COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-14-00141-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF V.P.,
A CHILD
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FROM THE 231ST DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 231-331365-02
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
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On September 10, 2014, we notified Appellant V.V. that her brief did not
comply with appellate rules of procedure 9.4(f) and (i); 9.9; and 38.1(g), (h), and
(i) and local rule 1.A. 2 We stated in our letter to Appellant that her failure to
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2
See Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(f), (i), 9.9, 38.1(g)–(i); 2nd Tex. App. (Fort Worth)
Loc. R. 1.A.
timely file an amended brief in compliance with the above rules could result in the
waiver of noncompliant points, our striking her brief, or the dismissal of her
appeal. 3 We received Appellant’s amended brief on September 19, 2014, but it
too was noncompliant. On October 8, 2014, we notified Appellant that her
amended brief did not comply with appellate rules of procedure 9.4(h), (i), and (j);
9.9; and 38.1(d) and (k). 4 We again stated in our letter to Appellant that her
failure to timely file an amended brief in compliance with the above rules could
result in the waiver of noncompliant points, our striking her brief, or the dismissal
of her appeal. 5
On October 20, 2014, this court filed Appellant’s second amended brief
that remained noncompliant. On November 20, 2014, we notified Appellant that
her second amended brief did not comply with appellate rules of procedure 9.1;
9.4(h); 9.9; and 38.1(g), (i), and (k) and local rule 7. 6 We again stated in our
letter to Appellant that her failure to timely file an amended brief in compliance
with the above rules could result in the waiver of noncompliant points, our striking
3
See Tex. R. App. P. 38.8(a), 38.9(a), 42.3(b), (c).
4
See Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(h)–(j), 9.9, 38.1(d), (k).
5
See Tex. R. App. P. 38.8(a), 38.9(a), 42.3(b), (c).
6
See Tex. R. App. P. 9.1, 9.4(h), 9.9, 38.1(g), (i), (k); 2nd Tex. App. (Fort
Worth) Loc. R. 7.
2
her brief, or the dismissal of her appeal. 7 The due date for her compliant brief
was December 1, 2014. We have received no brief and no response to our
November 20, 2014 letter.
“We liberally construe pro se briefs, but to ensure fairness in our treatment
of all litigants, we hold pro se litigants to the same standards as licensed
attorneys and require pro se litigants to follow the applicable laws and rules of
procedure.” 8 In this case, pro se Appellant is a licensed attorney. Accordingly,
we strike Appellant’s brief and dismiss this appeal for want of prosecution. 9
PER CURIAM
PANEL: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and WALKER, JJ.
DELIVERED: January 15, 2015
7
See Tex. R. App. P. 38.8(a), 38.9(a), 42.3(b), (c).
8
Branch v. Fannie Mae, No. 02-11-00355-CV, 2012 WL 3030525, at *1
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 26, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.); see Mansfield State
Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978); Shull v. United Parcel
Serv., 4 S.W.3d 46, 53 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. denied), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 835 (2000).
9
See Tex. R. App. P. 38.8(a), 38.9(a), 42.3(b), (c).
3
in the Interest of V.P., a Child
Combined Opinion