DLD-085 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 14-2757
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JEREMY NOYES,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(W.D. Pa. Criminal No. 1:08-cr-00055)
District Judge: Honorable David S. Cercone
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant
to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
January 15, 2015
Before: FISHER, SHWARTZ and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 21, 2015)
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OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Jeremy Noyes, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from orders
dismissing two post-judgment motions. We will affirm.
In 2011, Noyes was convicted of the transportation, receipt, and possession of
material depicting the sexual exploitation of a minor and the transportation of obscene
material and was sentenced to 45 years in prison. We affirmed the conviction and
sentence in 2012. See United States v. Noyes, 501 F. App’x 168 (3d Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 1654 (2013). In March 2012, while his direct appeal was pending,
Noyes filed a motion to correct the record, seeking to have the District Court change
certain factual aspects of its memorandum opinion concerning the denial of a pre-trial
motion to suppress evidence. About two years later, in February 2014, Noyes filed a
motion for an order to show cause why the “chambers file” of the judge who presided
over his trial should not be turned over to him so that he could prepare a motion to vacate
sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In April 2014, the District Court summarily
denied both motions. This appeal followed.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review a District Court’s
post-judgment orders. See Isidor Paiewonsky Assoc., Inc. v. Sharp Properties, Inc., 998
F.2d 145, 150 (3d Cir. 1993); Plymouth Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Illinois Mid-Continent Life
Ins. Co., 378 F.2d 389, 391 (3d Cir. 1967). We may summarily dispose of an appeal
when it clearly appears that no substantial question is presented, see 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4;
I.O.P. 10.6, and we may affirm on any ground supported by the record. See Tourscher v.
McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).
2
In his first motion, Noyes asked the District Court to change its opinion “to reflect
the correct factual circumstances.” Specifically, Noyes objected to the “implication” that
a thumb drive contained pornography and to the use of certain names and e-mail
addresses “as if they were real, identifiable persons.” His stated reason for seeking the
changes was that his direct appeal was pending before this Court. However, Noyes
presented no support for his view of the facts or his notion that the District Court
somehow made a clerical error in its descriptions.1 Furthermore, his appeal, which
focused on sentencing and waiver of counsel issues, did not involve the challenged
“facts” from the opinion denying his motion to suppress evidence. See Noyes, 501 F.
App’x at 169-73. Under these circumstances, the District Court correctly denied the
motion.
In his second motion, Noyes sought to have the “chambers file” of the District
Judge turned over to him so that he could “investigat[e] certain discrepancies” and
complete his motion to vacate sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He provided
nothing further in support of his request. It appears that the motion is best construed as a
1
Under Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a court may correct a
“clerical error” in any part of the record. This has been narrowly interpreted to be an
error that is “mechanical in nature,” and of the type that “a clerk or amanuensis might
commit.” United States v. Penson, 526 F.3d 331, 335 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
Noyes essentially alleged that the District Court was mistaken about the facts, which does
not fall within the narrow scope of “clerical error” that the court had the authority to
correct under Rule 36. Furthermore, there does not appear to be any basis for Noyes’
allegations. The memorandum opinion does not state that pornography was found on the
thumb drive and the references to certain names appear in verbatim quotes from
affidavits of probable cause.
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discovery request, even though such requests are not directed to judges.2 Under Rule 6 of
the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts, discovery
may be authorized for “good cause,” and “[a] party requesting discovery must provide
reasons for the request.” Noyes made no specific allegations that would have enabled the
court to determine whether the requested file was even relevant to the claims he sought to
raise in his § 2255 motion. Instead, it appears that he sought to go on a fishing expedition
for evidence, which does not constitute good cause for granting a discovery request. See
Deputy v. Taylor, 19 F.3d 1485, 1493 (3d Cir. 1994). The District Court therefore did
not err by denying his motion.
In his notice of appeal, Noyes contends that the District Court erred by denying his
motions without offering a rationale and that this, and other alleged acts, were done to
cover up misconduct by the trial judge. This extreme allegation is wholly devoid of
support. Noyes’ motions were similarly baseless. Under the circumstances of this case,
we perceive no error in the summary denial of them. For the foregoing reasons, we will
summarily affirm the orders of the District Court. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
2
We further note that the nature and extent of Noyes’ request is unclear, given that he
seeks a “chambers file.” The records of criminal proceedings are kept by the Clerk’s
Office. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 55.
4