IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-60791
Summary Calendar
JANITA WEST,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,
Defendant-Appellee.
__________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
(No. 3:00-CV-437-WS)
________________________________________________
May 22, 2002
Before DAVIS, BENAVIDES and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-appellant Janita West appeals from an adverse
summary judgment dismissing her Title VII claim as time-barred.
For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
West is employed by defendant-appellee Mississippi Department
of Public Safety (the “Department”) as a state trooper. She claims
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
that from 1987 until April 1998, she was sexually harassed and
discriminated against by her supervisor. Importantly, in her
deposition testimony and in discovery responses, West admitted that
no incidents of alleged harassment occurred after April 1998, when
she initiated an internal grievance procedure. When the internal
grievance procedure did not yield the relief she sought, West filed
a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) in late February or early March of 2000.
Thereafter, West filed this suit, asserting claims for gender
discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII and for
intentional infliction of emotional distress in violation of
Mississippi law. On the Department’s motion for summary judgment,
the district court dismissed West’s complaint with prejudice. West
timely appealed.1
II. DISCUSSION
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo, applying the same standard as the district court. Morris v.
Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998).
Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A genuine issue of fact exists only “if
the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
1
On appeal, West does not challenge the district court’s
summary dismissal of her claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress; she only contests the dismissal of her Title
VII claim.
2
for the non-moving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
In this case, we find that the district court properly
dismissed West’s Title VII claim as untimely. A Title VII claimant
must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days
of the alleged unlawful event. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Timely
filing of a charge with the EEOC is a prerequisite to maintaining
a Title VII action. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553,
555 n.4 (1977). Although she admitted that she was not subjected
to any alleged unlawful conduct after April 1998, West waited
almost two years before filing her charge with the EEOC.
Accordingly, West’s Title VII claim is barred as she failed to file
her EEOC charge within Title VII’s 180-day window.
West argued to the district court that the limitations period
should be equitably tolled because state law required her to
exhaust internal grievance procedures before filing a complaint
with the EEOC. The district court properly rejected this
contention, as “the pendency of a grievance, or some other method
of collateral review of an employment decision, does not toll the
running of the limitations period.” Delaware State College v.
Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 261 (1980); see also Holmes v. Texas A&M
Univ., 145 F.3d 681, 684-85 (5th Cir. 1998).
West attempts to avoid the district court’s correct
disposition of her Title VII claim by presenting two new arguments
that she admits were not presented to the district court. We
3
decline to consider these arguments as they were raised for the
first time on appeal. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d
1069, 1071 n.1 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (“[T]he plaintiffs may not
advance on appeal new theories or raise new issues not properly
before the district court to obtain reversal of the summary
judgment.”).
III. CONCLUSION
The district court properly granted summary judgment on the
record before it. The judgment of the district court is therefore
AFFIRMED.
4