FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 14 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
JIMMIE LEON MARTIN, No. 13-15619
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:09-cv-01017-CMK
Eastern District of California,
v. Sacramento
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, ORDER
Defendant - Appellee.
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, D. NELSON, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.
The memorandum disposition filed on September 5, 2014, is hereby
amended. The attached amended memorandum disposition is filed concurrently
with this order.
With these amendments, the panel has voted to deny the petition for panel
rehearing.
The petition for panel rehearing is DENIED. No future petitions shall
be entertained.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JAN 14 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
JIMMIE LEON MARTIN, No. 13-15619
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:09-cv-01017-CMK
v.
AMENDED MEMORANDUM*
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Craig Kellison, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 18, 2014**
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, D. NELSON, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.
Jimmie Leon Martin appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for
attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district court’s order denying
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
a motion for attorneys’ fees under EAJA for an abuse of discretion. Tobeler v.
Colvin, 749 F.3d 830, 832 (9th Cir. 2014). We reverse and remand.
EAJA provides that in a Social Security case, a court shall award attorneys’
fees to a prevailing party other than the United States “unless the court finds that
the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special
circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); Tobeler, 749
F.3d at 832. The government must demonstrate that both its litigation position and
the agency decision on review (that is, the administrative law judge’s decision)
were substantially justified. Campbell v. Astrue, 736 F.3d 867, 868 (9th Cir. 2013)
(order).
Martin sought attorneys’ fees after this court issued a memorandum
disposition reversing in part the district court’s summary judgment and remanding
with instructions for the district court to remand to the Commissioner. In Martin’s
prior appeal, we concluded that the ALJ “erred when formulating Martin’s residual
functional capacity (RFC) because the RFC neither incorporated [an examining
physician’s] opinion of Martin’s work limitations nor gave specific and legitimate
reasons for rejecting it.” Martin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 472 Fed. App’x
580, 580 (9th Cir. 2012). We thus held that the ALJ’s decision was not supported
by substantial evidence. See Meier v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 867, 872 (9th Cir. 2013)
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(holding that ALJ makes decision not supported by substantial evidence when he
fails to offer specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting a physician’s opinion);
Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009)
(holding that an ALJ makes a decision not supported by substantial evidence when
he formulates RFC that fails to take into account claimant’s limitations). Because
the ALJ failed to provide specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting the
examining physician’s opinion and the RFC failed to incorporate this physician’s
four-hour standing and walking limitation, the ALJ’s decision was not substantially
justified. See Shafer v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 1067, 1069-72 (9th Cir. 2008) (reversing
the district court’s denial of EAJA fees where the ALJ erred in rejecting, without
explanation, a non-examining doctor’s opinion, in contravention of governing
regulations requiring ALJ to evaluate every medical opinion received); see also
Meier, 727 F.3d at 872 (“[A] holding that the agency’s decision was unsupported
by substantial evidence is a strong indication that the position of the United States
was not substantially justified.”) (internal quotation marks, ellipses, and citation
omitted). This case is not one of those “decidedly unusual” cases in which there is
substantial justification under EAJA even though the agency’s decision was
reversed for a lack of substantial evidence. See id. We therefore reverse the
district court’s order and remand for an award of fees and costs.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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