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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-10522
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cv-00165-WLS-TQL
DONALD WAYNE TOENNIGES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants,
KEITH JONES,
DR. SMITH,
WARDEN, CALHOUN STATE PRISON,
DEBRA EDWARDS,
NURSE PATRICIA BROWN,
JOHNSON,
HSA SATTERFIELD,
DR. HENDERSON,
LT. TARVER,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
________________________
(January 23, 2015)
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Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Donald Toenniges, a formerly incarcerated inmate proceeding pro se,
appeals following the dismissal of his civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 alleging, among other things, that officials at two penal institutions violated
his constitutional rights. Specifically, he alleges that Keith Jones and Debra
Edwards improperly denied him visitation rights, Lt. Tarver retaliated against him
for exercising certain rights, and Dr. Smith, Nurse Brown, and Dr. Henderson were
deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. The district court originally entered a
final judgment against Toenniges in 2011, but on appeal, we vacated and remanded
the case for further proceedings. See Toenniges v. Georgia Dept. of Corr., 502
Fed. App’x 888 (11th Cir. 2012) (unpublished). In 2014, the district court once
again entered a judgment against Toenniges, this time concluding that he failed to
timely serve Nurse Brown with service of process, and that he failed to
administratively exhaust his claims against the remaining defendants. On appeal,
Toenniges argues that: (1) he properly served Nurse Brown or had good cause for
the failure to do so; (2) as to Jones and Edwards, he was not required to use the
administrative grievance procedure to grieve the denial of court ordered visitation;
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and (3) as to Lt. Tarver, Dr. Smith, and Dr. Henderson, he completely exhausted
administrative remedies. After thorough review, we affirm.
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(5), we review a dismissal for insufficient service
of process de novo as to legal issues, and for clear error as to findings of fact.
Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007). We review de novo a
district court’s dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). Brown v. Sikes, 212 F.3d 1205, 1207
(11th Cir. 2000); Johnson v. Meadows, 418 F.3d 1152, 1155 (11th Cir. 2005).
However, we review any factual findings underlying an exhaustion ruling for clear
error. Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1377 (11th Cir. 2008).
First, we are unpersuaded by Toenniges’s claim that the district court erred
in concluding that he had failed to timely serve Nurse Brown. Pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m), the district court may dismiss an action for failure to complete
service of process within 120 days. The district court may do so either on the
motion of a party, or on its own once notice is given and the party in error fails to
show good cause for the lack of timely service. Pardazi v. Cullman Medical
Center, 896 F.2d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir. 1990). However, when a litigant proceeds
in forma pauperis, the district court may order the U.S. Marshal to serve a
defendant named in the complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). In Richardson v.
Johnson, 598 F.3d 734 (11th Cir. 2010), we held that it was “unreasonable to
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expect incarcerated and unrepresented prisoner-litigants to provide the current
addresses of prison-guard defendants who no longer work at the prison.” Id. at
739–740. We concluded “that, as long as the court-appointed agent can locate the
prison-guard defendant with reasonable effort, prisoner-litigants who provide
enough information to identify the prison-guard defendant have established good
cause for Rule 4(m) purposes.” Id. at 740.
Here, the evidence showed that Toenniges did not complete service of
process on Nurse Brown within 120 days of April 10, 2013, when his amended
complaint was reinstated. His argument that he sent the complaint via certified
mail is unavailing since that is not an approved method of service. Moreover, his
claim that he did not receive adequate notice that his failure to perfect service
could lead to Brown’s dismissal is rebutted by the record. As the record shows,
Toenniges requested a motion for extension of time to respond to Brown’s motion
to dismiss, based in part on service of process grounds, before the time to serve her
had run. Furthermore, although the district court granted Toenniges assistance
from the U.S. Marshals to complete service of process while he was incarcerated,
he was no longer incarcerated when his amended complaint was reinstated and he
was required to serve the amended complaint on Brown, and the court correctly
noted that he was not proceeding in forma pauperis. Thus, the district court did not
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err in finding that he failed to show good cause for his failure to timely complete
service of process, nor in dismissing Nurse Brown for failed service of process.
We also find no merit to Toenniges’s claim that the district court erred in
concluding that he had failed to administratively exhaust his claims against Jones
and Edwards. The PLRA provides that “[n]o action shall be brought” by a prisoner
“until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a). To evaluate the exhaustion of administrative remedies, first, the district
court looks to the parties’ factual allegations, and if they conflict, the court takes
the plaintiff’s version as true. Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1082-84 (11th
Cir. 2008). If, per the plaintiff’s account, the administrative remedies have been
exhausted, then the court proceeds to step two. At step two, the defendants bear
the burden of proving that the plaintiff did not exhaust administrative remedies. Id.
At this stage, the court makes factual findings on whether or not the plaintiff
exhausted the available remedies. Id. at 1083. To the extent the factual findings
lead to procedural dismissal as opposed to dismissal on the merits, the district court
is free to make any findings necessary to resolve the issue. Bryant, 530 F.3d at
1376-77. If the remedies are not found to be exhausted, then dismissal is
appropriate. Turner, 541 F.3d at 1083.
The Georgia Department of Corrections (“GDOC”) Standard Operating
Procedures (“SOP”) provided the administrative grievance process applicable to
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Toenniges. Georgia Dep’t of Corrections SOP IIB05-001 VI; Brown, 212 F.3d at
1207. Exhaustion requires the inmate to complete three steps. Georgia Dep’t of
Corrections SOP IIB05-001 VI. The inmate must (1) file an informal grievance,
(2) file a formal grievance, and (3) file an appeal. Id. The informal grievance must
be filed within ten days of the date the inmate knew or should have known of the
harm that occurred. SOP IIB05-001 VI(B)(5). The counselor must respond to the
informal grievance, and, if the inmate is dissatisfied with that response, he may
request a form to file a formal grievance with the Warden or Superintendent. SOP
IIB05-001 VI(B). If the Warden or Superintendent violates the time limit for
responding to a formal grievance, then the inmate may proceed directly to appeal
to the Commissioner. SOP IIB05-001 VI(A)(11). Finally, if the Warden is timely
and the inmate is still dissatisfied, the inmate must file a direct appeal with the
Commissioner’s office. SOP IIB05-001 VI(D). The forms to directly appeal to the
Commissioner are kept in the control unit of each living area where they are
accessible to inmates. SOP IIB05-001 VI(D)(1).
Among many things, the exhaustion requirement is designed to incentivize
efficient grievance resolution, to reduce frivolous litigation against prisons, and to
improve the quality of the record of a grievance should it reach the federal courts.
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002). Inmates must properly exhaust the
grievance procedures unless the reason for not doing so is extreme. Woodford v.
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Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92 (2006) (holding that proper exhaustion, rather than mere
circumvention of available procedures, was a necessary prerequisite to filing a
grievance in court, but that failure will be excused if procedures are rendered
unavailable); Turner, 541 F.3d at 1085 (holding that a procedure may be
unavailable and the failure to exhaust it may be excusable if its unavailability is
caused by extreme threats of physical retaliation); Miller v. Tanner, 196 F.3d 1190
(11th Cir. 1999). Inmates cannot circumvent proper grievance procedures simply
because they are less speedy or effective than desired. Porter, 534 U.S. at 524.
In this case, Toenniges failed to exhaust administrative remedies for his
denial of visitation claim against Jones and Edwards. The divorce decree upon
which he based his claim for court-ordered visitation did not excuse him from the
need to exhaust administrative remedies regarding the denial of his visitors at the
prison. Although the SOPs do not directly indicate whether prisoners need to file a
grievance to complain of visitation problems, prisons have a compelling interest in
maintaining safety, security, and efficient operation. Caraballo-Sandoval v.
Honsted, 35 F.3d 521, 525 (11th Cir. 1994). Thus, because of the important
institutional interest in security and the PLRA’s goal to give institutions an
opportunity to internally resolve issues, it follows that prisoners must exhaust
administrative remedies regarding denial of visitation claims prior to taking legal
action. Toenniges, however, failed to even attempt to use the administrative
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remedies to address his denial of visitation claim. The district court did not err in
dismissing this claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Finally, we reject Toenniges’s claim that the district court erred in
concluding that he had failed to administratively exhaust his claims against Lt.
Tarver, Dr. Smith, and Dr. Henderson. We interpret the PRLA to “mandate[ ]
strict exhaustion” no matter “the forms of relief sought and offered through
administrative avenues.” Johnson, 418 F.3d at 1155 (quotation marks omitted).
To exhaust administrative remedies, a prisoner must complete the administrative
review process according to the rules set forth in the prison grievance process
itself. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). Section 1997e(a) makes
exhaustion “a precondition to filing an action in federal court.” Leal v. Ga. Dep’t
of Corr., 254 F.3d 1276, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks omitted).
Exhaustion of the grievance procedure does not require that every single
defendant be identified by name. Parzyck v. Prison Health Servs. Inc., 627 F.3d
1215, 1218 (11th Cir. 2010); Brown, 212 F.3d at 1209-10 (holding that a defendant
need only provide all the information he has or could reasonably obtain). Further,
exhaustion does not necessarily require an inmate to file a new grievance for each
harmful incident in a string of related occurrences. Parzyck, 627 F.3d at 1218.
Parzyck held that an inmate did not fail to exhaust administrative remedies against
a prison doctor by failing to name him, where the inmate filed a grievance before
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the specific doctor began treating him, and exhausted the process during the
doctor’s treatment. Id. The critical function of the grievance process is that it
provides the institution with notice of a problem such that they have an opportunity
to address the problem internally.
As for Toenniges’s claim against Lt. Tarver, the record confirms that
Toenniges failed to properly complete the grievance process. Based on the SOP’s
plain language, a delay on the prison’s behalf at the informal grievance phase did
not authorize him to proceed to a direct appeal to the Commissioners.
Furthermore, Toenniges did not request a formal grievance form, and he does not
argue that he was denied access to the direct appeal form.
As for his claim against Dr. Smith, Toenniges also failed to exhaust
administrative remedies. The district court’s factual finding that Toenniges’s 2008
medical grievance contained issues different from those contained in his deliberate
indifference claim was not clearly erroneous. While the 2008 grievance
complained of his orthotics, prescription refills, and an update to his charts, his
deliberate indifference claim included some different elements including
complaints about shoulder problems and failed treatment. Thus, Toenniges’s
situation is distinct from the one in Parzyck because the substantive discrepancy
between his 2008 grievance and his deliberate indifference claim casts doubt on
the fact that the prison was on notice of his grievance against Dr. Smith.
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Finally, as for his claim against Dr. Henderson, Toenniges also failed to
exhaust administrative remedies. Toenniges attempted to rely on a general medical
grievance he filed and exhausted in 2006, but a 2006 grievance cannot possibly
constitute exhaustion against all future treating doctors. A 2006 grievance that was
completely exhausted by the time Dr. Henderson commenced treatment did not
serve the purpose of putting the institution on notice of an ongoing problem with
treatment, nor did it provide the institution an opportunity to internally address this
issue over time. In light of the goals of the PLRA, and the fact that Toenniges had
completely exhausted the 2006 grievance before seeing Dr. Henderson, he did not
complete the grievance process as to Dr. Henderson.
AFFIRMED. 1
1
Nevertheless, Appellant’s motion to file an out-of-time reply brief is GRANTED.
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