with regard to the

General Farm Liability Coverage pollution exclusion is whether

manure is a pollutant. We conclude that manure is unambiguously

a pollutant when it seeps into a well.

¶37 Like many commercial and non-commercial insurance

policies, the Wilson Mutual policy's General Farm Liability

Coverage had a pollution exclusion. The pollution exclusion

clause excludes from coverage any "bodily injury" or "property

damage" which results from the "actual, alleged or threatened

discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release, or escape of

'pollutants' into or upon land, water, or air." The policy

defines pollutants as "any solid, liquid, gaseous, thermal, or

radioactive irritant or contaminant, including acids, alkalis,

chemicals, fumes, smoke, soot, vapor, and waste. Waste includes
materials to be recycled, reclaimed, or reconditioned, as well

as disposed of." As such, we must determine whether cow manure

falls unambiguously within the definition of "pollutants."

¶38 Whether a substance is a pollutant is evaluated from

the standpoint of a reasonable insured. Our line of pollution

exclusion cases reveals that a reasonable insured would consider

11
Further, Wilson Mutual briefed this issue at the circuit
court and neither the Falks nor the injured parties responded.

19
 No. Error! Reference source not found.

a substance to be a pollutant if (1) the substance is largely

undesirable and not universally present in the context of the

occurrence that the insured seeks coverage for; and (2) a

reasonable insured would consider the substance causing the harm

involved in the occurrence to be a pollutant.

¶39 When a substance is "universally present and generally

harmless in all but the most unusual instances," we have

concluded that the substance is not a pollutant. Donaldson, 211

Wis. 2d at 234. However, a substance can be a pollutant if the

harm is caused by "a unique and largely undesirable substance

that is commonly understood to be harmful." Hirschhorn, 338

Wis. 2d 761, ¶37.

¶40 We most recently analyzed a pollution exclusion in

Hirschhorn and concluded that a reasonable insured would view

bat guano as a pollutant as guano is undesirable inside a home.12

Id., ¶¶33, 37. There, the insureds' vacation home became

12
Though not addressed by this court, this was despite the
fact that bat guano can act as a beneficial fertilizer. See
Nikki Phipps, How to Use Bat Guano as a Fertilizer,
gardeningknowhow.com,
http://www.gardeningknowhow.com/composting/manures/bat-guano-
fertilizer.htm (last updated Oct. 31, 2014) ("Bat guano, or
feces, has a long history of use as a soil enricher. It is
obtained from only fruit and insect-feeding species. Bat dung
makes an excellent fertilizer. It’s fast-acting, has little
odor, and can be worked into the soil prior to planting or
during active growth.") Both bat guano and cow manure can be
repurposed for a beneficial use. Simply because a substance is
beneficial in one context does not prevent it from being a
pollutant in another. U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ace Baking Co., 164
Wis. 2d 499, 505, 476 N.W.2d 280 (Ct. App. 1991).

20
 No. Error! Reference source not found.

pervaded with bat guano, so much so that the home had to be

demolished and rebuilt because of the "penetrating and offensive

odor emanating from the home." Id., ¶¶8-10. The policy at

issue defined "pollutant" to include irritants, contaminants,

and waste. Id., ¶5. We concluded that a reasonable insured

would understand bat guano to be a pollutant because bat guano

is a unique and largely undesirable substance that is commonly

understood to be harmful when released into a home. Id., ¶37.

The harm caused by the bat guano constituted pollution as the

bat guano (1) was a contaminant because it made the home "impure

[and] unclean;" (2) was an irritant because it could cause

"inflammation, soreness, or irritability" in a person's lungs

and skin if they were to stay in the home; and (3) was waste

because it was a combination of feces and urine that had

permeated into the home.13 Id., ¶¶33, 34. Thus, Hirschhorn

shows that we must view a substance in the context of the

occurrence that the insureds seek coverage for; and in doing so

we concluded that, on and in a home, bat guano was a largely
undesirable and not universally present substance that a

13
The insureds in Hirschhorn argued that a reasonable
insured would not consider bat guano to be waste because the
policy, in listing examples of irritants and contaminants,
listed industrial pollutants. Hirschhorn v. Auto-Owners Inc.
Co., 2012 WI 20, ¶35, 338 Wis. 2d 761, 809 N.W.2d 529. We
rejected that argument, explaining that pollution exclusion
clauses do not apply to only industrial type pollutants. Id.;
Peace ex rel. Lerner v. Nw. Nat'l Ins. Co., 228 Wis. 2d 106,
138-44, 596 N.W.2d 429 (1999).

21
 No. Error! Reference source not found.

reasonable insured would unambiguously consider a pollutant.

Id., ¶37.

¶41 Similarly, in Peace, we concluded lead paint that had

flaked, chipped, and otherwise become dispersed from a wall in a

residential rental home was a pollutant. Peace, 228 Wis. 2d at

147-48. We concluded no reasonable insured could view flaked

lead paint in a home as anything but a pollutant based upon the

multitude of studies indicating the dangerous nature of lead

paint.14 Id. at 147. Indeed, we concluded that when lead paint

chips, flakes, or dusts off the walls of a home, it is "widely,

if not universally, understood to be dangerous and capable of

producing lead poisoning[, as t]he toxic effects of lead have

been recognized for centuries." Id. at 137-38. As such, lead

paint that has become detached from a wall in a home is

dangerous in any quantity. Id. Those flakes, chips, and dust

particles are largely undesirable and not universally present in

a home, so any harm caused by ingesting or inhaling them is

unambiguously pollution. Id.
¶42 In Ace Baking, the court of appeals concluded that

linalool in ice cream cones was a pollutant. Ace Baking, 164

14
We concluded the lead paint was a pollutant despite the
fact that lead can have a beneficial use when added to paint.
See Why Use Lead in Paint?, Royal Soc'y of Chemistry, (Aug. 21,
2007),
http://www.rsc.org/chemistryworld/news/2007/August/21080701.asp
(explaining that lead is often added to paint to increase the
paint's color, opacity, toughness, and protection against
water).

22
 No. Error! Reference source not found.

Wis. 2d at 505. In Ace Baking, linalool, a valuable ingredient

in fabric softener, contaminated ice cream cones, causing the

cones to taste like soap. Id. at 501. In response, Ace Baking

sought coverage under the insurance policy it purchased from

United States Fire. Id. at 500. The contamination occurred

because the fabric softener and ice cream cones were stored in

the same warehouse. Id. at 501. The occurrence was the

linalool "foul[ing]" Ace Baking's products, as linalool was a

unique and harmful foreign substance with respect to ice cream

cones. Id. at 505. Therefore, Ace Baking analyzed the

substance's effect on ice cream cones, not whether linalool was

beneficial in a different context. Id.

¶43 Thus, the prior pollution exclusion cases require us

to first analyze whether a substance is largely undesirable and

not universally present as to the occurrence for which coverage

is sought. Although manure may not be a pollutant when applied

to a farm field, the Falks do not seek coverage for that;

rather, they seek coverage for harm done to their neighbors'
wells. In relation to a well, manure is largely undesirable,

commonly understood to be harmful, and is not universally

present. See Hirschhorn, 338 Wis. 2d 761, ¶37.

¶44 Despite the contaminating nature of manure, the Falks

and injured parties argue that to a reasonable farmer, manure is

a universally present, desirable, and generally harmless

substance. While when safely and beneficially applied, manure

may be a universally present, desirable, and generally harmless
substance on a farm field, this ignores the occurrence for which
23
 No. Error! Reference source not found.

the Falks seek coverage. In Donaldson, abnormally high carbon

dioxide levels were not a pollutant because carbon dioxide is

universally present and generally harmless in normal

concentrations in an office building. Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at

234. A generally benign and common substance like carbon

dioxide is not a contaminant because it is "universally present

and generally harmless in all but the most unusual instances."

Id. Thus, any harm caused by an unusually high concentration of

carbon dioxide was not unambiguously pollution. Id. Similarly

in Langone, the court of appeals concluded that abnormally high

carbon monoxide concentrations in a rental property were not a

pollutant because carbon monoxide is an omnipresent substance

that people are exposed to on a daily basis. Langone, 300

Wis. 2d 742, ¶26. Thus, any harm caused by an unusually high

concentration of carbon monoxide was not unambiguously

pollution. Id.

¶45 The same cannot be said for manure. Like bat guano in

a home and lead paint chips in a home, manure is a unique and
largely undesirable substance commonly understood to be harmful

24
 No. Error! Reference source not found.

when present in a well.15 A reasonable insured would not view

manure as universally present and generally harmless when

present in a well.16

15
Indeed, a reasonable insured understands the dangerous
and polluting nature of manure. Myriad sources show how
dangerous livestock manure can be. See Wis. Admin. Code NR
§ 243.01(2) (stating that improperly managed manure can cause
groundwater or surface water pollution); U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, Literature Review, supra note 9, at 1 (warning that
though a resource, livestock manure can "degrade environmental
quality, particularly surface and ground water if not managed
appropriately. . . . Runoff related to manure is considered a
primary contributor to widespread nutrient water quality
pollution in the U.S."); U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, What's the
Problem?, supra note 9 ("When contaminants from animal waste
seep into underground sources of drinking water, the amount of
nitrate in the ground water supply can reach unhealthy levels");
R.K. Hubbard & R.R. Lowrance, U.S. Dep't of Agric., Management
of Dairy Cattle Manure, in Agricultural Utilization of
Municipal, Animal and Industrial Wastes, 92, 92 (Robert J.
Wright et al. eds., 1998) (warning by the USDA that "surface
runoff from dairy feedlots and holding areas have the highest
potential to cause water pollution [and] mismanagement in the
land application of diary cattle manure has been documented as a
cause of water pollution"); Lee Bergquist, Former DNR Regulator
Raises Concerns About Runoff From Large Dairy Operations,
Milwaukee J. Sentinel, Nov. 29, 2013
http://www.jsonline.com/news/wisconsin/former-dnr-regulator-
raises-concerns-about-runoff-from-large-dairy-operations-
b99153075z1-233855981.html ("[T]here is a 'general awareness
[among farmers] that agriculture is in fact a source of water
pollution'"). While manure is certainly beneficial when safely
applied, when it ends up in the wrong place, it pollutes.

25
 No. Error! Reference source not found.

¶46 After concluding that manure is largely undesirable,

commonly understood to be harmful, and not universally present

in a well, we next must examine whether a reasonable insured

would consider the substance causing the harm involved in the

occurrence to be a pollutant. A substance is not a pollutant

merely because it is largely undesirable and not universally

present where the occurrence happened. A pollution exclusion

bars coverage for an occurrence only if a reasonable insured

would necessarily consider the substance causing the harm

involved in the occurrence to be a pollutant under the policy.

See Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 232-33; Hirschhorn, 338 Wis. 2d

761, ¶30 ("everyday incidents [should not] be characterized as

pollution.").

¶47 For example, a pollution exclusion clause would not bar

coverage for harm that results from slipping on the spilled

contents of a bottle of Drano. Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 232

(quoting Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund v. Westchester Fire Ins.

Co., 976 F.2d 1037, 1043 (7th Cir. 1992)). Although Drano may
"'cause, under certain conditions, bodily injury or property

16
While it is true that some concentration of nitrates is
commonly found in water, Basic Information about Nitrate in
Drinking Water, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
http://water.epa.gov/drink/contaminants/basicinformation/nitrate
.cfm, (last updated Feb. 5, 2014) [hereinafter Basic
Information], a high concentration of nitrates is especially
harmful. See Preisler v. Gen. Cas. Ins. Co., 2014 WI 135, ¶46,
__ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __. Further, according to the DNR,
the injured parties were exposed to potentially lethal
pollutants, and the Jantes alleged their well was contaminated
with E. coli from the manure.

26
 No. Error! Reference source not found.

damage, one would not ordinarily characterize [slipping on

Drano] as pollution.'" Id. (quoting Pipefitters, 976 F.2d at

1043). Further, while Drano may be a unique and largely

undesirable substance on a floor, that fact alone does not

transform Drano into a pollutant. In other words, in the

hypothetical Drano example, the Drano caused harm by causing

someone to slip, not by contaminating or irritating someone

through pollution. See id. (holding harm caused by inhaling

excessive carbon dioxide is not pollution because a reasonable

insured would not consider that harm to be pollution).

¶48 The Wilson Mutual policy does not define "irritant,

"contaminant," or "waste." In Hirschhorn, a nearly identical

pollution exclusion did not define these terms either.

Hirschhorn, 338 Wis. 2d 761, ¶28. As such, we looked to

definitions used in prior pollution exclusion cases. Id., ¶29.

A substance is an irritant if it causes "inflammation, soreness,

or irritability of a bodily organ or part." Peace, 228 Wis. 2d

at 122 (quoting American Heritage Dictionary, supra, at 954). A
substance is a contaminant if it "make[s] [something] impure or

unclean by contact or mixture." Id. (quoting American Heritage

Dictionary, supra, at 406).

¶49 A reasonable insured may not consider manure safely

applied on a field to be a pollutant; however, a reasonable

insured would consider manure in a well to be a pollutant. Just

because manure may be beneficial when spread on a field, does

not mean it is not a pollutant. Manure is a contaminant as it
makes water impure or unclean when it comes into contact with or
27
 No. Error! Reference source not found.

mixes with water. The injured parties and the DNR allege that

the wells were contaminated and polluted by manure, bacteria,

and nitrates, requiring the drilling of new wells, as the wells

were unusable and the water undrinkable. See also Preisler, __

Wis. 2d __, ¶46 (explaining large concentrations of nitrates

make well water unusable). Further, as fecal matter, manure

fits within the ordinary definition of "waste," and waste is a

type of pollutant under the Wilson Mutual policy's General Farm

Liability Coverage. See Hirschhorn, 338 Wis. 2d, ¶¶34-35. The

Falks realize that manure has the potential to contaminate and

pollute wells, which is why they filed a nutrient management

plan, seeking to safely apply manure.17 Therefore, a reasonable

insured would consider manure to be a largely undesirable and

not universally present substance in a well, and would also

consider cow manure to be a pollutant; thus, manure is

unambiguously a pollutant under these circumstances.

¶50 The Falks and injured parties further argue that it

was the nitrates, not the manure, that caused the harm.
However, this argument interprets the pollution exclusion so

narrowly that our adoption of it would render the exclusion

17
Wisconsin Admin. Code NR § 151.07(3) requires that
farmers who spread manure obtain a nutrient management plan to
"limit or reduce the discharge of nutrients to waters of the
state." Washington County further recognizes the dangerousness
of improperly stored manure: "[I]mproper management of animal
waste storage facilities, including improper land application of
stored animal waste, may cause pollution of the ground and
surface waters." Washington County Code Chapter 16.01(3)(b).

28
 No. Error! Reference source not found.

almost meaningless. Nitrates of this quantity found in a well

could not occur but for excess nitrates that had formed as the

result of manure application. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Basic

Information, supra note 16. Under a causation analysis, the

nitrates could not have seeped into the well, had the manure not

been applied. No one would look at well water contaminated by

nitrates and conclude that the well is anything but polluted.

This argument further overlooks the fact that harmful bacteria

were also found in the injured parties' wells. When manure

infiltrates a well, it renders the well impure, unclean, and

contaminates the water.18

18
Our holding that manure found in a well is a pollutant is
in accord with other jurisdictions. The New York Appellate
Division held manure in a well was a pollutant. Space v. Farm
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 652 N.Y.S.2d 357 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
The plaintiffs operated a dairy farm and applied liquid manure
to their fields as fertilizer. Id. at 358. Their neighbors
brought a suit for the alleged contamination of their well due
to the over-application of manure. Id. The plaintiffs'
insurance policy excluded coverage for property damage arising
out of the discharge of pollutants. Id. The plaintiffs argued a
natural organic fertilizer that has been purposely and
beneficially applied to cropland is not a pollutant. Id. The
court explained that although the plaintiffs may have been
correct that liquid manure is not a "pollutant" when properly
applied and confined to cropland, the time and place of the
manure's initial discharge or application was not relevant. Id.
The "subsequent leachate of intentionally deposited waste
materials" was the occurrence and thus the manure was a
pollutant. Id. The court explained liquid manure is a
pollutant when "the substance has leached into the groundwater
and contaminated a well." Id. Further, even though the policy
was a "special farm package" "ordinary businessmen in the
farming community" would understand that "damages resulting from
the application of manure to cropland may be excluded from
coverage under the policy." Id. See also Weber v. IMT Ins.
Co., 462 N.W.2d 283, 286 (Iowa 1990) (explaining hog manure that
(continued)
29
 No. Error! Reference source not found.

¶51 Contrary to the Falks' argument, our holding that

manure in a well is a pollutant is in accord with Ace Baking.

Ace Baking indicated that things with a beneficial use, like

linalool in fabric softener, can be pollutants when found in

other items (such as ice cream cones). Many substances have

beneficial uses when properly applied, but can still pollute.

¶52 Finally, the Falks and injured parties argue that the

well contamination is the result of an everyday activity gone

slightly, but not surprisingly, awry. Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at

233 (explaining that a pollution exclusion should not apply for

everyday incidents gone slightly, but not surprisingly, awry);

Langone, 300 Wis. 2d 742, ¶19 (explaining that concentrated

carbon monoxide levels were a normal condition gone awry).

Manure in a well is not an everyday incident gone slightly awry.

Like many of the Falks' arguments, this one also focuses on the

spreading of manure on to a field, which was not the occurrence.

No reasonable insured could characterize manure seepage into a

well as anything but pollution. Viewed in light of the
occurrence for which the Falks seek coverage, well contamination

is not an everyday activity gone slightly, but not surprisingly,

spilled onto a road and contaminated nearby crops was
unambiguously "waste material" and a "pollutant" within the
meaning of a pollution exclusion); Wakefield Pork, Inc. v. Ram
Mut. Ins. Co., 731 N.W.2d 154 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) (holding
that the odor from pig manure was unambiguously a pollutant).

30
 No. Error! Reference source not found.

awry. A reasonable insured would therefore understand manure to

be a pollutant.19

B. The Pollution Exclusion in the Farm Chemicals Limited

Liability Endorsement Also Excludes Coverage.

¶53 We must next determine whether the Farm Chemicals

Limited Liability Endorsement provides coverage. We conclude

the endorsement does not make an initial grant of coverage for

Addicus Jante's bodily injury, and further conclude the well

contamination is excluded under this endorsement because the

Falks are being asked to respond to the effects of "pollutants."

¶54 As we noted before, "[f]irst, we examine the facts of

the insured's claim to determine whether the policy's insuring

agreement makes an initial grant of coverage. If it is clear

that the policy was not intended to cover the claim asserted,

the analysis ends there." Am. Girl, 268 Wis. 2d 16, ¶24. The

policy issued by Wilson Mutual contains an endorsement titled

"Farm Chemicals Limited Liability." The endorsement provides

coverage and will:

[P]ay those sums which an "insured" becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages for physical injury to
19
Typically, our third step is to examine whether the
exclusion has an exception: "if a particular exclusion applies,
we then look to see whether any exception to that exclusion
reinstates coverage. An exception pertains only to the
exclusion clause within which it appears; the applicability of
an exception will not create coverage if the insuring agreement
precludes it or if a separate exclusion applies." Am. Family
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Girl, Inc., 2004 WI 2, ¶24, 268 Wis. 2d 16,
673 N.W.2d 65. Because no one argues an exception applies, we
need not address it.

31
 No. Error! Reference source not found.

property if: 1. The injury is caused by the discharge,
dispersal, release, or escape of chemicals, liquids,
or gases into the air from the "insured premises".
The injury must be caused by chemicals, liquids, or
gases that the insured has used in the normal and
usual "farming" operations; and 2. The chemicals,
liquids, or gases have not been discharged, dispersed,
or released from an aircraft. [The endorsement also
explains] [t]he physical injury must be caused by an
"occurrence" during the policy period.
¶55 The endorsement's plain text covers only "physical

injury to property" (emphasis added). Thus, the endorsement

does not cover bodily injury to Addicus Jante.

¶56 We then turn to whether there is an initial grant of

coverage for the well contamination. First, we examine whether

the well contamination is physical injury to property. Wilson

Mutual argues the well contamination is loss of use, rather than

physical injury to property because the policy states

"[p]hysical injury does not include indirect or consequential

damages such as loss of use of soil, animals, crops, or other

property or loss of market." We are unconvinced and conclude

well contamination is physical injury to property. See Soc'y

Ins. v. Town of Franklin, 2000 WI App 35, ¶9, 233 Wis. 2d 207,

607 N.W.2d 342 (discussing contamination of property that

occurred due to seepage as the physical injury to property);

State v. City of Rhinelander, 2003 WI App 87, ¶¶11, 12, 263

Wis. 2d 311, 661 N.W.2d 509 (explaining that where property

damage was defined as "'injury to or destruction of tangible

property.' . . . Both the on-and off-site [groundwater]

contamination are 'property damage'"); Hellenbrand v. Hilliard,
2004 WI App 151, ¶¶33, 35, 275 Wis. 2d 741, 687 N.W.2d 37

32
 No. Error! Reference source not found.

(explaining replacement damages are distinct from loss-of-use

damages). Therefore, the well contamination is physical injury

to property.20

¶57 Second, the endorsement covers physical injury to

property caused by the seepage of liquids into wells.21 Wilson

Mutual argues that, given the endorsement's title "Farm

Chemicals Limited Liability," the endorsement applies only to

farm chemicals. Although the endorsement's title does not

mention liquids, the text does and controls over the title. See

Aiello v. Vill. Of Pleasant Prairie, 206 Wis. 2d 68, 73, 556

N.W.2d 697 (1996) (explaining text controls over title when

interpreting a statute). The endorsement's plain text provides

coverage for "physical injury to property" caused by "chemicals,

liquids, or gases." Thus, the endorsement's plain text covers

liquids, which is the form in which the manure was applied, and

may trigger an initial grant of coverage.

¶58 However, that does not end the inquiry. "If the claim

triggers the initial grant of coverage in the insuring
agreement, we next examine the various exclusions to see whether

any of them preclude coverage of the present claim." Am. Girl,

268 Wis. 2d 16, ¶24.

20
It is undisputed that the injured parties claim damages,
as required by the endorsement.
21
It is also undisputed that the liquid manure was released
into the air from the insured premises using a manure spreader,
and that the liquid manure was used in normal and usual farming
operations.

33
 No. Error! Reference source not found.

¶59 The Farm Chemicals Endorsement does have exclusions,

two of which Wilson Mutual contends are applicable. The first

exclusion states the coverage does not apply to "physical injury

to property arising out of 'farming' operations that are in

violation of an ordinance or law." The second provides:

This coverage does not apply to any loss, cost, or
expense arising out of any requests, demands, orders,
claims, or suits that the "insured" or others test
for, monitor, clean up, remove, contain, treat,
detoxify, neutralize, or in any way respond to or
assess the effects of pollutants, chemicals, liquids,
or gases.
¶60 The endorsement's exclusion barring coverage for a law

violation does not apply. Wilson Mutual has not shown that the

Falks violated a law, and the Falks correctly argue Wilson

Mutual bears the burden of proving that an exclusion applies.

Day v. Allstate Indem. Co., 2011 WI 24, ¶26, 332 Wis. 2d 571,

798 N.W.2d 199. Wilson Mutual cites to no authority for the

proposition that an unsupported allegation of a violation of law

triggers the law-violation exclusion in an insurance policy.

See State v. Boyer, 198 Wis. 2d 837, 842 n.4, 543 N.W.2d 562

(Ct. App. 1995) (stating an appellate court will not consider an

argument not supported by legal theory).

¶61 However, we conclude that the endorsement's pollution

exclusion bars coverage for harm incurred by the contamination

of the neighboring wells. Individual terms are not defined

under each endorsement, and unlike the term "pollutant"

elsewhere in the policy, "pollutant" in the endorsement is not
in quotation marks. The policy plainly states: "[r]efer to the

34
 No. Error! Reference source not found.

Definitions for words and phrases that have special meaning.

These words and phrases are shown in quotation marks or bold

type." "Pollutants" in the endorsement is neither in quotation

marks or bold type. Thus, we conclude a reasonable insured

would not consider the term "pollutant" to have special meaning

with regard to the endorsement.

¶62 However, the lack of a definition does not render the

term ambiguous. In Ace Baking, "pollutant" was not defined in

the policy, even though it was placed inside quotation marks.

Ace Baking, 164 Wis. 2d at 502. The court looked to the

dictionary definition of "pollutant" and defined a pollutant as

"'something that pollutes: a polluting substance, medium, or

agent,' and 'pollute' as, inter alia, 'to make physically impure

or unclean.'" Id. at 505 (internal citations omitted). This

definition of pollutant is substantially similar to the

definition of pollutant analyzed above. Thus, our analysis here

is the same as above, and we conclude a reasonable insured would

consider manure to be a pollutant when found in a well.
¶63 Finally, the exclusion applies because the Falks seek

coverage for a loss, cost, and expense, that arose out of

requests and demands on behalf of the DNR and the injured

parties that the Falks respond to the effects of manure. The

words "requests," "claims," and "suits" contradict the Falks'

argument that this pollution exclusion applies only to costs

incurred as a result of remediation ordered by the government;

such requests can come from any person or entity. The phrase
"in any way respond to" is also broad enough to include costs to
35
 No. Error! Reference source not found.

redrill wells and to reimburse the DNR for the grant money and

temporary clean water it provided to some of the Falks'

neighbors.22 As such, we conclude that although the endorsement

applies to liquids used in farming operations, pollutants cannot

find coverage under the Farm Chemicals Limited Liability

Endorsement just because they are also liquids.

C. The Incidental Coverages Section Provides Coverage.

¶64 Finally, we must address whether the incidental

coverages section of the Falks' policy provides coverage. We

conclude the "Damage to Property of Others" clause under the

incidental coverages section requires Wilson Mutual to indemnify

the Falks up to $500 for each unique well that was allegedly

contaminated by the Falks' manure and that Wilson Mutual has a

duty to defend the Falks.

¶65 The "Damage to Property of Others" clause under the

incidental coverages section of the Wilson Mutual policy

provides that "[r]egardless of an 'insured's' legal liability,

'we' [Wilson Mutual] pay for property of others damaged by an
'insured', or 'we' repair or replace the property, to the extent

practical, with property of like kind and quality. 'Our'

'limit' for this coverage is $500 per 'occurrence.'" The

incidental coverage section states: "The following coverages are

subjected to all the 'terms' of Coverage[] L," but the "Damage

22
The endorsement also does not apply to losses arising out
of requests to respond to the effects of liquids. The Falks'
liquid manure allegedly contaminated the wells, and as such,
even if the manure was not a pollutant, it was a liquid.

36
 No. Error! Reference source not found.

to Property of Others" clause further explains, "[t]he

exclusions that apply to Coverage[] L . . . do not apply to this

coverage." Coverage L provides: "'We' will defend a suit

seeking damages if the suit resulted from 'bodily injury' or

'property damage' not excluded under this coverage. 'We' may

make investigations and settle claims or suits that 'we' decide

are appropriate." The policy further states "'We' do not have

to provide a defense after 'we' have paid an amount equal to

'our' 'limit' as a result of a judgment, or after 'our' 'limit'

has been tendered for settlement." Wilson Mutual agrees that

coverage exists under the "Damage to Property of Others" clause;

however, it argues that it is obligated to pay only up to $500

total because there was only one occurrence. Wilson Mutual

further argues no duty to defend exists under the incidental

coverages section.

¶66 Wisconsin has adopted the "cause theory" to determine

the number of occurrences. Plastics, 315 Wis. 2d 556, ¶35.

Under the cause theory, "where a single, uninterrupted cause
results in all of the injuries and damage, there is but one

'accident' or 'occurrence.'" Welter v. Singer, 126 Wis. 2d 242,

250, 376 N.W.2d 84 (Ct. App. 1985). "If the cause is

interrupted or replaced by another cause, the chain of causation

is broken and there has been more than one accident or

occurrence." Id. (citing Olsen v. Moore, 56 Wis. 2d 340, 349,

202 N.W.2d 236 (1972)). Where the cause and result are "so

simultaneous or so closely linked in time and space as to be

37
 No. Error! Reference source not found.

considered by the average person as one event," only a single

occurrence has taken place. Id. at 251.

¶67 Because the occurrence under the Wilson Mutual policy

is well contamination, not manure application, there was an

occurrence each time manure seeped into a unique well. As such,

an "average person" would not consider the well contamination to

be one event because manure had to seep into each individual

well for the alleged contamination to occur. Further, because

the manure had to seep into each individual well, rather than

seep into one well which "fed" the other wells, it cannot be

said the seepage was "so simultaneous or so closely linked in

time and space as to be considered by the average person as one

event." Id. Similar to Plastics, where we rejected the

argument that the manufacture, sale, and installation of

asbestos containing products, without warning, constituted one

occurrence, and concluded each individual's repeated exposure to

asbestos constituted a unique occurrence, we likewise reject the

argument that the spreading of manure constituted one
occurrence, and conclude each well's exposure to manure

constituted a unique occurrence.

¶68 The "Damage to Property of Others" clause under the

incidental coverages section requires Wilson Mutual to indemnify

the Falks up to $500 for each well contaminated by the Falks'

manure. Thus, there is a $500 indemnification for each unique

well allegedly contaminated by the Falks.

¶69 The incidental coverages section also requires Wilson
Mutual defend the Falks. "The duty of defense depends on the
38
 No. Error! Reference source not found.

nature of the claim and has nothing to do with the merits of the

claim." Elliott v. Donahue, 169 Wis. 2d 310, 321, 485 N.W.2d

403 (1992). "'The insurer is under an obligation to defend only

if it could be held bound to indemnify the insured, assuming

that the injured person proved the allegations of the complaint,

regardless of the actual outcome of the case.'" Grieb v.

Citizens Cas. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 552, 558, 148 N.W.2d 103 (1967)

(internal citation omitted). "If there is any doubt about the

duty to defend, it must be resolved in favor of the insured."

Elliott, 169 Wis. 2d at 321. Where an insurer's policy provides

coverage for even one claim made in a lawsuit, that insurer is

obligated to defend the entire suit. See Doyle, 219 Wis. 2d at

284-85; Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., v. Badger Med. Supply Co., 191

Wis. 2d 229, 242, 528 N.W.2d 486 (Ct. App. 1995).

¶70 Thus, because the Wilson Mutual policy provides

coverage for manure seepage-related claims through the

incidental coverages section, Wilson Mutual has a duty to defend

the entire suit. However, the Wilson Mutual policy clearly
states Wilson Mutual has no duty to provide a defense once it

has paid its limit, either because of a judgment, or because of

a settlement. Wilson Mutual has the right, under the policy, to

settle. While we take no position on whether Wilson Mutual

should settle, if Wilson Mutual decides to settle each claim for

$500, the policy language plainly states its duty to defend is

complete, as no other policy provision would indemnify the

Falks.
IV. CONCLUSION
39
 No. Error! Reference source not found.

¶71 We hold that the pollution exclusion clause in Wilson

Mutual's General Farm Coverage Liability policy issued to the

Falks unambiguously excludes coverage for well contamination

caused by the seepage of cow manure. First, we conclude that

cow manure falls unambiguously within the policy's definition of

"pollutants" when it enters a well. Second, we conclude the

Farm Chemicals Limited Liability Endorsement likewise excludes

coverage for "physical injury to property" resulting from

pollutants. Finally, we conclude that the "Damage to Property

of Others" clause under the incidental coverages section

provides incidental coverage up to $500 for each unique well

that has allegedly been contaminated by the Falks' manure, and

Wilson Mutual has a duty to defend. Accordingly, the decision

of the court of appeals is reversed and we remand to the circuit

court for further proceedings consistent with our holding.

By the Court.-The decision of the court of appeals is reversed,

and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶72 DAVID T. PROSSER, J., did not participate.

40
 No. 2013AP691 & 2013AP776.awb

¶73 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (concurring). I agree with

the majority that "Wisconsin is in the jurisdictional majority

in defining an occurrence as unexpected or unintended resultant

damage." Majority op., ¶32. I further agree with the

application of that definition. Id., ¶¶33-34.

¶74 We part ways, however, when the majority strays from

its original occurrence analysis and inconsistently states that

"Wisconsin has adopted a 'cause theory.'" Id., ¶66.

Additionally, for the reasons set forth in the dissent, I do not

agree with the majority's interpretation of the Farm Chemicals

Limited Liability Endorsement. Dissent, ¶131. Accordingly, I

respectfully concur.

1
 No. 2013AP691 & 2013AP776.ssa

¶75 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J. (dissenting). I would

affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

¶76 This case requires us to interpret a standard

pollution exclusion clause in the insurance policy titled

"FARMOWNERS policy" issued to Robert and Jane Falk. The issue

is whether cow manure that the Falks spread over their land that

caused damage to nearby wells is a "pollutant" under the

pollution exclusion clause in their FARMOWNERS policy.

¶77 If the pollution exclusion clause bars coverage, then

the court must interpret two other policy provisions: the

incidental coverages section and the Farm Chemicals Limited

Liability Endorsement.

¶78 The extent of Wilson Mutual's liability under the

incidental coverages section depends on how many "occurrences"

there were.

¶79 Whether Wilson Mutual is liable under the Farm

Chemicals Limited Liability Endorsement depends on whether the
endorsement's remediation exclusion is applicable.

¶80 The majority opinion concludes that "manure is

unambiguously a pollutant when it seeps into a well."1 The

majority opinion's approach to this issue unnecessarily departs

from precedent, undercuts the limiting principles our prior

cases have applied, and further confuses this murky area of the

law.

1
Majority op., ¶36.

1
 No. 2013AP691 & 2013AP776.ssa

¶81 The majority opinion further concludes that the Falks

are covered under the incidental coverages section, which

obligates Wilson Mutual to pay $500 per occurrence. The

majority opinion determines that there were "five unique

occurrences" in this case: "[E]ach time there was 'property

damage' to a unique well, there was an occurrence."2 In

discussing the number of occurrences, the majority opinion

contradicts itself and assumes facts not established in the

summary judgment record.

¶82 Furthermore, the majority opinion's discussions of

what constitutes an occurrence and of whether a substance is a

pollutant are inconsistent with the court's approach to those

issues in Preisler v. General Casualty Insurance Co., 2014 WI

135, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, mandated on this same

date. I write on substantially similar issues in my dissent in

Preisler. My dissents in Preisler and in the instant case

should be read together.

¶83 Finally, the majority opinion determines that coverage

is barred under an exclusion within the Farm Chemicals Limited

Liability Endorsement. This interpretation of the exclusion

renders the endorsement illusory and superfluous.

¶84 I conclude that a reasonable person in the position of

the Falks, farmers insured under a FARMOWNERS policy, would not

consider manure a pollutant under the policy's pollution

exclusion clause. Thus, I would not bar coverage.

2
Id., ¶33, 34.

2
 No. 2013AP691 & 2013AP776.ssa

¶85 If the majority is unwilling to adhere to our

longstanding practice of honoring the expectations of the

reasonable insured, then I would remand the cause to the circuit

court so the parties can produce evidence regarding the Falks'

expectations of coverage and the objective reasonableness of

those expectations. Summary judgment should not be granted

before the parties have that opportunity.

¶86 If coverage is barred by the pollution exclusion

clause, I would find coverage under both the incidental

coverages section and the endorsement.

¶87 Accordingly, I dissent.

I

¶88 Robert and Jane Falk, the insureds in this case, are

dairy farmers. They own roughly 600 head of cattle and more

than 1,670 acres of land. Like countless other dairy farmers in

this state, the Falks fertilize their fields with liquid manure

from their dairy cows. Farmers must spread manure to ensure the

success of their crops, which are their livelihood. Manure is

"universally present and generally harmless" on farmland.3

¶89 In early 2011, the Falks spread liquid manure on their

farm as they had done in previous years. Shortly thereafter,

the Falks' neighbors discovered that manure had contaminated

their wells. The Department of Natural Resources confirmed that

manure spread by the Falks had seeped into five neighbors'

wells, contaminating the water.

3
See Donaldson v. Urban Land Interests, Inc., 211
Wis. 2d 224, 234, 564 N.W.2d 728 (1997).

3
 No. 2013AP691 & 2013AP776.ssa

¶90 During this time, the Falks were insured under a

FARMOWNERS policy issued by Wilson Mutual. Wilson Mutual

contends that manure is a "pollutant" and thus that coverage for

this incident is barred by the policy's pollution exclusion

clause. The Falks argue that manure is not a pollutant and thus

that the FARMOWNERS policy should cover their liability for the

well contamination.

II

¶91 The following principles govern the court's

interpretation of the insurance policy provisions at issue, as

they govern interpretation of all insurance contract provisions.4

• Words and phrases in insurance contracts are subject

to the same rules of construction that apply to

contracts generally.

• The primary objective in interpreting and construing a

contract is to ascertain and carry out the true intent

of the parties.

• If the language of an insurance policy is unambiguous,

a court will not rewrite the policy by construction

and will interpret the policy according to its plain

and ordinary meaning to avoid imposing contract

obligations that the parties did not undertake.

• Words and phrases in an insurance policy are ambiguous

when they are so imprecise and elastic as to lack any

certain interpretation or are susceptible to more than

4
See Frost ex rel. Anderson v. Whitbeck, 2002 WI 129, ¶¶15-
22, 257 Wis. 2d 80, 654 N.W.2d 225.

4
 No. 2013AP691 & 2013AP776.ssa

one reasonable construction. Terms of an insurance

policy may be inherently ambiguous or may be ambiguous

when considered in the context of the insurance policy

as a whole. Whether ambiguity exists in an insurance

policy is a question of law.

• Ambiguous terms are to be construed against the

insurance company that drafted the policy. Ambiguous

terms are to be construed in favor of coverage, and

exclusions are to be narrowly construed against the

insurance company.

• Language in an insurance policy is construed as

understood by a reasonable person in the position of

the insured rather than as intended by the insurance

company. The insured's reasonable expectations of

coverage should be furthered by the interpretation

given.

• Furthermore, in construing an insurance policy as it

is understood by a reasonable person in the position

of the insured, a court may consider the purpose or

subject matter of the insurance contract, the

situation of the parties, and the circumstances

surrounding the creation of the contract.

• A construction of an insurance policy that gives

reasonable meaning to every provision of the policy is

preferable to one leaving part of the language useless

or meaningless.

5
 No. 2013AP691 & 2013AP776.ssa

¶92 I now apply these interpretive principles to the three

policy provisions at issue.

III

¶93 I begin with the pollution exclusion clause.

¶94 The "Personal Liability Coverage (Farm)" section of

the Falks' FARMOWNERS policy includes the following exclusion:

"We" do not pay for a loss if one or more of the
following excluded events apply to the loss,
regardless of other causes or events that contribute
to or aggravate the loss, whether such causes or
events act to produce the loss before, at the same
time as, or after the excluded event.

. . . .

l. "bodily injury" or "property damage" which results
from the actual, alleged, or threatened discharge,
dispersal, seepage, migration, release, or escape of
"pollutants" into or upon land, water, or air.
¶95 The policy defines "pollutant" as "any solid, liquid,

gaseous, thermal, or radioactive irritant or contaminant,

including acids, alkalis, chemicals, fumes, smoke, soot, vapor

and waste. Waste includes materials to be recycled, reclaimed,

or reconditioned, as well as disposed of."

¶96 Pollution exclusion clauses present a particular

interpretive challenge, as this court has acknowledged.5 The

5
In some cases, courts have viewed similarly worded
pollution exclusion clauses ambiguous and thus have not barred
recovery. See, e.g., Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 235 (the
insurance policy's definition of "pollutant" was ambiguous;
thus, the landlord insured could recover for damage caused by
carbon dioxide).

(continued)
6
 No. 2013AP691 & 2013AP776.ssa

language of a standard pollution exclusion clause is "virtually

boundless, for there is virtually no substance or chemical in

existence that would not irritate or damage some person or

property."6 Thus, this court has concluded that "[w]ithout some

limiting principle, the pollution exclusion clause would extend

far beyond its intended scope, and lead to some absurd results."7

¶97 Because the court construes insurance policy

provisions as would a reasonable insured, this court has held

that pollution exclusion clauses do not bar coverage when

"injuries result[] from everyday activities gone slightly, but

not surprisingly, awry."8

¶98 To dairy farmers like the Falks, spreading manure is

indisputably an everyday activity. Manure is a substance with

which the Falks routinely work in the course of their ordinary

farming operations.

In other cases, courts have viewed similarly worded
pollution exclusion clauses as unambiguous and barred recovery.
See, e.g., Hirschhorn v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2012 WI 20, ¶47,
338 Wis. 2d 761, 809 N.W.2d 529 (bat guano unambiguously falls
within the policy's definition of "pollutants," thereby
precluding coverage); Peace ex rel. Lerner v. N.W. Nat'l Ins.
Co., 228 Wis. 2d 106, 136, 596 N.W.2d 429 (1999) (the policy's
definition of "pollutant" was unambiguous, lead paint was a
pollutant, and coverage was properly denied).
6
Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 232 (quoting Pipefitters Welfare
Educ. Fund v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 1037, 1043
(7th Cir. 1992)).
7
Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 232 (quoting Pipefitters, 976
F.2d at 1043).
8
See Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 233.

7
 No. 2013AP691 & 2013AP776.ssa

¶99 In addition, farmers like the Falks apply manure to

their land precisely in order to have it seep into the soil.

Seepage is the whole point. Seepage into neighbors' wells, the

injury in the present case, thus resulted from an everyday

activity "gone slightly, but not surprisingly, awry."9

¶100 A court keeps the underlying purpose and subject

matter of the insurance in mind when construing policy

provisions. The Falks purchased this FARMOWNERS policy to cover

their liability for injury to the person or property of others

caused by their farming operations. A reasonable insured would

not consider manure a pollutant under a FARMOWNERS policy it

purchased specifically to cover its liability for injury to the

person or property of others caused by farming operations.

Rather, as the court of appeals put it, a reasonable insured in

the position of the Falks would view manure as "liquid gold."10

¶101 A pollution exclusion clause is ambiguous when the

insured could reasonably expect coverage under the facts of the

case.11 The FARMOWNERS policy's failure to identify manure

specifically as a pollutant made the pollution exclusion clause

ambiguous in the context of this FARMOWNERS policy. Ambiguous

clauses are construed against the insurance company. Thus, the

9
Id.
10
Wilson Mut. Ins. Co. v. Falk, 2014 WI App 10, ¶15, 352
Wis. 2d 461, 844 N.W.2d 380.
11
Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 233.

8
 No. 2013AP691 & 2013AP776.ssa

pollution exclusion clause should be construed against the

insurance company.12

¶102 In sum, I conclude that a reasonable insured in the

position of the Falks would expect coverage under their

FARMOWNERS policy for damage caused by manure that they spread

as fertilizer on their farmland. The insured's reasonable

expectations of coverage must be honored. Thus, I conclude that

the pollution exclusion clause does not bar coverage in the

present case.

¶103 Many cases in other jurisdictions similarly limit the

scope of pollution exclusion clauses by adhering to the

reasonable insured's expectations of coverage. See, for

example, the following cases:

• Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kellman, 197 F.3d 1178,
1183 (6th Cir. 1999) (reasonable person in the
position of insured construction contractor would
expect coverage for injuries suffered by employee
who breathed fumes from chemicals the contractor
sprayed a few feet away despite pollution exclusion
clause in construction contractor's insurance
policy);

• Reg'l Bank of Colo., N.A. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 35 F.3d 494, 498 (10th Cir. 1994) (insured
landlord would not characterize carbon monoxide

12
For cases using similar reasoning, see W. Alliance Ins.
Co. v. Gill, 686 N.E.2d 997 (Mass. 1997) (reasonable insured
restaurant owner would expect coverage for patron's carbon
monoxide poisoning, which was caused by a defective oven,
despite pollution exclusion); Hocker Oil Co. v. Barker-Phillips-
Jackson, Inc., 997 S.W.2d 510, 518 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999)
(reasonable person in the position of insured gasoline
transporting company would not consider gasoline that spilled a
pollutant).

9
 No. 2013AP691 & 2013AP776.ssa

emitted from a malfunctioning residential heater as
"pollution");

• W. Alliance Ins. Co. v. Gill, 686 N.E.2d 997 (Mass.
1997) (reasonable insured restaurant owner would
expect coverage for patron's carbon monoxide
poisoning, which was caused by a defective oven,
despite the pollution exclusion);

• Hocker Oil Co. v. Barker-Phillips-Jackson, Inc., 997
S.W.2d 510, 518 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (reasonable
person in the position of insured gasoline
transporting company would not consider gasoline a
pollutant);

• Island Assocs., Inc. v. Eric Grp., Inc., 894
F. Supp. 200, 203 (W.D. Pa. 1995) (reasonable person
in the position of insured asbestos abatement
subcontractor would not consider cleaning supply
fumes pollutants);

• Langone v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2007 WI App
121, ¶28, 300 Wis. 2d 742, 731 N.W.2d 334
(reasonable person in the position of insured
landlord would expect coverage for tenant's death
caused by carbon monoxide poisoning from a poorly
installed boiler despite pollution exclusion clause
in landlord's insurance policy).
¶104 The majority opinion fails to adhere to the

longstanding practice in this and many other courts of honoring

the expectations of the reasonable insured in interpreting a

pollution exclusion clause.

¶105 The majority's interpretation of the pollution

exclusion clause is unpersuasive. It sets forth the following

test for whether a substance is a pollutant:

Whether a substance is a pollutant is evaluated from
the standpoint of a reasonable insured. Our line of
pollution exclusion cases reveals that a reasonable
insured would consider a substance to be a pollutant
if (1) the substance is largely undesirable and not
universally present in the context of the occurrence
that the insured seeks coverage for; and (2) a
reasonable insured would consider the substance
10
 No. 2013AP691 & 2013AP776.ssa

causing the harm involved in the occurrence to be a
pollutant.13
¶106 Despite the majority opinion's claim that this test is

grounded in precedent, in fact it sharply diverges from

precedent. Part (1) of the test takes a far narrower view of

what constitutes a pollutant than the court has taken in past

cases. Part (2) of the test simply restates the premise that we

construe the pollution exclusion clause from the perspective of

the reasonable insured.

¶107 Regarding part (1) of its test, the majority opinion

concludes that "[w]hile when safely and beneficially applied,

manure may be a universally present, desirable, and generally

harmless substance,"14 it is nevertheless a "largely undesirable

substance commonly understood to be harmful when present in a

well."15

¶108 Regarding part (2) of its test, the majority concludes

that "[a] reasonable insured would consider manure in a well to

be a pollutant."16 Who wouldn't?

¶109 The essence of the majority's analysis is that manure
is a pollutant when it pollutes. Using this reasoning, every

substance that pollutes is a pollutant. This reasoning simply

begs the question.

13
Majority op., ¶38.
14
Id., ¶44.
15
Id., ¶45.
16
Id., ¶49 (emphasis in original).

11
 No. 2013AP691 & 2013AP776.ssa

¶110 The point this court has made again and again in cases

involving pollution exclusion clauses is that "there is

virtually no substance or chemical in existence that would not

irritate or damage some person or property."17 Thus, "[t]he

reach of the pollution exclusion clause must be circumscribed by

reasonableness, lest the contractual promise of coverage be

reduced to a dead letter."18

¶111 By contending that at the moment the substance

contaminates it becomes a pollutant under the policy, the

majority opinion allows the pollution exclusion clause to extend

far beyond the limited scope we have permitted in prior cases,

leading to absurd results.

¶112 If the majority is unwilling to apply our general

rules for interpreting insurance policies, which honor the

expectations of the reasonable insured, then the majority should

remand the case to the circuit court to allow the parties to

develop a factual record regarding the reasonable expectations

of the insured.

¶113 The parties are here on summary judgment. The Falks

contend that they expected coverage. It is unclear what

representations Wilson Mutual may have made to the Falks about

their coverage. Summary judgment is inappropriate when the

Falks have not had a chance to prove their expectations and the

17
Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 232 (quoting Pipefitters, 976
F.2d at 1043).
18
Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 233.

12
 No. 2013AP691 & 2013AP776.ssa

objective reasonableness of those expectations. Remanding the

matter would conform to prior cases that have explored the

subjective expectations of the insured.

IV

¶114 Because the majority opinion concludes that coverage

is barred under the pollution exclusion clause, it considers

whether the incidental coverages section provides some lesser

coverage. This section of the FARMOWNERS policy states in

relevant part:

The following coverages . . . do not increase the
"limits" stated for the Principal Coverages.

1. Damage to Property of Others – Regardless of an
"insured's" legal liability, "we" pay for property of
others damaged by an "insured", or "we" repair or
replace the property, to the extent practical, with
property of the like kind and quality. "Our" "limit"
for this coverage is $500 per "occurrence."
(Emphasis added.)

¶115 In my view, the incidental coverages section is not an

issue in the present case because the pollution exclusion clause

does not bar coverage under the principal coverages section. If

the pollution exclusion bars coverage, I agree that the Falks

can recover $500 per occurrence under the incidental coverages

section. I disagree, however, with the majority opinion's

approach to determining the number of occurrences.

¶116 The majority correctly notes the policy's definition

of "occurrence" ("an accident, including repeated exposures to

similar conditions, that results in 'bodily injury' or 'property
damage' during the policy period"), but its application of that

definition is problematic for at least two reasons.
13
 No. 2013AP691 & 2013AP776.ssa

¶117 First, the majority opinion contradicts itself.

¶118 The majority opinion initially states that "Wisconsin

is in the jurisdictional majority in defining an occurrence as

unexpected or unintended resultant damage."19 The majority

opinion then concludes that "the exposure of manure to each well

constituted an occurrence"20 because the damage in this case was

"seepage of manure into the neighboring wells."21

¶119 Later on, the majority opinion states that "Wisconsin

has adopted the 'cause theory,'" which holds that "where a

single, uninterrupted cause results in all of the injuries and

damage, there is but one accident or occurrence."22

19
Majority op., ¶32.
20
Id., ¶33.
21
Id., ¶32.
22
Majority op., ¶66 (citing Plastics Eng'g Co. v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 WI 13, ¶67, 315 Wis. 2d 556, 759 N.W.2d 613;
quoting Welter v. Singer, 126 Wis. 2d 242, 250, 376 N.W.2d 84).

Plastics Engineering, 315 Wis. 2d 556, ¶38, states:

The general rule is that an occurrence is determined
by the cause or causes of the resulting injury. . . .

The fact that there were multiple injuries and that
they were of different magnitudes and that injuries
extended over a period of time does not alter our
conclusion that there was a single occurrence. As
long as the injuries stem from one proximate cause,
there is a single occurrence.

(Quoting Welter, 126 Wis. 2d at 250-51).

14
 No. 2013AP691 & 2013AP776.ssa

¶120 Was the cause of the damage or the damage itself the

occurrence in this case? The majority opinion does not provide

a clear answer to this question.

¶121 The majority opinion's discussion of "occurrence" is

inconsistent with the discussion of occurrence in the majority

opinion in Preisler v. General Casualty Insurance Co., 2014 WI

135, ¶¶24-28, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___. In her

concurring opinion in Preisler, Justice Bradley persuasively

explains that the majority opinion's discussion of occurrence in

Preisler is unnecessary, internally contradictory,23 and

inconsistent with the instant case. I join Justice Bradley's

criticisms of the discussion of occurrence in Preisler. These

criticisms apply to the majority opinion in the instant case, as

well.

¶122 Second, the majority opinion assumes facts not

established in the summary judgment record.

¶123 The majority opinion determines there were five

occurrences in this case because five wells were contaminated.

It appears to assume that manure seeped into each well just

once, and thus that there was only one cause or incidence of

damage per well. The record does not support this conclusion.

The majority opinion overlooks the fact that a single piece of

23
"It is unclear whether the majority is embarking on a
cause approach or damage approach in determining what
constitutes an occurrence." Preisler v. Gen. Cas. Ins. Co.,
2014 WI 135, ¶___, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Bradley, J.,
concurring).

15
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property can be damaged multiple times and that there can be

different causes for each incidence of damage.

¶124 The majority opinion further overlooks the ambiguity

in the record regarding what the "accident" was. It concludes

the accident was seepage of manure into the well. However, if

the Falks over-applied or otherwise misapplied manure to their

farmland, the accident might instead be considered that

misapplication. If the accident was the Falks' misapplication

of manure to their farmland, then there may have been just one

occurrence in this case. The record does not reveal how many

times the Falks fertilized their land in early 2011 or whether

it was one particular application of fertilizer, or the

cumulative effect of multiple applications over a period of

time, that caused manure to seep into their neighbors' wells.

¶125 These are fact questions that the summary judgment

record does not resolve. Summary judgment should not be granted

on this issue before the parties have the opportunity to further

develop the factual record.

V

¶126 I turn to the Farm Chemicals Limited Liability

Endorsement. The endorsement states in relevant part:

"We" pay those sums which an "insured" becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages for physical injury to
property if:

1. The injury is caused by the discharge, dispersal,
release, or escape of chemicals, liquids, or gases
into the air from the "insured premises". The injury
must be caused by chemicals, liquids, or gases that
the "insured" has used in the normal and usual
"farming" operations[.]

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¶127 The endorsement includes various exclusions, as well.

The exclusion relevant here is as follows:

This coverage does not apply to any loss, cost, or
expense arising out of any requests, demands, orders,
claims, or suits that the "insured" or others test
for, monitor, clean up, remove, contain, treat,
detoxify, neutralize, or in any way respond to or
assess the effects of pollutants, chemicals, liquids,
or gases.
¶128 On its face, this exclusion can be read to negate all

coverage provided by the endorsement, rendering the endorsement

useless.

¶129 The endorsement first states that Wilson Mutual will

pay "damages for physical injury to property . . . caused by the

discharge, dispersal, release, or escape of chemicals, liquids,

or gases into the air . . . ." The endorsement then excludes

from coverage "any loss, cost, or expense arising out of any

requests . . . or suits that the 'insured' or others . . . in

any way respond to or assess the effects of pollutants,

chemicals, liquids, or gases."

¶130 Manure used as fertilizer is indisputably a liquid.

If a lawsuit against the Falks seeking money damages constitutes

a "suit that the 'insured' . . . in any way respond to . . . the

effects of" manure, then the endorsement provides no coverage at

all.

¶131 The majority opinion adopts this literal

interpretation, concluding that "well contamination is excluded

under this endorsement because the Falks are being asked to

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respond to the effects of 'pollutants.'"24 The majority opinion

violates the rule that "[a] construction of an insurance policy

that gives reasonable meaning to every provision of the policy

is preferable to one leaving part of the language useless or

meaningless."25 The majority opinion also ignores the principles

that "ambiguous terms are to be construed in favor of coverage"

and that "exclusions are to be narrowly construed against an

insurer."26

¶132 Although the text of the endorsement could be clearer,

a careful reading of the text and a review of case law shows

that the exclusion at issue bars coverage only when the insured

has been ordered to undertake remediation.27 The exclusion does

not bar coverage when, as in the instant case, the claimants

seek to recover money damages.28 By overlooking this

distinction, the majority opinion renders the endorsement

illusory and mere surplusage.

¶133 In sum, I conclude that a reasonable person in the

position of the Falks, insured farmers, would not consider

24
Majority op., ¶53.
25
Frost, 257 Wis. 2d 80, ¶21.
26
Id., ¶19.
27
See Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis. v. Hills, 209 Wis. 2d 167, 180,
561 N.W.2d 718 (1997) (when parties other than the EPA and DNR
sought compensatory monetary damages for past injuries insured
allegedly inflicted, suit was brought against insured for
damages under the policy).
28
Hills, 209 Wis. 2d at 185.

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manure a pollutant under the pollution exclusion clause of the

FARMOWNERS policy. Thus, I would not bar coverage.

¶134 If the majority is unwilling to adhere to this court's

longstanding practice of honoring the expectations of the

reasonable insured, then I would remand the cause to the circuit

court so the parties can produce evidence regarding the Falks'

expectations of coverage and the objective reasonableness of

those expectations. Summary judgment should not be granted

before the parties have that opportunity.

¶135 If coverage is barred by the pollution exclusion

clause, coverage is available to the Falks under both the

incidental coverages section and the endorsement. However,

because there are insufficient facts in the summary judgment

record to determine what the occurrence was or what the number

of occurrences were in this case, I would leave that issue for

the circuit court to decide after further development of the

factual record.

¶136 In conclusion, I note that on the same day the court

heard argument on the instant case, it heard argument on another

case involving damage caused by septage and a substantially

similar pollution exclusion clause. See Preisler v. Gen. Cas.

Ins. Co., 2014 WI 135, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___. As a

result of our new procedure for opinion preparation and mandate,

Preisler and Wilson Mutual were on different orbits of

circulation with different deadlines, there was no conference to

discuss the draft opinions, and it was difficult to make the two
opinions consistent. Even upon their release, the opinions

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remain inconsistent. The core function of courts is, of course,

consistent and reliable application of the law. I set forth the

new procedure for opinion preparation and mandate in full in my

concurring opinion in State v. Gonzalez, 2014 WI 124, ¶¶25-40,

___ Wis. 2d ___. ___ N.W.2d ___ (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).

¶137 For the reasons set forth, I dissent.

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