14-1335-cv
Kanderskaya v. City of New York
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO
A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS
GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S
LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH
THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING
A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
Thurgood Marshall Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 26th day of
January, two thousand fifteen.
Present:
ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
Chief Judge,
RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
Circuit Judges.
________________________________________________
IRINA KANDERSKAYA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 14-1335-cv
THE CITY OF NEW YORK; NEW YORK CITY POLICE
COMMISSIONER WILLIAM J. BRATTON*, in his official
capacity; NEW YORK CITY POLICE OFFICER RONALD
PEREIRA, in his official and individual capacity; NEW
YORK CITY POLICE OFFICER ZAYDA NATAL, in
her official and individual capacity; NEW YORK CITY
POLICE OFFICER JOHN P. MOGULA, in his official
and individual capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________
*
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Police Commissioner
William J. Bratton is automatically substituted for former Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly
as appellee in this case. The Clerk of the Court is directed to amend the caption to read as shown
above.
For Plaintiff-Appellant: GARRY POGIL, New York, NY.
For Defendants-Appellees: DEVIN SLACK, Of Counsel (Richard Dearing, on the
brief), for Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel of
the City of New York, New York, NY.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
(Hellerstein, J.).
ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED that the order of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff-Appellant Irina Kanderskaya appeals from a final judgment entered on April 10,
2014, by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (Hellerstein, J.). The
order granted defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts,
procedural history, and issues presented for review.
We review Rule 12(c) motions for judgment on the pleadings de novo, accepting as true
the facts plausibly alleged in the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff’s favor. See Graziano v. Pataki, 689 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
On appeal, Kanderskaya argues that the district court erred in dismissing her claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest and malicious prosecution. However, “‘[i]t is well-
established that a law enforcement official has probable cause to arrest if he received his
information from some person, normally the putative victim or eyewitness,’ unless the
circumstances raise doubt as to the person’s veracity.” Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 395
(2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2000)); see also Singer
v. Fulton Cnty. Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 1995) (“An arresting officer advised of a crime
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by a person who claims to be the victim, and who has signed a complaint or information
charging someone with the crime, has probable cause to effect an arrest absent circumstances
that raise doubts as to the victim’s veracity.”). Here, the complaint states that all three police
officers arrested Kanderskaya in reliance on information from the putative victim, her husband.
It does not allege that the officers had sufficient reason to doubt his veracity that would vitiate
the probable cause provided by his complaint. At the time of the first arrest, the officers had only
Kanderskaya’s word against her husband’s, and they were entitled to credit her husband’s
account. See Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Although [the
officer] would have been entitled to believe [the arrestee’s] version of events rather than [the
putative victim’s], he was not required to do so.”). That Kanderskaya and her husband were
experiencing marital discord did not require the officers to discount her husband’s account, nor
did Kanderskaya’s protestations of innocence. See id. (“Once a police officer has a reasonable
basis for believing there is probable cause, he is not required to explore and eliminate every
theoretically plausible claim of innocence before making an arrest.”). Moreover, by the second
and third arrests, the arresting officers also knew that there was an order of protection against
Kanderskaya that had been entered by a New York State Supreme Court justice, ordering
Kanderskaya to stay away from her husband and refrain from communicating with or harassing
him. Under these circumstances, the officers had no reason to doubt her husband’s veracity and
therefore had probable cause to arrest Kanderskaya.
In the context of false arrest, “the existence of probable cause is an absolute defense . . .
and affords the arresting officer qualified immunity from litigation.” Caldarola v. Calabrese,
298 F.3d 156, 161 (2d Cir. 2002). In the context of malicious prosecution, probable cause is also
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a complete defense. Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d 63, 72 (2d Cir. 2003). Here, Plaintiff
alleges no intervening facts that would alter the probable cause analysis for the malicious
prosecution claim. Cf. Lowth v. Town of Cheektowaga, 82 F.3d 563, 571 (2d Cir. 1996),
amended (May 21, 1996). The district court therefore did not err in dismissing the false arrest
and malicious prosecution claims.
Kanderskaya also argues that the district court erred in dismissing what she characterizes
as a Section 1983 claim for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. However,
while a court may award damages for emotional suffering in a Section 1983 case, such damages
are awarded only when the plaintiff “suffered distress because of the denial of procedural due
process itself.” Miner v. City of Glens Falls, 999 F.2d 655, 662 (2d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation
marks omitted). As there was no finding of an underlying deprivation of a federal right, the
district court also did not err in dismissing this claim.
Next, Kanderskaya contends that the district court erred in dismissing her Monell claim
for municipal liability. However, because there is no underlying deprivation of a federal right
here, there is correspondingly no Monell claim. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of
N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
Finally, Kanderskaya argues that the district court abused its discretion in declining to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims. However, “in the usual case,” where
“all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors will point toward
declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Kolari v. New York-
Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and alterations
omitted). The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction.
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We have considered all of the Appellant’s remaining arguments and find them to be
without merit. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
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