J-S75011-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
ANTHONY BRASWELL
Appellant No. 2928 EDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 8, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006710-2011
BEFORE: ALLEN, J., LAZARUS, J., and MUNDY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED JANUARY 23, 2015
Appellant, Anthony Braswell, appeals nunc pro tunc from the January
8, 2013 aggregate judgment of sentence of 25 to 50 years’ incarceration,
imposed following his conviction at a bench trial for aggravated assault,
possession of an instrument of crime, simple assault and recklessly
endangering another person, in connection with the stabbing of the
complainant/victim.1 After careful review, we affirm based on the thorough
and well-supported opinion of the Honorable Daniel J. Anders.
The trial court, in its June 10, 2014 opinion, has aptly summarized the
factual history of this case, which we need not repeat in full here. In brief,
the procedural history of this case as determined from the certified record
transpired as follows. Appellant was charged with the aforementioned
____________________________________________
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a), 907(a), 2701(a), and 2705, respectively.
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crimes on May 25, 2011. On November 19, 2012, Appellant waived his right
to trial by jury and proceeded with a bench trial, at the conclusion of which
the trial court found him guilty of all counts. On January 8, 2013, the trial
court sentenced Appellant to the mandatory 25 to 50 years’ imprisonment
for “third-strike” offenders prescribed by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(a)(2). On
January 18, 2013, Appellant filed post-sentence motions, raising sufficiency
of the evidence and weight of the evidence challenges. The trial court
denied those motions on March 6, 2013. No direct appeal was filed.
On August 8, 2013, Appellant filed a petition pursuant to the Post
Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), seeking, in part, restoration of his direct appeal
rights. The PCRA court granted Appellant relief on September 19, 2013,
permitting Appellant to file a nunc pro tunc direct appeal within 30 days.
Appellant filed his notice of appeal on October 15, 2013.2
On appeal, Appellant raises the following questions for our review.
I. Should Appellant’s sentence be vacated
because the evidence was insufficient to
support a verdict of guilty under 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2702(a)(1) because:
a. The Commonwealth failed to prove that
Appellant intended to cause serious
bodily injury, and
b. The Commonwealth failed to prove that
Appellant caused serious bodily injury
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly
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2
Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of
Appellate Procedure 1925.
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under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to the value of
human life?
II. Should Appellant’s sentence be vacated
because the trial court abused its discretion by
not ruling that the verdict of guilty on the
charge of Aggravated Assault as a Felony of
the First Degree, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1)
was against the weight of the evidence?
III. Was the evidence presented at trial sufficient
to justify a finding of self-defense under 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 505?
IV. Should Appellant’s sentence be vacated
because the Commonwealth failed to meet its
burden, under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 505, of
disproving self-defense?
Appellant’s Brief at 5-6.
In his first issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the
Commonwealth’s evidence relative to the aggravated assault charge. Id. at
12. “A claim impugning the sufficiency of the evidence presents us with a
question of law.” Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 756 (Pa.
Super. 2014) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 95 A.3d 275 (Pa. 2014).
Our standard and scope of review are well settled.
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence
admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the
verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable
the fact-finder to find every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above
test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute
our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we
note that the facts and circumstances established by
the Commonwealth need not preclude every
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possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder
unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that
as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
drawn from the combined circumstances. The
Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving
every element of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.
Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire
record must be evaluated and all evidence actually
received must be considered. Finally, the [finder] of
fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses
and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to
believe all, part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Fabian, 60 A.3d 146, 150-151 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(citation omitted), appeal denied, 69 A.3d 600 (Pa. 2013).
However, the inferences must flow from facts and
circumstances proven in the record, and must be of
such volume and quality as to overcome the
presumption of innocence and satisfy the jury of an
accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The trier
of fact cannot base a conviction on conjecture and
speculation and a verdict which is premised on
suspicion will fail even under the limited scrutiny of
appellate review.
Commonwealth v. Kearney, 92 A.3d 51, 64 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
omitted), appeal denied, 101 A.3d 102 (Pa. 2014).
Specifically, Appellant maintains the Commonwealth’s evidence failed
to prove the requisite mens rea to support a conviction for aggravated
assault under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1). Appellant’s Brief at 12. “In this
case, there is very little evidence by which the fact finder could infer
Appellant’s intent beyond the injury itself. Neither [of the Commonwealth’s
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eyewitnesses] described Appellant’s actions in sufficient detail to
conclusively prove that he intended to cause the type of serious injury that
[the victim] sustained.” Id. at 17. He further asserts that alternative
explanations of his intent can be inferred from the evidence, including
accident or defense. Id. at 17-18.
The trial court, in its June 10, 2014 opinion, carefully recounts the
evidence supporting its verdict, concluding the evidence was sufficient to
prove Appellant caused serious bodily harm to the victim and did so with
specific intent. Trial Court Opinion, 6/10/14, at 4. Based on our careful
review of the record, we agree. Specifically, we agree with the trial court
that the evidence of Appellant initiating an aggressive confrontation with the
victim, his use of a previously hidden deadly weapon on a vital part of the
victim’s body, his consequent flight, and his attendant and subsequent
statements all support an inference beyond a reasonable doubt that
Appellant acted with the requisite specific intent.3
Appellant next claims the verdict of guilty for aggravated assault was
against the weight of the evidence. Appellant’s Brief at 22. An argument
that the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence concedes the
evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions. Commonwealth v.
____________________________________________
3
Because we conclude the trial court correctly determined the evidence
supports its finding of specific intent to cause serious bodily injury, we do
not need to address Appellant’s companion claim that the evidence was
insufficient to show he acted intentionally, knowingly or recklessly
manifesting extreme indifference to human life raised in his issue I.b.
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Lyons, 79 A.3d 1053, 1067 (Pa. 2013), cert. denied, Lyons v.
Pennsylvania, 134 S. Ct. 1792 (2014). “A claim alleging the verdict was
against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial
court.” Commonwealth v. Landis, 89 A.3d 694, 699 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(citation omitted). “[A]n appellate court’s role is not to consider the
underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence. Rather, appellate review is limited to whether the trial court
palpably abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim.”
Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d 274, 282 (Pa. Super. 2009)
(quotations and citations omitted), appeal denied, 3 A.3d 670 (Pa. 2010).
In reviewing the entire record to determine the
propriety of a new trial, an appellate court must first
determine whether the trial judge’s reasons and
factual basis can be supported. Unless there are
facts and inferences of record that disclose a
palpable abuse of discretion, the trial judge’s reasons
should prevail. … Where the record adequately
supports the trial court, the trial court has acted
within the limits of its judicial discretion.
Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1056-1057 (Pa. 2013), quoting
Commonwealth v. Brown, 648 A.2d 1177, 1190 (Pa. 1994).
The factfinder is free to believe all, part, or none of
the evidence and to determine the credibility of the
witnesses. The trial court will award a new trial only
when the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence
as to shock one’s sense of justice. In determining
whether this standard has been met, appellate
review is limited to whether the trial judge’s
discretion was properly exercised, and relief will only
be granted where the facts and inferences of record
disclose a palpable abuse of discretion. Thus, the
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trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial based
on a weight of the evidence claim is the least
assailable of its rulings.
Commonwealth v. Weathers, 95 A.3d 908, 910-911 (Pa. Super. 2014),
quoting Commonwealth v. Diggs, 949 A.2d 873, 879–80 (Pa. 2008).
Specifically, Appellant argues, “[c]onsidering the totality of the
evidence, [the victim’s] claim that she did not swing at Appellant just before
she sustained her injuries is undermined by her prior testimony wherein she
admitted that she did.” Appellant’s Brief at 23. Appellant asserts that fact
refutes the claim he acted with specific intent or reckless indifference and
supports his claim of self-defense. Id.
In its June 10, 2014 opinion, the trial court again references its
recitation of the testimony in light of its credibility determinations to
conclude the verdict “does not shock one’s sense of justice.” Trial Court
Opinion, 6/10/14, at 5. Upon review of the record, we discern no abuse of
discretion by the trial court in denying Appellant’s motion for new trial based
on the insufficient weight of the evidence. See Weathers, supra.
In his final issue,4 Appellant claims the evidence presented by the
Commonwealth was insufficient to disprove Appellant’s claim of self-defense
beyond a reasonable doubt. We have noted our standard of review for
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4
The trial court determined that Appellant had sufficiently raised the issue of
self-defense justification to shift the burden to the Commonwealth to
disprove his claim. Trial Court Opinion, 6/10/14, at 5-6. We therefore do
not need to address Appellants issue III herein.
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claims of insufficient evidence above. In addition, relative to self-defense
claims we note the following.
[A] claim of self-defense (or justification, to use the
term employed in the Crimes Code) requires
evidence establishing three elements: (a) [that the
defendant] reasonably believed that he was in
imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury
and that it was necessary to use deadly force against
the victim to prevent such harm; (b) that the
defendant was free from fault in provoking the
difficulty which culminated in the slaying; and (c)
that the [defendant] did not violate any duty to
retreat. Although the defendant has no burden to
prove self-defense… before the defense is properly in
issue, there must be some evidence, from whatever
source, to justify such a finding. Once the question
is properly raised, the burden is upon the
Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant was not acting in self-defense.
The Commonwealth sustains that burden of negation
if it proves any of the following: that the slayer was
not free from fault in provoking or continuing the
difficulty which resulted in the slaying; that the
slayer did not reasonably believe that [he] was in
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and
that it was necessary to kill in order to save [him]self
therefrom; or that the slayer violated a duty to
retreat or avoid the danger.
Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 53 A.3d 738, 740-741 (Pa. 2012) (internal
quotation marks, citations and footnote omitted), see also 18 Pa.C.S.A.
505.5
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5
The version of Section 505 applicable to this case provides in pertinent part
as follows.
§ 505. Use of force in self-protection
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
(a) Use of force justifiable for protection of the
person.—The use of force upon or toward another
person is justifiable when the actor believes that
such force is immediately necessary for the purpose
of protecting himself against the use of unlawful
force by such other person on the present occasion.
(b) Limitations on justifying necessity for use
of force.—
…
(2) The use of deadly force is not justifiable
under this section unless the actor believes
that such force is necessary to protect himself
against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping
or sexual intercourse compelled by force or
threat; nor is it justifiable if:
…
(ii) the actor knows that he can avoid the
necessity of using such force with
complete safety by retreating or by
surrendering possession of a thing to a
person asserting a claim of right thereto
or by complying with a demand that he
abstain from any action which he has no
duty to take…:
…
(3) Except as required by paragraphs (1) and
(2) of this subsection, a person employing
protective force may estimate the necessity
thereof under the circumstances as he believes
them to be when the force is used, without
retreating, surrendering possession, doing any
other act which he has no legal duty to do or
abstaining from any lawful action.
…
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Instantly, Appellant, in support of his argument, selectively recites
facts he deems support an inference he acted in self-defense, including the
number of people he confronted, and the fact some of them stood up.
Appellant’s Brief at 25. Further, Appellant, in a conclusory manner, asserts
he had no duty to retreat, because he reasonably believed he could not do
so without being harmed. Id. at 26.
Again, in its June 10, 2014 opinion, the trial court carefully recounts
the evidence supporting its conclusion that the Commonwealth met its
burden in disproving Appellant’s claim of self-defense. Trial Court Opinion,
6/10/14, at 7-9. After close review of the certified record, we agree.
Specifically, we agree with the trial court that the evidence shows Appellant
acted with specific intent to harm, that even if Appellant was reacting to
perceived aggression his reaction was excessive and use of deadly force
unwarranted, and that even if Appellant was reacting to perceived
aggression Appellant had a duty to retreat. See Id.
In sum, after careful review, we conclude that the trial court’s June 10,
2014 Rule 1925(a) opinion fully sets forth Appellant’s claims, identifies the
proper standard of review, discusses the relevant law and explains the basis
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 505. We note the subject incident in this case predated the
amendments, effective August 29, 2011, incorporating Pennsylvania’s “stand
your ground” law provisions. As such, those amendments do not apply to
this case. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 97 A.3d 782, 787 n.2 (Pa.
Super. 2014).
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for its conclusion that said claims lack merit. Instantly, we carefully
reviewed the entire record and Appellant’s arguments and we conclude that
the thorough and well-reasoned opinion of Judge Daniel J. Anders is in
concert with our own views as addressed above. We conclude the trial court
did not abuse its discretion or commit an error of law when it denied
Appellant’s post-trial motion for arrest of judgment or for new trial based on
the foregoing sufficiency and weight of evidence claims. Accordingly, we
adopt the opinion by the Honorable Daniel J. Anders as our own for purposes
of appellate review and affirm the January 8, 2013 judgment of sentence.
See Id.
Judgment of sentence affirmed
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/23/2015
.
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FiLED
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PIDLADELPHIA COUNTVUN 1 0 2014
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA Criminal Appeals Unit
TRIAL DNISION - CRlMlNAL First Judicial District of PA
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA CP-5l-CR-0006710~2011
VS. 2928 EDA 2013
ANTHONY BRASWELL
OP1NION
Following a waiver trial, Defendant Anthony Braswell was convicted of aggravated
assault, possession of an instrument of crime, simple assault, and recklessly endangering another
person. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a mandatory sentence of25 to 50 years of
. of probation, Defendant filed a timely appeal in which he
incarceration followed by 7 years .
argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the aggravated assault conviction, (2) the
aggravated assault conviction was against the weight of the evidence, (3) the evidence was
sufficient to justifY a finding of self-defense, and (4) the Commonwealth failed to disprove self-
defense. For the reasons stated below, the Superior Court should affinn the judgment of
sentence.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On the afternoon of May 24, 2011, Ramieka Hart was walking down the 1500 Block of
West Pacific Street in Philadelphia. As Hart crossed West Pacific Street, she noticed a ten-dollar
bill in the middle of the street. Hart picked up the money and walked with her daughter to
Gennantown Avenue. Hart and her daughter shopped for approximately two hours and returned
to 1500 West Pacific Street. Hart arrived at a friend's home and set ber bags down to try on a
pair of shoes. N.T. 11119/2012 at 10-37.
Defendant Anthony BraswelI approached Hart and the other individuals, including Jackie
Evans, Aaron, Ebony, Bud, and Knita, outside of 1500 West Pacific Street. Defendant asked for
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his money back. Hart replied that she did not have any money for him. Hart handed her purse to
her daughter and instructed her to go inside the house. Defendant repeated his request for Hart to
give the money back several times and then stepped even closer toward Hart. Defendant was
now face-to-face with Hart. Hart and the others all stood up because Defendant "passed the
comfort zone for everybody." Defendant then stabbed Hart in the abdomen with a knife.ld.
Defendant immediately tried to flee the scene after he stabbed Hart. Other individuals
nearby, including Aaron, grabbed Defendant as he started to run off and tackled him. to the
ground. As they tussled on the groWld, Defendant also tried to stab Aaron. Eventually Aaron let
go of Defendant to avoid being injured by Defendant. Defendant then ran away before police
arrived.ld.
The first responders on scene transported Hart by ambulance to Temple Hospital. Hart
remained there for three or four days obtaining trea~ent. Hart endured emergency surgery and
voluntary explomtory surgery to examine the extent ~f any internal injuries, which required 36
staples and left a large scar running from her upper-left abdomen down to her pelvic region. Hart
can no longer lift objects over 50 pounds, and she is physically unable to shop or wash clothes on
her own. Id. at 17-20.
Police anived at the scene shortly after the ambulance departed with Hart. The blood was
already cleaned from the street. After several phone conversations with his girlfriend, who was at
the scene in the presence of police officers) Defendant returned to the scene and turned himself
in to police. ld. at 55-66.
The Commonwealth introduced recorded phone calls from Defendant to rus girlfriend
while in custody. These tapes further corroborated the evidence on several points: (1) the money
at issue, (2) that Defendant was angry and upset just before the stabbing because he realized he
would not be getting his money back, (3) how the Defendant felt "wronged," (4) awareness of
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the knife used and attempts to clean and hide the knife, and (5) scheming to make up an
alternative story.
DISCUSSION
1. There Is Sufficient Evidence To Support The Aggravated Assault Conviction
Defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support the aggravated assault
conviction. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must detennine
whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to establish all elements ofllie crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Burton, 2 AJd 598 (pa. Super. Ct. 2010). In doing so, the
appellate court views all of the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth
. as verdict winner. ld. A coqviction may be.sustained wholly on
circumstantial evidence, and the trier offact~wbile passing on the credibility of the witnesses
and the weight of the evidence-is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. ld.
A person is guilty of aggravated assault in the first degree ifhe attempts to cause serious
bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. 18 Pa.C.S. §
2702(a)(l). "Serious bodily injury" is bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or
which causes serious, pennanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of function of
any bodily member or organ. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2301. A person acts intentionally when it is his
conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result. Commonwealth v.
Martuscelli, 54 A.3d 940, 948 (pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
If the victim does not sustain serious bodily injury, the Commonwealth must prove that
the defendant acted with the specific intent to cause serious bodily injury. The Commonwealth
may prove intent to cause serious bodily injury by circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth v.
Lewis, 911 A.2d 558, 563 (pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (finding that a victim with multiple swollen areas
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on her face and neck, and multiple cuts and lacerations on her face and inside of her mouth
sufficient evidence of serious bodily injury or intent to inflict serious bodily injury);
Commonwealth v. Gray, 867 A.2d 560 (pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (finding that a victim with multiple
stab and puncture wounds to ann, forehead, and scalp provided sufficient evidence for a fact-
finder to infer an attempt to cause serious bodily injury).
Here, there is sufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant
caused serious bodily injury to Hart. Hart suffered protracted loss or impainnent of function, in
that she is no longer able to lift heavy objects and cannot shop or wash clothes. She also has a
large permanent scar from her chest down to her abdomen.
There is also sufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant
acted with the specific intent to cause serious bodily injury. Defendant was observed in broad
daylight stabbing Hart in her chest, which is a vital part of her body. Defendant's statements to
Hart and her godson about the money indicated his state of mind and his motive. Defendant
produced the knife from his person, further indicating his intent and premeditated purpose when
approaching Hart. Other circumstantial evidence of his mindset included: (1) Defendant
approached the group in an aggressive manner, (2) Defendant then approached Hart individually,
(3) Defendant then stepped closer into Hart's face, which was past her "comfort zone," (4)
Defendant escalated the situation with repeated questions that were unprovoked, (5) Defendant
initially attempted to flee, and ultimately successfully fled the scene, (6) Defendant attempted to
stab another individual when tackled to the ground, and (7) the recorded phone calls further
corroborated the evidence of Defendant's state ofnrind, and provided insight into his
consciousness of guilt.
Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's aggravated assault
conviction as a felony of the first degree.
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2. The Verdict Was Not Against The Weight Of The Evidence
Defendant asserts that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. When
evaluating the weight of the evidence, the standard of review is as follows:
The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact who
is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine
the credibility of the witnesses. An appellate court cannot
substitute its judgment foriliat of the finder of fact. Thus, [the
Superior Court] may only reverse the lower court's verdict if it is
so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice.
Moreover, where the trial court has ruled on the weight claim
below, an appellate court's role is not to consider the underlying
question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence. Rather, appellate review is limited to whether the trial
court palpably abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim.
Commonwealth v. Champney, 832 A.2d 403,408 (pa. Super. Ct. 2003). .
The fact-finder's credibility determinations based on the evidence presented and the
demeanor of the witnesses at trial should stand, particularly when there i.s corroboration of Hart's
testimony. In light ofllie overwhelming evidence discussed above, the verdict is not contrary to
the evidence and does not shock one's sense ofjustice.
3. Although The Evidence Was Sufficient To Raise The Issue Of Self-Defense, The
Commonwealth Met Its Burden Of Disproving Self-Defense Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
Defendant asserts that the evidence was sufficient to justify a finding of self-defense.
Defendant also claims that the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of disproving self-
defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
a. Defendant Properly Raised The Issue Of Self-Defense
Although the defendant has no burden to prove self~defense, before the defense is
properly in issue, ''there must be some evidence, from whatever source, to justify such a
finding." Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 53 A.3d 738, 740 (pa. 2012) (citing Commonwealth v.
Black, 376 A.2d 627,630 (pa. 1977»). Once the question is properly raised, "the burden is upon
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the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting in self-
defense." Id.
At trial, defense counsel cross-examined Hart on a prior statement from her preliminary
hearing testimony. N.T. 11119/2012 at 25. Hart denied her previous statement that she Hstood up
and swung" at defendant. [d. at 26, This evidence-that Hart "swung" at Defendant-is
sufficient to raise a colorable claim of selfwdefense that required the Commonwealth to disprove
the claim of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court instructed itself on self-
defense before issuing the verdict. N.T. 11/1912012 at 74-75.
b. The Commonwealth Disproved Self-Defense Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
The use of force against a person is justified when the actor .b eli eves that such force is
immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting bimselfagainst the use of unlawful force by
the other person. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 505 (a). When a defendant raises the issue of self-defense, the
Commonwealth bears the burden to disprove such a defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Commonwealth v. Bullock, 948 A.2d 818, 824 (pa. Super. Ct. 2008).
In order for the Commonwealth to disprove self-defense, one ofllie following elements
must exist: (1) the defendant used more force than was necessary to save himself from death,
bodily injury, or the commission of a fe10ny; (2) the defendant provoked the use of force; or (3)
the defendant had a duty to retreat, which was possible to accomplish with complete safety. See
Commonwealth v. Bums, 765 A.2d 1144, 1148-1149 (pa. Super. Ct. 2000). "Although the
Commonwealth is required to disprove a claim of self-defense arising from any source beyond a
reasonable doubt, a jury is not required to believe the testimony of the defendant who raises the
claim." Bullock, 948 A.2d at 824.
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i. The Commonwealth Proved Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That
Defendant Used Excessive And Unreasonable Force
When confronted with non~dead1y force, a defendant's responding use of force must not
be excessive. Commonwealtlt v. Buterbaugh> 2014 PA Super 102, _ A.3d ~ (Fa. Super. Ct.
2014) (citing Commonwealth v. Cutts, 421 A.2d 1172 (Fa. Super. Ct. 1980). There is a right to
use force to repel unlawful non~deadly force, but the force that is used must be reasonable under
the circumstances. Commonwealth v. Witherspoon, 730 A,2d 496 (pa. Super. Ct. 1999). If the
force used purportedly in self-defense i~ excessive, the defendant forfeits bis claim of self-
defense. 18 Pa.C.S. § 505; see also Commonwealth v. Witherspoon, 730 A.2d 496 (pa. Super. Ct.
1999) (explaining the difference in the rule used for cases involving deadly force and the rule
used for cases not involving deadly force). For example, a defendant who uses a knife to defend
against fists, under some circumstances, has used excessive force and cannot claim self-defense.
See Commonwealth v. Jones, 332 A,2d 464 (pa. 1974) (holding that use ofa pocket knife against
kicking and pushing assailants is excessive force), Commonwealth v. Cutts, 421 A.2d 1172 (Fa.
Super. Ct. 1980) (holding that use of "shiny instrument" capable of slashing is excessive force
applied against person who poked defendant with a sharp stick).
Viewing aU of the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, Defendant approached Hart and aggressively
demanded money from her. The corroborated testimony and previous statements from Hart and
Evans and the other evidence of record show that Defendant responded to the situation with
deadly force with a knife. There were no injuries to Defendant; there was no evidence Hart or
anyone else had a lmife or any weapon. Defendant's prison calls further corroborated Hart's
testimony and Defendant's intent to cause serious bodily injury. Thus, the Commonwealth
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disproved Defendant's alleged self-defense claim because the evidence proves Defendant used
excessive and unreasonable force.
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that Defendant was punched by Hart before he
stabbed her with a knife, Defendant's stabbing oEHart would be a classic example of meeting
non~deadly force by Hart with deadly force by Defendant. Tbis hypothetical scenario fails ~ll1y
selfwdefense justification because stabbing an unanned woman is inherently excessive and
unreasonable. See Witherspoon, Jones, and Cutts, supra at 7. Ajortiori, meeting the minimal
force of a rather tame argument between Hart and Defendant with deadly force is unequivocally
excessive and unreasonable. Therefore, the Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that Defendant's use of.force was excessive and unreasonable, and Defendant's daim must fail.
ii. The Commonwealth Proved Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
That Defendant Had A DUty to Retreat
It is well-established under Pennsylvania law that "the use of deadly force cannot be used
where there is an avenue ofretreai; lithe defendant knows the avenue of retreat is available."
Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1143 (pa. Super. Ct. 2009). "The law does not
require an accused to elect an avenue of retreat where a reasonably prudent person would
conclude that such a decision would increase his or her eXposure to the threatened harm." Id. at
1143-44.
Here, the evidence supports the proposition that retreat was possible and would not have
exposed Defendant to any harm. Defendant was presented with numerous opportunities to
retreat. Instead, Defendant repeatedly decided to escalate the situation. Defendant chose the
location for the altercation. Defendant provoked the initial confrontation by aggressively starting
an argument with Hart. Defendant brought the knife, which was initially concealed somewhere
on his person> with him to 1500 West Pacific Street. Defendant chose to escalate the argument by
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stepping closer in an intimidating and threatening manner. Defendant decided to stab Hart and
attempt to stab Aaron as Defendant fled. Finally, Defendant successfully fled the area after he
completed the crime, which reveals Defendant's clear avenue ofretreat throughout the
encounter.
Moreover, there is no evidence that Defendant was blocked by anyone from safely
retreating. Or that, in doing so, that Defendant would have increased his exposure to harm. To
the contrary, Defendant was able to easily escape after he stabbed Hart, which is evidence that he
knew that an avenue of safe retreat was available. What stopped Defendant from retreating-and
caused him to stab Hart-was Defendant's ego and pride.
As a result, the Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant failed
to utilize an avenue of safe retreat as required. Therefore, Defendanfs self-defense claim fails.
CONCLUSION
g, the judgment of sentence should be affirmed.
D
9
Com. v. Braswell, A.
Combined Opinion