IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
DANIEL PASKINS, §
§
Defendant Below, § No. 583, 2014
Appellant, §
§
v. § Court Below: Superior Court
§ of the State of Delaware,
STATE OF DELAWARE, § in and for Sussex
§ Cr. ID No. 88S01362DI
Plaintiff Below, §
Appellee. §
Submitted: December 18, 20141
Decided: January 14, 2015
Before STRINE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and VALIHURA, Justices.
ORDER
This 14th day of January 2015, upon consideration of the appellant’s
opening brief, the appellee’s motion to affirm, and the record below,2 it appears to
the Court that:
(1) The appellant, Daniel Paskins, filed this appeal from the Superior
Court’s September 29, 2014 order summarily dismissing his first motion for
1
The motion to affirm was filed on November 5, 2014, but the record was filed on December 18,
2014.
2
This Court has not considered the Appendix or the Notice of Appeal with a Superior Court
caption that Paskins filed after the motion to affirm. Under Supreme Court Rule 25(a), no
response to a motion to affirm is permitted unless requested by the Court. The Court did not
request a response to the motion to affirm and finds no good cause to permit a response in this
case.
postconviction relief from a January 4, 2013 VOP sentence. The State of Delaware
has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is
manifest on the face of Paskins’ opening brief that the appeal is without merit.3
We agree and affirm.
(2) The record reflects that Paskins pled guilty in October 1988 to one
count of Robbery in the First Degree and one count of Burglary in the First
Degree. The Superior Court sentenced him to a total period of twenty years at
Level V incarceration to be suspended after serving four and one-half years for
probation. Paskins did not appeal.
(3) In January 1994, Paskins was convicted by a Superior Court jury of
four counts of Robbery in the First Degree and one count of Possession of a
Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony. The Superior Court
sentenced him to a total period of thirty-three years at Level V incarceration to be
suspended after serving twenty-five years for probation. On direct appeal, this
Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.4
(4) In November 2010, Paskins filed a motion for sentence reduction or
modification, which the State opposed. The Superior Court held a hearing on
Paskins' motion on December 22, 2010. At the hearing, the Superior Court
3
Supr. Ct. R. 25(a).
4
Paskins v. State, 1995 WL 120665 (Del. Mar 15. 1995).
2
indicated that it would grant Paskins’ motion but stated that the modified
sentencing order would not be issued until the Superior Court had the opportunity
to consider all of Paskins’ sentences and account for all of the time he previously
served on each. On January 19, 2011, the Superior Court issued its modified
sentencing orders, suspending all of the Level V time remaining on Paskins’
sentences (approximately thirty-one years and six months) for one year at Level IV
home confinement followed by a total period of eight years and six months at
Level III probation. The sentencing orders contained zero tolerance illegal drug
and alcohol conditions.
(5) On July 15, 2012, Paskins was arrested and charged with Driving
Under the Influence of Alcohol. As a result of this arrest, Paskins was charged
with violating his probation. After a contested VOP hearing on August 10, 2012,
the Superior Court found Paskins had violated his probation and sentenced him to a
total period of thirty-one years at Level V incarceration to be suspended for one
year at Level IV home confinement followed by a total period of eight years and
six months at Level III probation. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the
judgment of the Superior Court.5
(6) On December 20, 2012, administrative warrants were filed for
Paskins’ VOP. Paskins’ probation officer alleged that Paskins had a positive urine
5
Paskins v. State, 2012 WL 5948969 (Del. Nov. 27, 2012).
3
test for alcohol and admitted to drinking a six-pack of beer in violation of the zero
tolerance condition for alcohol in his sentencing orders. A VOP hearing was held
on January 4, 2013.
(7) At the VOP hearing, the public defender informed the Superior Court
that she gave Paskins a copy of his appeal rights and tried to speak with him, but
he was unwilling to speak with her. The Superior Court granted Paskins’ request
to speak on his own behalf. Paskins admitted that he had consumed alcohol, but
argued that his term of probation violated his constitutional rights because his 1994
convictions were illegal. The Superior Court found that Paskins had violated his
probation and sentenced him to thirty-one years at Level V incarceration to be
suspended after successful completion of the Level V Greentree program for
decreasing levels of treatment and supervision. Paskins’ appeal was dismissed
after he failed to pay the Supreme Court filing fee or file a motion to proceed in
forma pauperis and failed to file a timely response to a notice to show cause.6
(8) On September 16, 2014, Paskins filed a motion for postconviction
relief. In this motion, Paskins claimed that his VOP counsel was ineffective and
that the test used to detect alcohol in his system was unreliable. The Superior
Court summarily dismissed the motion on September 29, 2014. This appeal
followed.
6
Paskins v. State, 2013 WL 1098258 (Del. Mar. 14, 2013).
4
(9) On appeal, Paskins claims that: (i) he was deprived of due process at
the VOP hearing because the test used to detect alcohol in his system was
unreliable; (ii) his VOP counsel was ineffective because she failed to prevent the
presentation of the unreliable test results and failed to inform Paskins of his appeal
rights or file a direct appeal; (iii) the Superior Court judge sentenced him with a
closed mind; and (iv) his sentence exceeded SENTAC guidelines. We review the
Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for abuse of discretion and
questions of law de novo.7 The procedural requirements of Superior Court
Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”) must be considered before any substantive issues are
addressed.8
(10) Paskins’ motion for postconviction relief is untimely under Rule
61(i)(1).9 Paskins was sentenced for his VOP on January 4, 2013, but he did not
file the motion for postconviction relief until September 16, 2014. To overcome
the one-year time bar of Rule 61(i)(1),10 Paskins must plead with particularity that
7
Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996).
8
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
9
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (2014) (barring postconviction motion filed more than one year
after conviction is final or, if it asserts retroactively applicable right that is newly recognized
after conviction, more than one year after right is first recognized by this Court or United States
Supreme Court). Paskins filed his motion for postconviction relief after Rule 61 was amended
effective June 4, 2014, so we apply the provisions of Rule 61 in effect as of June 4, 2014.
10
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5) (providing Rule 61(i)(1) does not apply to claim that court lacked
jurisdiction or that satisfies pleading requirements of Rule 61(d)(2)(i) or Rule 61(d)(2)(ii)).
5
there is new evidence creating a strong inference that he is actually innocent11 or
that a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review
by the United States Supreme Court or the Delaware Supreme Court, applies to his
case and renders his conviction invalid. 12 Paskins’ contention that the alcohol test
was unreliable and his efforts to downplay his VOP hearing admission to
consumption of alcohol by claiming he meant non-alcoholic beer do not satisfy
either standard. Accordingly, the Superior Court did not err in summarily
dismissing Paskins’ motion for postconviction relief.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is
GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr.
Chief Justice
11
Super. Ct. Crim R. 61(d)(2)(i).
12
Super. Ct. Crim R. 61(d)(2)(ii).
6