NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 14-1864
___________
DONNA M. HILL,
Appellant
v.
JAMES BARNACLE; STEVEN GLUNT; DAVID CLOSE;
KENNETH HOLLIBAUGH; CAPTAIN BRUMBAUGH; HEATHER MOORE
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-13-cv-01604)
District Judge: Honorable Nora B. Fischer
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 29, 2014
Before: AMBRO, VANASKIE and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 23, 2015)
___________
OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM
Appellant, Donna Hill, is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. The
government was not served with process in either the District Court or on appeal, and
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
therefore has not appeared or briefed the issues in either proceeding. The District Court
dismissed Hill’s complaint following a Report and Recommendation from a Magistrate
Judge. We will vacate and remand for further proceedings.
I.
Hill is a prisoners’ rights advocate whose husband and daughter are serving life
sentences in Pennsylvania state prison. Hill claims that she received reports that her
husband was being mistreated in prison and that, in 2011, she began a “letter-writing
campaign” to various news media outlets, lawmakers and prison officials about his
alleged mistreatment. Thereafter, on April 12, 2012, Hill claims that she travelled to
SCI-Houtzdale to visit her husband and to investigate these reports, and was told that her
visiting privileges had been suspended indefinitely pending an investigation. She later
learned that prison officials had confiscated her mail beginning in April 2012, instead of
delivering it to her husband.
Hill then filed a petition in the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
(Pennsylvania’s trial court for cases by or against the Commonwealth) on June 20, 2012,
against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections. She claimed that the visitation ban violated her due process rights and
constituted retaliation for her letter-writing campaign in violation of the First
Amendment. On June 26, 2012, the superintendent of SCI-Houtzdale notified her that
the suspension of her visitation privileges as to her husband was indefinite. Hill amended
2
her petition to allege that the Department of Corrections retaliated against her for filing it
by making her visitation ban indefinite as to her husband.
Hill then filed a § 1983 complaint in the Western District of Pennsylvania on
August 13, 2012. Instead of naming the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, Hill named as defendants six Department of
Corrections officers and employees in their individual capacities and sought, inter alia,
monetary damages. In 2013, the District Court abstained from deciding her case under
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), under which “federal courts must abstain in
certain circumstances from exercising jurisdiction over a claim where resolution of that
claim would interfere with an ongoing state proceeding.” Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d
139, 145 (3d Cir. 2010). We affirmed. Hill v. Barnacle, 523 F. App’x 856 (3d Cir. 2013)
(per curiam).1
The Commonwealth Court ultimately dismissed Hill’s June 2012 petition on the
merits. Hill v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., No. 419 M.D. 2012, 2013 WL 3970256 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. Apr. 9, 2013). The Commonwealth Court rejected Hill’s due process claim on the
ground that she did not have a protected interest in prison visitation. The court also
rejected her retaliation claim as “nonsensical” because the alleged retaliation (indefinite
1
We issued our ruling before the Supreme Court emphasized the narrow scope of the
Younger abstention doctrine in Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584
(2013). Although Younger abstention may preclude a return to federal court following a
state-court ruling in some instances, we decline to give our prior ruling continuing effect
under the particular circumstances presented here and in light of Sprint. Cf. Beazer E.,
Inc. v. Mead Corp., 525 F.3d 255, 263-64 (3d Cir. 2008).
3
suspension of visiting privileges) occurred after Hill filed her lawsuit in the
Commonwealth Court. In so ruling, the Commonwealth Court apparently did not
consider Hill’s allegation that the initial suspension of her privileges was in retaliation for
her earlier letter-writing campaign, and the indefinite suspension of privileges was in
retaliation for filing her lawsuit. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed without
discussion. Hill v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 80 A.3d 376 (Pa. 2013) (table).
Hill then filed a second federal § 1983 complaint in the Western District of
Pennsylvania based on the same conduct, and named as defendants only the six prison
officials she named in her first federal complaint, in their individual capacities. This is
the complaint currently on appeal. A Magistrate Judge recommended dismissing Hill’s
complaint for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) based on the
same reasoning as the Commonwealth Court expressed.2 The District Court adopted the
2
The Magistrate Judge initially recommended dismissing Hill’s complaint on somewhat
different grounds but later amended his report in response to Hill’s first set of objections.
Hill questions whether the Magistrate Judge was authorized to amend his report, but we
perceive no irregularity in that regard because Hill was permitted to object to the
Magistrate Judge’s amended report as well and the District Court reviewed Hill’s
objections in adopting that amended report. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C).
The Magistrate Judge also noted that if Hill sought federal review of the Commonwealth
Court’s ruling, her complaint would be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See D.C.
Ct. App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
Although the Magistrate’s conclusion did not rest on Rooker-Feldman grounds, we note
that Hill’s complaint is not, in fact, barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. “The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine . . . is confined to . . . cases brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
4
Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, and concluded that Hill’s complaint is
also barred by res judicata. Hill appeals. Our review of a dismissal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim is plenary. See Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591
F.3d 666, 670 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam).3
II.
We cannot conclude that Hill’s complaint is subject to dismissal at this stage for
any of the reasons mentioned by the District Court. Res judicata does not bar Hill’s
complaint at this stage. “The Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, . . . requires
the federal court to give the same preclusive effect to a state-court judgment as another
court of that State would give.” Exxon Mobile Corp., 544 U.S. at 293 (quotation marks
omitted). Thus, Hill’s complaint is barred by res judicata only if a Pennsylvania court
would bar her complaint on res judicata grounds under Pennsylvania law. Res judicata is
an affirmative defense, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1), and may not form the basis for dismissal
unless it is apparent on the face of Hill’s complaint, see Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448,
459 & n.16 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1547 (2014).
The District Court concluded with little discussion that Hill’s complaint is barred
by res judicata because she brought her Commonwealth Court action “against essentially
Hill is not complaining of any injury caused by the Commonwealth Court’s judgment.
To the contrary, she continues to complain merely of the same alleged injuries that
prompted her to file her Commonwealth Court action in the first place. See Turner v.
Crawford Square Apartments III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2006). The effect of
the Commonwealth Court’s ruling on Hill’s complaint is governed, not by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine, but by preclusion law. See Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 293.
3
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
5
the same parties.” Pennsylvania law, however, requires an identity of both the parties
and the “quality or capacity of the parties” in both actions for res judicata to apply.
Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111, 116 (3d Cir. 1988). Hill named different parties in the
state and federal suits—in the Commonwealth Court she named the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania and the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections; in the Western District of
Pennsylvania she named six prison officials in their individual capacities and sought
monetary damages. These defendants thus are not identical and do not share the same
capacity for res judicata purposes. See id. at 119-20. Indeed, Hill could not have named
the prison officials in their individual capacities in the Commonwealth Court because that
court’s original jurisdiction over individuals “is limited to civil actions or proceedings
brought against a state officer acting in his official capacity.” Law v. Fisher, 399 A.2d
453, 455 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979); see also Balshy v. Rank, 490 A.2d 415, 420-21 (Pa.
1985) (holding that the Commonwealth Court lacks original jurisdiction over § 1983
claims for monetary damages against individual defendants even in their official
capacities).4
Finally, we cannot agree that Hill’s complaint fails to state a claim for the reason
given by the Commonwealth Court and repeated by the District Court. Hill alleges that
4
The District Court did not address whether Hill’s complaint is barred by collateral
estoppel. Although the Commonwealth Court did not address Hill’s retaliation claim
premised on her pre-suspension letter-writing campaign, Hill did present those claims
before the Commonwealth Court. We leave the issue of whether Hill’s claims are barred,
either in part or in full, by collateral estoppel, for the District Court to determine in the
first instance.
6
the defendants retaliated against her for her letter-writing campaign by suspending her
visiting and mail privileges.5 The District Court nevertheless concluded that Hill failed to
state a claim, stating that Hill’s alleged protected activity occurred only after defendants
had already suspended her visitation privileges. This is an incomplete reading of Hill’s
complaint. As explained above, Hill alleges that her letter writing campaign began in
2011 and that defendants later suspended her visitation privileges and confiscated her
mail in retaliation for that protected activity in 2012. (ECF No. 3 at 7 ¶ 12) (referencing
November 5, 2011 letter attached as Exhibit 2). She then alleges that the defendants
made her suspension of visitation privileges indefinite in retaliation for filing a lawsuit in
Commonwealth Court. There is nothing nonsensical about Hill’s allegations.
For these reasons, we will vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand
for further proceedings.
5
As the District Court acknowledged, this claim is potentially valid even if Hill does not
have a “right” to visitation per se, see Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001),
and even though Hill is not a prisoner, see, e.g., George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562, 585 &
n.24 (3d Cir. 2013) (addressing non-prisoner’s First Amendment retaliation claim);
Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 282 (3d Cir. 2004) (same).
7