2015 WI 4
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.: 2012AP2695-D
COMPLETE TITLE: In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Khaja M. Din, Attorney at Law:
Office of Lawyer Regulation,
Complainant-Respondent,
v.
Khaja M. Din,
Respondent-Appellant.
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST DIN
OPINION FILED: January 22, 2015
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:
SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT:
COUNTY:
JUDGE:
JUSTICES:
CONCURRED:
DISSENTED:
NOT PARTICIPATING:
ATTORNEYS:
For the respondent-appellant, there were briefs by Claude
J. Covelli and Boardman & Clark LLP, Madison.
For the complainant-respondent, there was a brief by Robert
Krohn and Roethe Pope Roethe LLP, Edgerton.
2015 WI 4
NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further
editing and modification. The final
version will appear in the bound
volume of the official reports.
No. 2012AP2695-D
STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Khaja M. Din, Attorney at Law:
Office of Lawyer Regulation, FILED
Complainant-Respondent,
JAN 22, 2015
v.
Diane M. Fremgen
Clerk of Supreme Court
Khaja M. Din,
Respondent-Appellant.
ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding. Attorney publicly
reprimanded.
¶1 PER CURIAM. Attorney Khaja M. Din appeals that
portion of a revised report filed by referee John Nicholas
Schweitzer on April 9, 2014, recommending that Attorney Din be
publicly reprimanded for eight counts of misconduct involving
four clients. Attorney Din does not appeal the referee's
findings of fact or conclusions of law, but argues that his
misconduct warrants a private, rather than a public, reprimand.
No. 2012AP2695-D
¶2 After careful review of the matter, we agree with the
referee that the appropriate discipline for Attorney Din's
misconduct is a public reprimand. We also agree with the
referee's recommendation that Attorney Din pay $14,250 in
restitution, and we agree that Attorney Din should pay one-half
of the total costs of this proceeding, or $10,003.65.1
¶3 Attorney Din was licensed to practice law in Wisconsin
in 2007 and practices in Chicago in the area of immigration law.
He has not previously been the subject of discipline.
¶4 On December 11, 2012, the Office of Lawyer Regulation
(OLR) filed a complaint alleging 28 counts of misconduct with
respect to Attorney Din's handling of six client matters.
Attorney Din filed an answer to the complaint on February 15,
2013. The referee was appointed on March 28, 2013.
¶5 The OLR filed an amended complaint on October 28,
2013, alleging 12 counts of misconduct with respect to Attorney
Din's handling of four client matters. Attorney Din filed an
answer to the amended complaint on November 18, 2013.
¶6 On December 23, 2013, the parties filed a stipulation
and no contest plea whereby the OLR voluntarily dismissed four
counts of the amended complaint and Attorney Din withdrew his
answer to the amended complaint and pled no contest to the
remaining eight counts, as amended by the OLR in the parties'
stipulation. The parties jointly recommended that the referee
1
The supplemental statement of costs filed in this matter
shows total costs of $20,007.30 as of July 28, 2014.
2
No. 2012AP2695-D
determine that the appropriate sanction in the matter be a
private reprimand and restitution in the amount of $13,250.
¶7 The referee issued his report on February 13, 2014.
Attorney Din filed a motion for reconsideration or, in the
alternative, for relief from the stipulation and no contest
plea. The referee issued a revised report on April 9, 2014.
¶8 The first instance of client misconduct discussed in
the referee's revised report involved Attorney Din's
representation of A.N. A.N. was interested in opening a martial
arts club in Tomah. She wanted to employ a Philippine national
as a martial arts instructor. The man did not have permission
to work in the United States, and A.N. was looking for an
immigration attorney to advise her concerning bringing him to
Tomah to work.
¶9 A.N. spoke by telephone with Attorney Din, whose
office at the time was in Madison, on February 5, 2010, and she
informed him of her desire to employ the man. When A.N. told
Attorney Din that the man was a former Philippines national
player and a judge of karate tournaments, Attorney Din
recommended that A.N. pursue obtaining an O-1 visa, for people
who possess extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts,
education, business, or athletics.
¶10 Subsequent to the telephone call, Attorney Din mailed
A.N. a flat fee agreement under which she was to pay $2,250
immediately and the balance "at the point of submitting work:
for a total fee of $4,500." A.N. signed the fee agreement and
made a $2,250 payment by credit card. After that, she sent in
3
No. 2012AP2695-D
documents that she believed would assist in obtaining an O-1
visa.
¶11 A.N. and Attorney Din met in late July 2010, at which
point Attorney Din suggested an L visa be pursued. An L visa
involved intercompany transfer of an employee. A.N. told
Attorney Din she did not think the L visa was an option. A.N.
explained that an H2-B visa appeared appropriate, and Attorney
Din indicated that the documentation previously submitted was
satisfactory for that purpose. Attorney Din told A.N. they
would need to enter into a new fee agreement and an additional
$3,750 would have to be paid. Attorney Din told A.N. he would
have the H2-B paperwork ready by August 6, 2010.
¶12 A.N. signed a second fee agreement for a flat fee of
$3,750 and paid $2,000. A.N. never received the H2-B visa
certificate, any accounting of the hours or activities Attorney
Din invested in the case, or any refund of unearned fees.
¶13 The parties' stipulation averred, and the referee
found, the following counts of misconduct with respect to
Attorney Din's representation of A.N.:
[Count One] By charging and accepting significant
fees in [A.N.'s] matter without performing sufficient
useful work on [A.N.'s] case, [Attorney] Din collected
an unreasonable fee, in violation of SCR 20:1.5(a).2
2
SCR 20:1.5(a) provides:
A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge,
or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable
amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in
determining the reasonableness of a fee include the
following:
(continued)
4
No. 2012AP2695-D
[Count Two] By failing to show that he had done
sufficient work on [A.N.'s] immigration matter, yet
failing to refund payments, [Attorney] Din failed to
return unearned fees, in violation of SCR 20:1.16(d).3
¶14 The second client matter discussed in the referee's
revised report involved Attorney Din's representation of E.A-S.,
a native of Mexico who moved to the United States in 1991. He
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and
difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill
requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client,
that the acceptance of the particular employment will
preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality
for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or
by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of
the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
3
SCR 20:1.16(d) provides:
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer
shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable
to protect a client's interests, such as giving
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and
property to which the client is entitled and refunding
any advance payment of fee or expense that has not
been earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers
relating to the client to the extent permitted by
other law.
5
No. 2012AP2695-D
returned to Mexico for a year and returned to the U.S. illegally
in 1996. He has never had permission to reside in the U.S.
¶15 E.A-S. and his spouse sought Attorney Din's assistance
in adjusting E.A-S.'s status from that of an illegal alien to a
permanent resident or U.S. citizen, based on his marriage. On
May 26, 2010, E.A-S. entered into a fee agreement with Attorney
Din by which E.A-S. agreed to pay a flat fee of $2,500 in
exchange for the preparation and filing of a family-based
petition. Additional fees would be required if E.A-S. sought a
hardship waiver. E.A-S. paid Attorney Din the $2,500 that day.
¶16 In June of 1010, Attorney Din's paralegal contacted
E.A-S.'s spouse to advise that Attorney Din did not have all the
documents needed and that it was essential he obtain a copy of
E.A-S.'s I-94 document. The paralegal was told that E.A-S. did
not have an I-94. Soon thereafter, Attorney Din contacted
E.A-S. and requested additional legal fees of $3,000 due to the
fact that Attorney Din would need to seek a hardship waiver on
E.A-S.'s behalf.
¶17 On June 29, 2010, E.A-S. and his spouse met with
Attorney Din and signed a second flat fee agreement, which
called for additional legal services consisting of the
preparation of a hardship waiver for overstay in the United
States. E.A-S. told Attorney Din he would pay $1,500 of the
$3,000 fee and would pay the balance the following afternoon.
¶18 On July 2, 2010, E.A-S.'s spouse requested a full
refund of the $4,000 paid to Attorney Din as of that date.
Attorney Din and E.A-S.'s spouse spoke by telephone on July 2,
6
No. 2012AP2695-D
at which time Attorney Din advised he would not refund any money
to E.A-S. A request was made for copies of any paperwork
Attorney Din's office had generated. Attorney Din said that by
early the next week he would send E.A-S. an itemization of his
work performed and an explanation as to why he was not returning
any part of a fee.
¶19 On July 9, 2010, Attorney Din wrote to E.A-S. saying
he had performed six hours and 50 minutes of work and that he
considered the $4,000 flat fee fully earned. On July 14, 2010,
E.A-S. sent Attorney Din another request asking for a full
refund of fees.
¶20 The parties' stipulation averred, and the referee
found, the following counts of misconduct with respect to
Attorney Din's representation of E.A-S.:
[Count Four] By charging and accepting
significant fees in [E.A-S.'s] matter without any
showing that he performed sufficient useful work on
[E.A-S.'s] case, [Attorney] Din collected an
unreasonable fee, in violation of SCR 20:1.5(a).
[Count Five] By failing to show that he had done
sufficient useful work on [E.A-S.'s] immigration
matter, yet refusing a request for a refund of
payments, [Attorney] Din failed to return unearned
fees, in violation of SCR 20:1.16(d).
¶21 The third client matter discussed in the referee's
revised report involved Attorney Din's representation of
F.J.C-L., a native of Mexico who resided in Dane County but did
not have permission to reside in the U.S. On July 17, 2009,
Attorney Din and F.J.C-L. signed a fee agreement under which
Attorney Din agreed to represent F.J.C-L. in filing and
7
No. 2012AP2695-D
appearing in court for a cancellation of removal. Attorney Din
asked for payment of a $6,000 advanced flat fee. F.J.C-L. paid
Attorney Din $3,000 on July 17, 2009.
¶22 By mid-September 2009, F.J.C-L. had submitted to
Attorney Din all the documents Attorney Din had requested of him
for filing the immigration petition. On October 15, 2009,
Attorney Din and F.J.C-L. signed a second fee agreement, the
terms of which were essentially the same as the first one. On
October 16, 2009, F.J.C-L. provided Attorney Din with a check
for $1,010, which included funds for the filing fee for the
immigration petition. At the time that F.J.C-L. provided the
check, Attorney Din told him that the petition was ready to
file.
¶23 In November of 2009, F.J.C-L. asked Attorney Din to
return the $1,010 because he was short on money. He informed
Attorney Din he would give him that amount back within two
weeks. Attorney Din complied with F.J.C-L.'s request. In
December of 2009, F.J.C-L. contacted Attorney Din to advise him
that he had the $1,010 again ready for him. Attorney Din
informed F.J.C-L. that he did not intend to do anything further
with F.J.C-L.'s case. F.J.C-L. asked for a refund of the $3,000
in fees he had paid up to the time Attorney Din filed the
petition. Attorney Din provided no evidence of doing any legal
work for F.J.C-L. Ultimately, Attorney Din told F.J.C-L. that
the $3,000 fee had been earned. On July 7, 2010, F.J.C-L. filed
an application with the Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for Client
8
No. 2012AP2695-D
Protection (Fund), requesting the return of the $3,000 advanced
fee. The Fund approved the claim and paid F.J.C-L. $3,000.
¶24 The parties' stipulation averred, and the referee
agreed, that Attorney Din committed the following count of
misconduct with respect to his representation of F.J.C-L.:
[Count Six] By charging and accepting $3,000 in
[F.J.C-L.'s] matter without performing or showing he
had performed sufficient useful work for [F.J.C-L.],
[Attorney] Din collected an unreasonable fee, in
violation of SCR 20:1.5(a).
¶25 The final client matter discussed in the referee's
revised report involved Attorney Din's representation of K.F.
On November 19, 2010, K.F. and his father hired Attorney Din to
prepare an investor visa petition for the father, who is a
citizen of Iran. The father wanted to invest in a business in
the U.S. with his son. Attorney Din charged a flat fee of
$8,000 to prepare the visa petition. The fee agreement provided
for payment of an additional $2,500 to SB Consulting Group, Inc.
for preparation of a business plan. K.F. paid $7,500 with the
remaining $3,000 to be paid upon completion of the business
plan.
¶26 On October 12, 2011, the OLR received a grievance from
K.F. against Attorney Din. In response, Attorney Din claimed he
had completed all the necessary work in a timely fashion. In
response to the OLR's request for a copy of his entire file,
Attorney Din provided some paperwork but produced no work
product and no draft of a business plan, completed visa
9
No. 2012AP2695-D
application, or any other document related to a visa
application.
¶27 The parties' stipulation averred, and the referee
agreed, that Attorney Din committed the following counts of
misconduct with respect to his representation of K.F.:
[Count Seven] By failing to consult with his
clients regarding the appropriate visa to pursue for
[K.F.'s] father and how to best accomplish the
transfer of funds for their business, [Attorney] Din
violated SCR 20:1.2(a)4 and SCR 20:1.4(a)(2).5
[Count Ten] By collecting $5,000.00 from his
clients, yet not being able to show sufficient
relevant work in furtherance of his clients' goals,
[Attorney] Din collected an unreasonable fee, in
violation of SCR 20:1.5(a).
[Count Eleven] By failing to refund unearned
fees, when he could submit no evidence of appropriate
4
SCR 20:1.2(a) provides:
Subject to pars. (c) and (d), a lawyer shall
abide by a client's decisions concerning the
objectives of representation and, as required by
SCR 20:1.4, shall consult with the client as to the
means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may
take such action on behalf of the client as is
impliedly authorized to carry out the representation.
A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to
settle a matter. In a criminal case or any proceeding
that could result in deprivation of liberty, the
lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after
consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be
entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the
client will testify.
5
SCR 20:1.4(a)(2) provides that a lawyer shall "reasonably
consult with the client about the means by which the client's
objectives are to be accomplished."
10
No. 2012AP2695-D
sufficient legal work he performed himself, [Attorney]
Din violated SCR 20:1.16(d).
¶28 The referee's revised report noted that Thomas C.
Hochstatter was deposed as an expert witness on immigration law,
and he expressed the opinion that Attorney Din did provide some
useful work for all of the grievants, but not sufficient work to
justify the full fees that were charged and retained.
Hochstatter's testimony indicated that Attorney Din should
refund $3,750 to A.N., $2,500 to E.A-S., $2,000 to F.J.C-L., and
$5,000 to K.F.
¶29 The referee noted that by pleading no contest to the
eight charges, the OLR's burden of proof was satisfied and no
further proof or analysis of the elements of the alleged
offenses was necessary. The referee also noted that the
parties, in the stipulation and no contest plea, agreed that the
referee may use the allegations of the amended complaint as an
adequate factual basis in the record for a determination of
misconduct. Accordingly, the referee found that the OLR proved
the eight counts of misconduct to which Attorney Din pled no
contest.
¶30 The referee said the only substantive issues remaining
were the appropriate amount of discipline, including the amount
of restitution, and costs. Although the parties' stipulation
recommended that Attorney Din make restitution to F.J.C-L. in
the amount of $2,000, the referee pointed out that F.J.C-L.
filed a claim with the Fund for the return of his $3,000
advanced fee, and the Fund paid him the full $3,000. The
11
No. 2012AP2695-D
referee further pointed out that the stipulation and no contest
plea stated that the payment of restitution was to be "without
prejudice to any claims held by the [Fund] as to the various
grievants, provided such claims do not duplicate the amounts of
restitution agreed to herein, and subject to any defenses
[Attorney] Din may raise to such claims." The referee said
there was no apparent ambiguity about the Fund's claim and,
accordingly, it was appropriate to order Attorney Din to repay
$3,000 to the Fund. Thus, the referee recommended that Attorney
Din make restitution as follows: $3,750 to A.N.; $2,500 to
E.A-S.; $5,000 to K.F.; and $3,000 to the Fund.
¶31 With respect to the appropriate level of discipline,
the referee noted that the purposes of professional discipline
are to protect the public from further misconduct by the
offending attorney, to deter other attorneys from engaging in
similar misconduct, and to foster the attorney's rehabilitation.
Although the parties stipulated that a private reprimand was
appropriate, the referee said that given the number of rule
violations and the number of charges and clients affected, a
private reprimand was not sufficient. The referee explained:
It is my opinion that imposing only a private
reprimand in a case involving four violations of
charging an unreasonable fee for three different
clients, plus three failures to return unearned fees
for three different clients, plus one instance of
failing to consult with a client, would fail
adequately to impress on other attorneys the need to
follow the rules.
12
No. 2012AP2695-D
¶32 The referee went on to say that even though the
purpose of discipline is not to impose punishment per se,
appreciating the unpleasant consequences of unprofessional
behavior is part of rehabilitation. The referee said he would
seriously worry that imposing only a private reprimand would
have only minimal rehabilitative effect on Attorney Din. The
referee concluded that the purposes of discipline can only be
achieved here by the imposition of a public reprimand.
¶33 With respect to costs, the referee noted that the
parties made a joint recommendation that Attorney Din pay one-
half of the OLR's pre-appellate costs. The referee noted that
this joint recommendation was based largely on the "number of
counts charged, contested and proven" factor set forth in
SCR 22.24(1m)(a), in that certain counts charged in the original
complaint were removed from the amended complaint to which
Attorney Din pled no contest. The referee found the joint
recommendation to be reasonable and recommended that Attorney
Din pay one-half of the pre-appellate costs as filed in the
OLR's preliminary statement of costs. In its supplemental
statement of costs filed on July 28, 2014, the OLR recommended
that Attorney Din also be assessed one-half of the appellate
costs.
¶34 Attorney Din has appealed the referee's recommendation
for a public reprimand and argues that a private reprimand is an
appropriate sanction. Attorney Din notes that the OLR
voluntarily withdrew 70 percent of the counts of misconduct
13
No. 2012AP2695-D
alleged in its original complaint and amended nearly all the
counts that remained.
¶35 While Attorney Din acknowledges that this court is
free to impose whatever discipline it deems appropriate, he says
this court should impose a private reprimand with restitution
because:
The conduct occurred early in Attorney Din's practice
when he was inexperienced;
Attorney Din provided useful services to his clients;
The amount of fees to be refunded were matters of
judgment;
Attorney Din promptly and fully cooperated with the
OLR's investigation;
Attorney Din has changed his practice to avoid a
recurrence of similar conduct; and
Attorney Din has no prior private or public
discipline.
¶36 In spite of the fact that the parties stipulated that
the referee may use the allegations of the amended complaint as
an adequate factual basis in the record for a determination of
misconduct relating to the eight counts to which Attorney Din
entered a no contest plea, Attorney Din argues that the referee
improperly made a point of describing the withdrawn allegations.
Attorney Din says he did not admit the withdrawn allegations and
indeed denies them. He questions why the referee would mention
the withdrawn allegations unless they played some conscious or
14
No. 2012AP2695-D
unconscious role in the referee's decision to recommend a public
reprimand.
¶37 Attorney Din says the need to document the stage of
work completed under flat fee agreements may not be appreciated
by lawyers early in their practice. He says an inexperienced
lawyer may not anticipate issues that arise if the lawyer's
engagement is terminated before the lawyer's work is complete.
He says these issues have been brought home to him by this
proceeding and he has taken steps to improve his practices to
avoid a recurrence of this problem in the future. Attorney Din
acknowledges that he exercised poor judgment in failing to make
any refund to his clients, but he says the absence of bright
line rules determining the proper amount of flat fee refunds
ameliorates in some measure the severity of his conduct.
¶38 Attorney Din says he acknowledges his mistakes, and he
argues that a private reprimand with restitution will fulfill
the purposes of discipline. He says:
In today's world, the difference between a
private and a public reprimand is no small matter,
particularly for a lawyer early in practice. Today, a
public reprimand is republished in a variety of
internet and referral sources. It is a permanent
black mark easily accessed electronically. A private
reprimand provides lawyers fairly early in their
practices with another chance without this permanent
stigma. A public reprimand is not necessary to
protect the public, to deter others or to rehabilitate
[Attorney] Din. This proceeding has already had a
salutary effect on [Attorney] Din's practices. A
private reprimand will fulfill all purposes of
discipline and will be consistent with this Court
[sic] adherence to a pattern of progressive
discipline.
15
No. 2012AP2695-D
¶39 The OLR asserts that the referee's revised report
addresses Attorney Din's objections to the initial report. The
OLR argues that a flat fee agreement does not excuse the
repeated failure to return unearned fees when a lawyer fails to
complete the agreed upon services. The OLR says that regardless
of the description of the fee, the fact is that a lawyer must
perform the agreed upon services. In this matter, Attorney Din
collected fees from several clients but failed to provide
sufficient useful work for the client and then refused to refund
any fees upon the client's request. The OLR disagrees with
Attorney Din's argument that he ought to be afforded some
special consideration due to the fact that the fee was a flat
fee.
¶40 The OLR acknowledges that it stipulated to the
propriety of imposing a private reprimand, and it says it is not
backing away from that recommendation. However, the OLR says
that a stipulation from the parties is not binding upon the
court as to sanction. The OLR also notes that no two
disciplinary matters are identical, and it says the parties
submitted a good deal of authority to the referee as to the
appropriate sanction and the referee considered many cases on
the subject.
¶41 A referee's findings of fact are affirmed unless
clearly erroneous. Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.
See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg,
2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747. The court may
impose whatever sanction it sees fit, regardless of the
16
No. 2012AP2695-D
referee's recommendation. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.
¶42 There is no showing that any of the referee's findings
of fact are erroneous. Accordingly, we adopt them. We also
agree with the referee's conclusions of law that Attorney Din
violated the supreme court rules set forth above.
¶43 With respect to the appropriate level of discipline,
upon careful review of the matter, we agree with the referee
that Attorney Din's misconduct warrants a public reprimand.
Even though Attorney Din had been practicing law for only a few
years at the time he undertook the representations that gave
rise to this case, and even though he has no prior disciplinary
history, he pled no contest to eight counts of misconduct
involving four clients, and he does not dispute the fact that he
owes restitution of $14,250. The misconduct allegations at
issue here are not insignificant, nor are the violations
technical in nature. Attorney Din took fees from clients and
failed to complete the agreed upon services. When the clients
asked for refunds, he refused to provide them.
¶44 The facts of this case are somewhat analogous to those
in In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Grapsas,
174 Wis. 2d 816, 498 N.W.2d 400 (1993) and In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Halverson, 225 Wis. 2d 215, 591 N.W.2d 821
(1999). In both of those cases, the attorneys were publicly
reprimanded for one count of failure to return unearned fees, as
well as other violations. Attorney Din pled no contest to four
counts of collecting an unreasonable fee, three counts of
17
No. 2012AP2695-D
failing to return unearned fees when he failed to complete the
agreed upon services, and one count of failing to consult with a
client. We agree with the referee that a private reprimand
would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the offenses.
¶45 We agree with the referee that Attorney Din should be
required to make restitution in the total amount of $14,250.
Finally, we find it appropriate to reduce the amount of costs in
this case by 50 percent. SCR 22.24(1m) notes that it is this
court's general policy, upon a finding of misconduct, to impose
all costs upon the respondent. In appropriate cases, the court
may, in the exercise of its discretion, reduce the amount of
costs imposed upon a respondent. The OLR's original complaint
alleged 28 counts of misconduct and sought a one-year
suspension. The amended complaint alleged 12 counts of
misconduct and sought a public reprimand. The OLR subsequently
agreed to dismiss an additional four counts and concluded that a
private reprimand would be sufficient. In its supplemental
statement of costs, filed on July 28, 2014, the OLR recommends
that 50 percent of the total costs, $10,003.65, be assessed
against Attorney Din. We agree that assessing one-half of the
costs is appropriate under the facts of this case.
¶46 IT IS ORDERED that Khaja M. Din is publicly
reprimanded for professional misconduct.
¶47 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date
of this order, Khaja M. Din shall make restitution as follows:
$3,750 to A.N.; $2,500 to E.A-S.; $5,000 to K.F.; and $3,000 to
the Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection.
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No. 2012AP2695-D
¶48 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date
of this order, Khaja M. Din shall pay to the Office of Lawyer
Regulation one-half of the costs of this proceeding, $10,003.65.
¶49 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the restitution specified
above is to be completed prior to paying costs to the Office of
Lawyer Regulation.
¶50 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the director of the Office
of Lawyer Regulation shall advise the court if there has not
been full compliance with all conditions of this order.
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No. 2012AP2695-D
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