UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4061
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JUAN ANGEL BACA-ARIAS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Greenville. James C. Dever III,
Chief District Judge. (4:13-cr-00012-D-1)
Submitted: December 31, 2014 Decided: January 12, 2015
Before NIEMEYER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Deborrah L. Newton, NEWTON LAW, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Shailika K. Shah, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Juan Angel Baca-Arias pled guilty to illegal reentry
of an aggravated felon, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a),
(b)(2) (2012), and was sentenced to forty-six months of
imprisonment. On appeal, Baca-Arias challenges the sixteen-
level enhancement to his base offense level, arguing that his
California conviction for possession of marijuana for sale is
not a “drug trafficking offense” for purposes of the illegal
reentry Guideline. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”)
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) (2013). Baca-Arias also challenges his
indictment and conviction for illegal reentry on the basis of
the five-year statute of limitations. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282(c)
(2012). We affirm.
When a defendant challenges the district court’s
calculation of the Sentencing Guidelines range, we review the
district court’s “legal conclusions de novo and its factual
findings for clear error.” United States v. Medina-Campo, 714
F.3d 232, 234 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 134 S. Ct. 280 (2013).
To determine whether a state conviction qualifies as an
aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”), courts use a “categorical approach,” comparing the
state offense to an offense listed in the INA. Moncrieffe v.
Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684 (2013); Medina-Campo, 714 F.3d at
235. A state drug trafficking crime satisfies the categorical
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approach when it “‘necessarily’ proscribe[s] conduct that is an
offense under the CSA, and the CSA . . . ‘necessarily’
prescribe[s] felony punishment for that conduct.” Moncrieffe,
133 S. Ct. at 1685. Baca-Arias’s conviction of possessing
marijuana for sale, under California Health and Safety Code
§ 11359, qualifies categorically as an aggravated felony under
the INA and, therefore, is a drug trafficking offense within the
meaning of USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i). See United States v.
Martinez-Rodriguez, 472 F.3d 1087, 1095 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding
that a conviction under California Health and Safety Code
§ 11359 “categorically qualifies as a ‘drug trafficking offense’
under the Guidelines”); see also United States v. Maroquin-Bran,
587 F.3d 214, 218 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting that a California
statute that prohibits the sale of marijuana “properly triggers
the sixteen-level sentencing enhancement”). Therefore, the
district court properly enhanced Baca-Arias’s offense level.
Turning to Baca-Arias’s statute of limitations
argument, we first note that he did not assert this defense in
the district court. It has long been the law in this Circuit
that a valid guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional defenses.
United States v. Willis, 992 F.2d 489, 490 (4th Cir. 1993).
“The statute of limitations set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3282 is not
jurisdictional. It is an affirmative defense that may be
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waived.” United States v. Matzkin, 14 F.3d 1014, 1017 (4th Cir.
1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case Baca-Arias waived the nonjurisdictional
statute-of-limitations defense by entering a valid guilty plea.
See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-33 (1993)
(“Deviation from a legal rule is ‘error’ unless the rule has
been waived.”); United States v. Claridy, 601 F.3d 276, 284 n.2
(4th Cir. 2010) (noting that a claim for relief is not
reviewable on appeal when it is waived).
Accordingly, we affirm Baca-Arias’s conviction and
sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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