IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-0500
Filed January 28, 2015
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CREIGHTON PAUL CATLETT,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, Gregory W.
Steensland, Judge.
The defendant appeals the judgment and sentence entered following his
guilty pleas. CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED, SENTENCES REVERSED IN PART,
AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Robert P. Ranschau,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney
General, Matthew D. Wilber, County Attorney, and Martha Heinicke, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Potterfield, J., and Scott, S.J.*
*Senior judges assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2015).
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SCOTT, S.J.
Creighton Paul Catlett appeals the judgment and sentence entered
following his convictions of two counts of assault causing bodily injury, two
counts of serious injury by vehicle, one count of possession with intent to deliver,
and one count of first-degree theft. He raises several claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel stemming from his guilty plea. He also contends the trial
court erred in failing to reduce the fine imposed following his probation revocation
and in imposing a mandatory minimum sentence on his conviction of possession
with intent to deliver. We affirm his convictions, vacate his sentence in part, and
remand with directions.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
This case involves a guilty to plea to five charges stemming from four
separate incidents in 2012 and 2013. Catlett entered his guilty pleas to all five
charges on October 30, 2013. Judgment was deferred, and Catlett was placed
on two years of probation under the supervision of the Drug Court Program.
Catlett was assessed a $1000 civil penalty pursuant to Iowa Code section 907.14
(2013).
In December 2013, Catlett failed to return to the residential correctional
facility where he had been placed, and an arrest warrant was issued for his
escape from custody. Catlett pleaded guilty to the escape charge on March 19,
2014, and the deferred judgments entered in October 2013 were revoked. The
district court ordered Catlett to serve a term of imprisonment not to exceed one
year on each of his convictions of assault causing bodily injury and five years on
his conviction of possession with intent to deliver. The court ordered those
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sentences be served concurrently. The court also ordered Catlett to serve a term
of incarceration not to exceed five years on each of his convictions of serious
injury by vehicle and ten years on his conviction of first-degree theft but ordered
these sentences be served consecutively for a total term of incarceration not to
exceed twenty years.
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
On appeal, Catlett first contends he was denied his constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel, which is one of two ways a defendant may attack
a guilty plea. See Rhoades v. State, 848 N.W.2d 22, 28 (Iowa 2014). We review
ineffective-assistance claims de novo. State v. Finney, 834 N.W.2d 46, 49 (Iowa
2013). While we ordinarily preserve such claims for postconviction relief
proceedings, we will address an ineffective-assistance claim on direct appeal if
the record is sufficient to permit a ruling. Id. We find the record here is sufficient.
Catlett alleges his counsel was ineffective in allowing him to plead guilty
and for failing to file a motion in arrest of judgment because (1) his convictions
and sentences for serious assault by vehicle arise from a single incident, in
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, (2) his plea was involuntary and
unintelligent due to the district court’s failure to explain the nature and elements
of each offense, and (3) there is no factual basis for his theft conviction.
A. Double Jeopardy.
Catlett’s first claim of ineffective assistance of counsel concerns his
serious-injury-by-vehicle convictions. He argues counsel was ineffective in
allowing him to plead guilty to both counts because they arise from the same
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incident and are the same offense, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of
the United States Constitution.
One of the purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to prevent multiple
punishments for the same offense. State v. Lindell, 828 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa
2013). However, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prevent multiple
sentences if a defendant is convicted of two offenses that are not the same.
State v. Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d 679, 688 (Iowa 2000). “Where the sentences
imposed are based on distinct acts, there is no double jeopardy problem.” Id.
The test to determine whether the same act violates two distinct statutory
provisions “‘is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which
the other does not.’” State v. Wissing, 528 N.W.2d 561, 566 (Iowa 1995)
(quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)).
The State charged Catlett with two counts of serious injury by vehicle
arising from an incident on July 26, 2013. On that date, Catlett was driving a
truck at a high rate of speed when it struck a parked van, mailbox, and concrete
pole. Catlett’s girlfriend sustained injuries to her head and shoulder in the crash
and was transported to the hospital for treatment. A test of Catlett’s urine
following the crash showed the presence of alcohol, marijuana metabolites, and
cocaine metabolites. Count I of the trial information alleged Catlett caused “a
serious injury by operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or
a drug or a combination of such substances.” Count II alleged Catlett caused “a
serious injury by driving a motor vehicle in a reckless manner with willful or
wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.”
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Both Catlett’s convictions for serious injury by vehicle arise from the same
incident. The question is whether the offenses—and the acts being punished—
are the same. Iowa Code section 707.6A(4) provides several ways a person
may commit serious injury by vehicle. One way is “by operating a motor vehicle
while intoxicated.” Iowa Code § 707.6A(1), (4). Another is by “[d]riving a motor
vehicle in a reckless manner with willful or wanton disregard for the safety of
persons or property.” Id. § 707.6A(2)(a), (4). To commit the offense of serious
injury by vehicle as described in section 7076A(1), a person need not drive
recklessly. See State v. Massick, 511 N.W.2d 384, 387 (Iowa 1994) (“Although
driving under the influence is certainly reckless behavior, proof of recklessness is
not an essential element of operating while intoxicated.”). And while operating a
motor vehicle while intoxicated is reckless, it is not a requirement for committing
the offense of serious injury by vehicle as described in section 707.6A(2)(a). See
id. at 388 (noting one may operate a motor vehicle while intoxicated without
actually moving the vehicle, which would obviate the recklessness element of
reckless driving). Because each offense requires proof of a fact the other does
not require, the offenses are not the same. Accordingly, counsel was not
ineffective in allowing Catlett to plead guilty to both.
B. Voluntary and Intelligent.
Catlett alleges his counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion in
arrest of judgment following his guilty plea because his plea was not voluntary
and intelligent. He alleges the district court failed to explain the nature and
elements of each offense and to inform him the jury’s verdict must be unanimous
to convict.
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Due process requires that a defendant enter a guilty plea voluntarily and
intelligently. State v. Philo, 697 N.W.2d 481, 488 (Iowa 2005). If Catlett pleaded
guilty without a voluntary and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights and
counsel failed to file a motion in arrest of judgment, counsel breached an
essential duty. Id. Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(b) sets forth the
requirements for accepting a guilty plea. The first requirement is informing the
defendant of “[t]he nature of the charge to which the plea is offered.” Iowa R.
Crim. P. 2.8(2)(b)(1). However, the court “need only substantially comply with
this rule; strict compliance is not required.” State v. Yarborough, 536 N.W.2d
493, 496 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995).
We conclude the court substantially complied with the requirements of rule
2.8(2)(b). The court is not required to discuss each element of a charge with the
defendant to ascertain his understanding of the nature of the offense. Id. The
court’s failure to explain an offense is not reversible error if, under the
circumstances, the defendant understood the nature of the charge. Id. Here, the
names of the offenses alone are descriptive enough for Catlett to understand the
charges he faced. See id. (“In fact, in some situations the name of the offense
itself has been held to be sufficiently descriptive.”). The court also confirmed
Catlett had received the trial information and agreed the minutes of evidence for
each charge were accurate. Under these circumstances, the record shows
Catlett was aware of and understood the nature of the charges to which he was
pleading guilty. Therefore, counsel had no duty to file a motion in arrest of
judgment.
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Counsel was also not ineffective in failing to file a motion in arrest of
judgment for failure to explain the jury’s verdict must be unanimous. Rule
2.8(2)(b) requires that the court inform the defendant of the right to be tried by
jury. At the plea hearing, the court asked Catlett, “Do you understand that you
have a right to a speedy and public trial by a jury of 12 persons?” Catlett
affirmed he understood. There is no requirement that the court inform a
defendant the jury’s verdict must be unanimous. Therefore, counsel did not
breach an essential duty in failing to file a motion in arrest of judgment.
Because Catlett has failed to show his guilty plea was entered in violation
of his due process rights, counsel was not ineffective by failing to file a motion in
arrest of judgment on this basis.
C. Factual Basis.
Catlett’s final ineffective-assistance claim concerns counsel’s alleged
failure to ensure there was a factual basis for his guilty plea to the first-degree
theft charge. If counsel allowed Catlett to plead guilty and waive his right to file a
motion in arrest of judgment when there was no factual basis to support the plea,
counsel failed to perform an essential duty and prejudice is presumed. See State
v. Velez, 829 N.W.2d 572, 576 (Iowa 2013).
In determining the existence of a factual basis for the plea, we may
examine the entire record before the district court—not just the plea colloquy.
Finney, 834 N.W.2d at 62. The record includes the inquiry of the defendant,
inquiry of the prosecutor, presentence report, and minutes of evidence. State v.
Ortiz, 789 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Iowa 2010). Although the evidence must
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demonstrate sufficient facts to support the offense, it need not rise to the level
necessary to support a guilty conviction. Id.
We conclude sufficient evidence supports Catlett’s guilty plea to first-
degree theft. Theft occurs when a person “[t]akes possession or control of the
property of another, or property in the possession of another, with the intent to
deprive the other thereof.” Iowa Code § 716.1(1). Catlett alleges there is no
factual basis for showing he intended to permanently deprive his brother of his
cell phone. The record evidence shows otherwise. An incident report filed with
the minutes of evidence shows Catlett was in a physical altercation with his
brother, Harbour, on August 28, 2013. When Harbour attempted to use his cell
phone to call the police, Catlett took the phone and “slammed it on the ground.”
Although Catlett claims the evidence only shows he intended to prevent Harbour
from using the phone to call the police, Catlett’s intent to permanently deprive
Harbour of the phone can be inferred as a natural consequence of his act of
slamming it to the ground. State v. Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d 785, 789 (Iowa
1999) (noting that we examine the record for facts and circumstances that would
support an inference of intent to permanently deprive an owner of property
because intent is seldom capable of being established by direct evidence); State
v. Chang, 587 N.W.2d 459, 462 (Iowa 1998) (holding an actor is presumed to
intend the natural consequence of his or her acts).
Because there is a factual basis in the record for the theft conviction,
counsel was not ineffective in allowing Catlett to plead guilty and failing to file a
motion in arrest of judgment.
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III. Sentence.
Catlett next contends the district court erred in sentencing him.
Specifically, he challenges the court’s failure to reduce the amount of his fine by
$1000 pursuant to Iowa Code section 908.11(5) for the civil penalty previously
imposed upon his deferred judgment. He also argues the court erred in imposing
a three-year mandatory minimum on his possession-with-intent-to-deliver
conviction. Because Catlett alleges the court imposed an illegal sentence, our
review is for correction of errors at law. Tindell v. State, 629 N.W.2d 357, 359
(Iowa 2001).
The State concedes the failure to reduce the fine and the imposition of a
mandatory minimum sentence resulted in an illegal sentence. We vacate this
portion of the sentence and remand for entry of a corrected sentencing order
reducing the total amount of fines imposed by $1000 and eliminating the
mandatory minimum sentence imposed upon his conviction for possession with
intent to deliver.
CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED, SENTENCES REVERSED IN PART, AND
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
State of Iowa v. Creighton Paul Catlett
Combined Opinion