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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
DANIEL JAY KERR
Appellant No. 982 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 15, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0017081-2013
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., JENKINS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED JANUARY 09, 2015
Appellant, Daniel Jay Kerr, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, following his bench
trial convictions for harassment and criminal mischief.1 We affirm
Appellant’s convictions but vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for
resentencing.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows.
Sherra Burley [(“Victim”)] testified that she was dating
[Appellant] during the month of November, 2013. She
testified that she was with [Appellant] on November 3,
2013, between 2:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. outside a bar.
She testified that she had two or three beers prior to
meeting [Appellant]. She explained that [Appellant] was
upset with her because she was out late. He grabbed her
____________________________________________
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2709(a)(1), 3304, respectively.
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hand and began pulling her down the street. She stated
that she was staggering because she was wearing high
heels and he was pulling her down the street. She
testified that she then tried to make a phone call to find a
ride home. While she was trying to make the call,
[Appellant] “snatched” the phone from her hand.
[Appellant] grabbed the phone and threw it to the ground
and broke the phone. [Victim] picked up the phone.
[Appellant] grabbed it again and threw it to the ground
again. The phone was completely shattered. At that
point, [Appellant] pushed [Victim] “real hard” at her
collarbone area. She fell back to the ground and hit her
head. She got up and tried to walk away from [Appellant].
[Appellant] followed her for approximately 50 feet.
[Victim] then sat down on the curb where she and
[Appellant] exchanged unpleasantries. [Victim] testified
that she was “scared.” [Appellant] told her to be quiet for
fear that someone “would call the cops.” At that point,
[Appellant] grabbed her shoulder and “kneed” her in the
stomach. He then struck her with an open hand in the
face. She testified that she was in pain and she was
bleeding. [Appellant] spit in her face. [Victim] eventually
walked to [Appellant’s] grandmother’s house where she
telephoned the police.
City of Pittsburgh Police Officer Gregory McGee testified
that he responded to the scene of the incident. Officer
McGee testified that [Victim] was upset and afraid of
[Appellant]. Officer McGee noticed redness and swelling
on the left side of [Victim’s] face. Officer McGee
transported [Victim] to her apartment. Officer McGee
testified that he spent approximately 30 minutes with
[Victim] and she did not appear intoxicated nor did she
emit any odor of alcohol.
(Trial Court Opinion, filed July 29, 2014, at 1-2).
Following a bench trial, the court convicted Appellant of the summary
offenses of harassment and criminal mischief. On May 15, 2014, the court
sentenced Appellant to ninety (90) days’ imprisonment for the summary
harassment conviction. The court sentenced Appellant to a consecutive term
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of ninety (90) days’ probation for the summary criminal mischief conviction.
Appellant did not file post-sentence motions.
Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on Monday, June 16, 2014.
That same day, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of
errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant
timely filed a Rule 1925(b) statement on July 7, 2014.
Appellant raises one issue for our review:
WAS THE EVIDENCE INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT
[APPELLANT] OF HARASSMENT, IN VIOLATION OF 18
PA.C.S.A. § 2709(a)(1), WHERE [VICTIM’S] TESTIMONY
WAS INHERENTLY UNTRUSTWORTHY AND [APPELLANT]
PRESENTED A COHERENT AND CANDID ACCOUNT OF THE
EVENTS ON THE EVENING IN QUESTION?
(Appellant’s Brief at 5).
On appeal, Appellant contends Victim provided an inconsistent and
inherently untrustworthy account of the incident. Appellant emphasizes
Victim’s admission that she consumed alcohol shortly before the incident.
Appellant claims Officer McGee contradicted Victim’s testimony about her
injuries, because the officer did not observe scratches, bleeding, or bruises
to Victim’s stomach or head. Appellant also argues the incident was not as
dire as Victim’s testimony suggested, because Officer McGee did not take
Victim to apply for a protection from abuse order immediately afterward.
Likewise, Appellant notes Victim’s testimony that she was screaming and
crying during the altercation; nevertheless, Victim did not knock on any
doors in search of assistance, and no one attempted to help her. In light of
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the purported inconsistencies in Victim’s testimony, Appellant asserts the
court should have relied on Appellant’s own rendition of the underlying facts.
Significantly, Appellant reiterates his trial testimony that he did not kick or
strike Victim. Appellant concludes the Commonwealth presented insufficient
evidence to support his harassment conviction. We cannot agree.
Initially, we observe:
A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is entirely
distinct from a challenge to the weight of the evidence.
The distinction between these two challenges is
critical. A claim challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence, if granted, would preclude retrial under the
double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution, and Article I,
Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, whereas
a claim challenging the weight of the evidence if
granted would permit a second trial.
A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is
a question of law. Evidence will be deemed sufficient
to support the verdict when it establishes each
material element of the crime charged and the
commission thereof by the accused, beyond a
reasonable doubt. Where the evidence offered to
support the verdict is in contradiction to the physical
facts, in contravention to human experience and the
laws of nature, then the evidence is insufficient as a
matter of law. When reviewing a sufficiency claim
the court is required to view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict winner giving the
prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences
to be drawn from the evidence.
A motion for new trial on the grounds that the
verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence,
concedes that there is sufficient evidence to sustain
the verdict. Thus, the trial court is under no
obligation to view the evidence in the light most
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favorable to the verdict winner. An allegation that
the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is
addressed to the discretion of the trial court. A new
trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict
in the testimony or because the judge on the same
facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. A
trial judge must do more than reassess the
credibility of the witnesses and allege that he would
not have assented to the verdict if he were a juror.
Trial judges, in reviewing a claim that the verdict is
against the weight of the evidence do not sit as the
thirteenth juror. Rather, the role of the trial judge is
to determine that notwithstanding all the facts,
certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to
ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the
facts is to deny justice.
Commonwealth v. Smith, 853 A.2d 1020, 1028 (Pa.Super. 2004) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560 Pa. 308, 318-20, 744 A.2d 745, 751-52
(2000)). See also Commonwealth v. Wilson, 825 A.2d 710 (Pa.Super.
2003) (holding sufficiency of evidence review does not include assessment of
credibility of witness testimony; review of credibility of witness testimony
constitutes weight of evidence challenge).
Generally, an appellant must preserve a weight of the evidence
challenge by filing a motion in the trial court:
Rule 607. Challenges to the Weight of the Evidence
(A) A claim that the verdict was against the weight of
the evidence shall be raised with the trial judge in a
motion for a new trial:
(1) orally, on the record, at any time before
sentencing;
(2) by written motion at any time before sentencing;
or
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(3) in a post-sentence motion.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A). “As noted in the comment to Rule 607, the purpose of
this rule is to make it clear that a challenge to the weight of the evidence
must be raised with the trial judge or it will be waived.” Commonwealth v.
Gillard, 850 A.2d 1273, 1277 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 581 Pa.
672, 863 A.2d 1143 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). A claim
challenging the weight of the evidence generally cannot be raised for the
first time in a Rule 1925(b) statement. Commonwealth v. Burkett, 830
A.2d 1034 (Pa.Super. 2003). An appellant’s failure to avail himself of any of
the prescribed methods for presenting a weight of the evidence issue to the
trial court constitutes waiver of that claim, even if the trial court responds to
the claim in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. Id.
Additionally, the Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines the offense of
harassment as follows:
§ 2709. Harassment
(a) Offense defined.—A person commits the crime
of harassment when, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm
another, the person:
(1) strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects the
other person to physical contact, or attempts or
threatens to do the same;
* * *
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709(a)(1).
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Instantly, Appellant attacks the credibility of Victim’s testimony. As
such, Appellant actually challenges the weight of the evidence supporting
the harassment conviction. See Smith, supra; Wilson, supra. Here,
Appellant failed to challenge the weight of the evidence before sentencing or
in a post-sentence motion. Instead, Appellant raised his claim for the first
time in his Rule 1925(b) statement. Therefore, Appellant’s challenge to the
weight of the evidence is waived. See Gillard, supra; Pa.R.Crim.P. 607.
Even if Appellant had properly preserved his weight challenge, no relief
is due. The trial court evaluated Appellant’s claim as follows:
[The trial court] determined that the testimony of [Victim]
and Officer McGee was credible. [The trial court] did not
find that [Appellant’s] testimony was credible. The
credible testimony of [Victim] and Officer McGee
established that [Victim] was not intoxicated at the time of
the incident. [Victim’s] testimony established that
[Appellant] pushed her in the shoulder causing her to fall
back and hit her head. Her testimony also established that
[Appellant] “kneed” her and struck her in the face with an
open hand. [Appellant] also spit in [Victim’s] face. Officer
McGee’s testimony corroborated [Victim’s] testimony as
Officer McGee testified that he observed redness and
swelling on [Victim’s] face. The credible evidence
established that [Appellant] struck [Victim] in the face,
shoved her near her collarbone and kicked (or “kneed”)
her in the stomach with the intent to harass, annoy or
alarm her.
(See Trial Court Opinion at 4-5.) The court credited Victim’s version of the
facts regarding the assault. Even if properly preserved, we would see no
error in the court’s resolution of Appellant’s claim. See Commonwealth v.
Champney, 574 Pa. 435, 444, 832 A.2d 403, 408 (2003), cert. denied, 542
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U.S. 939, 124 S.Ct. 2906, 159 L.Ed.2d 816 (2004) (explaining weight of
evidence is exclusively for finder of fact who is free to believe all, part, or
none of evidence and to determine the credibility of witnesses; appellate
court cannot substitute its judgment for that of finder of fact).
Nevertheless, we do see in the record a problem with the legality of
Appellant’s sentence. See Commonwealth v. Randal, 837 A.2d 1211
(Pa.Super. 2003) (en banc) (stating appellate court can raise and review
legality of sentence sua sponte); Commonwealth v. Watson, 945 A.2d
174, 178-79 (Pa.Super. 2008) (stating: “If no statutory authorization exists
for a particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and subject to correction.
An illegal sentence must be vacated”). Specifically, a flat sentence of ninety
(90) days’ imprisonment for a summary harassment conviction is illegal and
must be corrected. See Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 986 A.2d 1241
(Pa.Super. 2009) (holding imposition of flat sentence of confinement for
summary harassment is illegal); Commonwealth v. Duda, 831 A.2d 728
(Pa.Super. 2003) (holding same). See generally Commonwealth v.
Robinson, 7 A.3d 868 (Pa.Super. 2010) (reiterating that issue concerning
court’s power to impose given sentence implicates legality of sentence;
sentencing code requires court to impose maximum and minimum sentence
of confinement per 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9756); Commonwealth v. Cain, 637
A.2d 656, 658-59 (Pa.Super. 1994) (stating, unless otherwise specified in
the Sentencing Code, flat sentence of confinement or one that fails to set
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minimum term violates Section 9756 of sentencing code).
Instantly, the trial court imposed a flat sentence of ninety (90) days
incarceration for the summary harassment conviction, which is an illegal
sentence that must be corrected. Accordingly we affirm Appellant’s
convictions but must vacate his judgment of sentence and remand for re-
sentencing. See Commonwealth v. Bartrug, 732 A.2d 1287 (Pa.Super.
1999), appeal denied, 561 Pa. 651, 747 A.2d 896 (1999) (stating if trial
court errs in its sentence on one count in multi-count case, then all
sentences for all counts should be vacated so court can restructure its entire
sentencing scheme).
Judgment of sentence vacated; case remanded for re-sentencing.
Jurisdiction is relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/9/2015
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