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SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CR-13-1006
ROLANDIS LARENZO CHATMON Opinion Delivered JANUARY 29, 2015
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE FAULKNER
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 23CR-12-571]
STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE MICHAEL A. MAGGIO,
APPELLEE JUDGE
AFFIRMED.
PAUL E. DANIELSON, Associate Justice
Appellant Rolandis Larenzo Chatmon appeals the order of the Faulkner County
Circuit Court finding him guilty of three counts of aggravated robbery and one count of theft
of property. He was sentenced, as a habitual offender with a firearm enhancement, to a total
term of three life sentences, plus 360 months’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively. On
appeal, he argues that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions because
the State failed to prove that he was the person who committed the crimes; (2) the circuit
court erred in allowing the State to introduce into evidence certain recordings of phone
conversations; and (3) the circuit court erred in denying his motion for new trial based on a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Our jurisdiction of this appeal is pursuant to
Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 1-2(a)(2) (2014). We affirm.
The record reflects that on the evening of May 15, 2012, Derek Leidholm, his wife,
Morgan, and their neighbor, Jansen McGuire, were in the garage of the Leidholms’ house,
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when a man entered the garage, carrying a black semiautomatic pistol, and demanding money.
After Jansen handed over a leather wallet, the man exited the garage from the left side, just
as he had entered. Both Morgan and Jansen called 911 in separate calls. While they were
doing so, Derek peeked around the corner of the garage and saw the man running “down the
side . . . through the yards.” Derek then saw a dark-color, midsize SUV proceed slowly
through a stop sign without stopping, while the man ran beside it. After losing sight of the
SUV, Derek remained outside of his garage, and then saw the SUV again, this time moving
at a high rate of speed.
After receiving a subject description and vehicle description, officers checked the area.
Specifically, police were looking for a tall, thin black male wearing a white shirt, black jeans,
and possibly a blue baseball cap and carrying a black semiautomatic pistol. In addition, police
sought what was possibly a black SUV. In checking nearby apartment complexes, police
discovered a dark-colored SUV parked in a slanted position with a driver and a passenger
sitting inside. After approaching the vehicle, police discovered a tall, thin black male, wearing
a white shirt and black jeans, who identified himself as Chatmon; Chatmon informed the
police that he and his passenger, Rodney Chambers, were about to leave.
At that time, Crystal Brown, Chatmon’s then girlfriend and the owner of the SUV,
came outside and subsequently consented to a search of the car. Police searched the vehicle,
and a hat and a black semiautomatic pistol were found. Police also searched a nearby trash
dumpster and discovered Jansen’s wallet sitting on top of the trash inside the dumpster.
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On May 18, 2012, a felony information was filed, charging Chatmon with three counts
of aggravated robbery, one count of theft of property, and one count of possession of a firearm
by certain persons.1 Chatmon was tried before a jury on August 8–9, 2013. He was
convicted and sentenced, as previously set forth, and now appeals.
For his first point on appeal, Chatmon argues that the circuit court erred in denying
his motion for directed verdict. He contends not that there was insufficient evidence of
aggravated robbery and theft of property, but that there was insufficient evidence that he was
the person who committed the crimes. Chatmon avers that there is only circumstantial
evidence to support his convictions and that it was insufficient to identify him as the assailant.
The State responds that substantial evidence exists to show that Chatmon committed the
crimes, including his own admission to a fellow inmate at the county jail.
The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the verdict is
supported by substantial evidence. See Wells v. State, 2013 Ark. 389, 430 S.W.3d 65.
Substantial evidence is evidence that is forceful enough to compel a conclusion one way or
the other beyond suspicion or conjecture. See id. On review, only evidence that supports the
verdict is considered, and the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.
See id.
1
The possession count was severed on Chatmon’s motion.
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A person commits aggravated robbery if he or she commits robbery as defined in
Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-12-102,2 and the person (1) is armed with a deadly
weapon, (2) represents by word or conduct that he or she is armed with a deadly weapon, or
(3) inflicts or attempts to inflict death or serious physical injury upon another person. See Ark.
Code Ann. § 5-12-103 (Repl. 2013). A person commits theft of property if, with the
purpose of depriving the owner of the property, he knowingly (1) takes or exercises
unauthorized control over or makes an unauthorized transfer of an interest in the property of
another, or (2) obtains the property of another by threat. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-103(a)
(Repl. 2013).
Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the proof adduced at
trial revealed the following. The Leidholms and Jansen each testified that a black male, armed
with a gun, entered the Leidholms’ garage and demanded money. Derek testified that once
Jansen handed over his wallet, the assailant left, and his wife went inside to call 911 and Jansen
left to go to his home. After checking on his wife, Derek went back outside to make sure the
gunman was not going to return. He stated that he looked out of his garage and saw the
robber running through the neighbors’ yards and then noticed an SUV “creep through a stop
sign.” Derek described the SUV as a dark-colored, midsize SUV, similar to a Toyota 4-
2
Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-12-102 provides that a person commits robbery
if, with the purpose of committing a felony or misdemeanor theft or resisting apprehension
immediately after committing a felony or misdemeanor theft, the person employs or threatens
to immediately employ physical force upon another person. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-12-
102(a) (Repl. 2013).
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Runner. According to Derek, he saw the SUV again when it drove past his house at
approximately sixty miles per hour and failed to stop at a nearby stop sign. Derek described
the gunman as African American, close to six feet tall, wearing high-top basketball shoes, dark
blue jeans, a white shirt, and a fitted, straight-billed ball cap. He stated that the gun was black
or synthetic in color and was a large-caliber handgun, about the size of a .9 millimeter or .45-
caliber, semiautomatic handgun. When the State showed Derek the gun that was recovered
when police arrested Chatmon, Derek stated that it appeared to be consistent with the gun
used in the robbery. Derek also confirmed that a picture of the vehicle in which police found
Chatmon shortly after the robbery matched the description of the vehicle he saw in his
neighborhood after the robbery. Derek further identified the clothing that was taken from
Chatmon after his arrest as the clothing worn by the person who committed the robberies.
Jansen testified that he called 911 after the robbery, and the State introduced the
recording of that phone call into evidence. The recording was played for the jury and, on it,
Jansen is heard telling the operator that a man showed up in the garage, with a gun,
demanding their money and cell phones, and then ran off, possibly getting into a black
Trailblazer. Jansen stated that the gunman was a black male and was wearing a white shirt,
black pants, and a baseball cap. Jansen further stated that the assailant’s baseball cap had some
type of raised logo and a flat bill. He described the assailant as being about five feet, eleven
inches tall and weighing approximately 140–150 pounds. According to Jansen, the assailant’s
gun was black, with a long barrel, and was not a revolver. When the State showed him
pictures of the baseball hat and the gun recovered when police arrested Chatmon, Jansen
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confirmed that they were consistent with the hat worn and the gun used by the assailant.
Jansen stated that he gave the man his wallet, which was a brown Fossil wallet, and confirmed
that police recovered his wallet and returned it to him the day after the robbery.
Morgan testified as well. She stated that after the robbery she went into her home to
call 911. The State introduced into evidence the recording of her call to 911 and published
it to the jury. During this call, Morgan described the assailant as a black male, wearing a T-
shirt, jeans, and a bandana over his face and carrying a black handgun. Morgan also testified
at trial that the assailant was wearing a flat-billed hat and some type of high-top tennis shoes.
Officer Matt Edgmon, with the Conway Police Department, testified that he was on
patrol the evening of May 15, 2012, when he received notice of a reported armed robbery
nearby. After receiving a description of the suspect and a vehicle possibly connected to the
crime, Officer Edgmon began searching the area for that vehicle. The suspect was described
to the officer as a tall, thin black male, wearing a white shirt and black jeans and possibly a
blue ball cap. Dispatch also reported that the suspect was armed with a black semiautomatic
pistol, and the suspect vehicle was described as “a possibly black in color SUV.” Officer
Edgmon began searching nearby apartment complexes, including the Stoneridge Apartments,
when he noticed a dark-colored SUV that was parked in two slots and appeared to have been
hastily parked. As he drove by, the officer noticed someone in the driver’s seat, so he got out
to speak with the person in the vehicle. As the officer approached the vehicle, the person on
the driver’s side of the vehicle began to exit. The officer noticed that he was a tall, thin black
male, wearing a white shirt and black jeans and also noticed that there was a passenger in the
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vehicle. The driver, who stated he was a resident at the apartments, identified himself as
Rolandis Chatmon and the passenger identified himself as Rodney Chambers. According to
Officer Edgmon, as he was talking to Chatmon, Chatmon grew increasingly nervous and
repeatedly stated that he and Chambers were about to leave. Chatmon told Officer Edgmon
that he and Chambers had been down at another apartment but had not been driving the car,
which was inconsistent with the fact that the SUV’s hood was warm to the touch, indicating
it had recently been driven. Officer Edgmon subsequently learned that the SUV belonged
to Crystal Brown, Chatmon’s then girlfriend, who had come from one of the apartments
while the officer was talking to the men. Brown gave the officer, along with Officer Travis
Caldwell who also reported to the scene, permission to search the vehicle. While Officer
Edgmon was talking to Brown, Chatmon was yelling at her not to allow the officers to search
the vehicle. Inside the vehicle’s console was a black semiautomatic pistol and in the back of
the vehicle was a hat. And, in a nearby trash dumpster, police located a brown leather Fossil
wallet sitting atop the trash inside the dumpster. Officers Edgmon and Caldwell testified that
the SUV, a Ford Explorer, appeared to be black under the lights but was actually dark green
in color.
Brown testified that Chatmon was living with her at the time of the robbery, and that
on that particular evening he left their apartment in her Ford Explorer around 7:00 p.m. and
returned shortly after 11:00 p.m. Brown thought she remembered Chatmon wearing a white
T-shirt and hat that evening. According to Brown, she saw Chatmon return, get out of the
passenger side of the vehicle, walk toward where the dumpster was located, and then return
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to the car and get in the driver’s side. Brown stated that she gave officers permission to search
her vehicle, which upset Chatmon.
Detective David Short with the Conway Police Department testified that he
investigated this case. He stated that he had spoken with both Brown and Chatmon and was
able to recognize their voices and, in the course of the investigation had reviewed some
recordings of phone calls made by Chatmon, while in jail, to Brown. These calls were then
played for the jury. During one of the calls, Chatmon admitted that he had the gun in
Brown’s vehicle and had also kept it in her apartment at times. In another call, Chatmon was
angry with Brown for allowing police to search her car. And, in yet another call, Chatmon
admitted that on the night of the robbery he did not know why he did not get out of the car
and go into the apartment as soon as he parked.
Finally, Monette Solomon testified that he met Chatmon while they were incarcerated
together and that Chatmon told him he was in jail because he “had hit a lick.” Solomon
explained that was street slang for committing a robbery or burglary. Solomon also testified
that Chatmon told him he used a .40-caliber handgun during that robbery and that Rodney
Chambers had driven the vehicle that Chatmon got into after the robbery. According to
Solomon, Chatmon believed he would not be convicted for the crimes because the victims
had described the gun as a .45-caliber weapon, when it was actually a .40-caliber handgun.
In advancing his argument that there was insufficient evidence to support his
convictions, Chatmon points to some inconsistencies in statements made by the three victims
and also asserts that the information they provided to police to describe the assailant was
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nothing more than generalities. According to Chatmon, the State failed to present any direct
evidence of his guilt and, instead, relied solely on circumstantial evidence to convict him.
And, according to him, this circumstantial evidence caused the jury to resort to speculation
and conjecture in convicting him. This argument is simply unavailing.
Circumstantial evidence is evidence of circumstances from which a fact may be
inferred. Jackson v. State, 363 Ark. 311, 214 S.W.3d 232 (2005). Direct evidence is evidence
that proves a fact without resort to inference, when for example, it is proved by witnesses who
testify to what they saw, heard, or experienced. Id. Here, Chatmon ignores crucial evidence
introduced by the State through witness Monette Solomon that Chatmon confessed to
committing the robbery and to using a .40-caliber pistol to do so. This was direct evidence
linking him to the crimes. See, e.g., Echols v. State, 326 Ark. 917, 936 S.W.2d 509 (1996)
(stating that witness testimony that a defendant admitted to committing the murders was
direct evidence of guilt). And, even though Chatmon attempts to discount this testimony by
pointing to the fact that Solomon was a felon with pending charges, it is within the discretion
of the jury to believe or disbelieve any witness. Ellis v. State, 2012 Ark. 65, 386 S.W.3d 485.
Clearly, the jury found Solomon’s testimony to be credible.
Moreover, in addition to this direct evidence, the State introduced ample
circumstantial evidence, as set forth above, that tied Chatmon to the crime. Simply because
the majority of the evidence was circumstantial does not mean that there was insufficient
evidence supporting the convictions. Evidence of guilt is not less because it is circumstantial.
Jackson, 363 Ark. 311, 214 S.W.3d 232. Where the evidence is substantial, it is the jury’s duty
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to decide whether the circumstantial evidence offered to prove guilt excludes every other
reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence. Sales v. State, 374 Ark. 222, 289 S.W.3d
423 (2008). In light of the foregoing evidence, we reject Chatmon’s claim that there was
insufficient evidence supporting his convictions and affirm on this point.
Chatmon next argues that the circuit court erred in admitting certain audio recordings
of Chatmon talking with Brown and because of such error he is entitled to a new trial. More
specifically, Chatmon argues that the State’s introduction of the recordings through Detective
Short did not satisfy the authentication requirement of Arkansas Rule of Evidence 901. The
State counters that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the recordings.
Alternatively, the State argues that even if there was any error in the admission of the
recordings, there was no prejudice and, thus, any error was harmless.
The decision to admit or exclude evidence is within the sound discretion of the circuit
court, and we will not reverse that decision absent a manifest abuse of discretion. E.g., Laswell
v. State, 2012 Ark. 201, 404 S.W.3d 818. The abuse-of-discretion standard is a high threshold
that does not simply require error in the circuit court’s decision, but requires that the circuit
court act improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration. E.g., Grant v. State, 357
Ark. 91, 161 S.W.3d 785 (2004). In addition, we will not reverse a ruling on the admission
of evidence absent a showing of prejudice. E.g., Davis v. State, 350 Ark. 22, 86 S.W.3d 872
(2002).
Rule 901 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence sets out the foundation that must be laid
prior to voice-identification testimony and provides as follows:
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Requirement of authentication or identification.
(a) General Provision. The requirement of authentication or identification as a
condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.
(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the
following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the
requirements of this rule:
....
(5) Voice identification. Identification of a voice, whether heard firsthand or
through mechanical or electronic transmission or recording, by opinion based upon
hearing the voice at any time under circumstances connecting it with the alleged
speaker.
Ark. R. Evid. 901(a), (b)(5) (2014). Authentication requirements are satisfied if the trial
court, in its discretion, concludes that the evidence presented is genuine and, in reasonable
probability, has not been tampered with or altered in any significant manner. Davis, 350 Ark.
22, 86 S.W.3d 872; Guydon v. State, 344 Ark. 251, 39 S.W.3d 767 (2001).
This court has previously addressed a similar argument that an insufficient foundation
had been laid prior to the introduction of a recording. In Smithey v. State, 269 Ark. 538, 602
S.W.2d 676 (1980), this court held that a proper foundation had been laid for the introduction
of a recording of a conversation between a defendant and an informant where an officer
testified that he had listened to the conversation electronically, reviewed the tapes and
transcript, and stated that the recording accurately reflected the conversation. Indeed,
Chatmon concedes that an officer’s testimony that he recognized a defendant’s voice on a
recording was sufficient for purposes of authentication, citing to this court’s decision in
Hinkston v. State, 340 Ark. 530, 10 S.W.3d 906 (2000). But, Chatmon asserts that Detective
Short’s testimony does not comply with the requirements of Rule 901 because “it falls short
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of the knowledge necessary to authenticate the purported recording.” This argument is
simply without merit.
Here, Detective Short testified that he had spoken with both Chatmon and Brown,
that he was familiar with their voices, and that he would recognize their voices on a phone
call or other recording. He also stated that, based on his prior contact with both of them, he
believed he would be able to identify their voices. Detective Short specifically stated that he
had interviewed Chatmon for over an hour and had spoken to him another time subsequent
to that interview and had spoken to Brown on several occasions. Detective Short then
testified that the voices on the recorded phone calls were those of Chatmon and Brown. In
light of the detective’s testimony, and considering the high threshold of review related to the
admission of evidence, we cannot say that the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting
the recorded phone calls between Chatmon and Brown. We therefore affirm on this point.
As his final point on appeal, Chatmon argues that the circuit court erred in denying
his pro se motion for a new trial because his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel
during his trial. According to Chatmon, his counsel waived his right to speedy trial without
his knowledge, understanding, or consent. Moreover, Chatmon asserts that his counsel failed
to adequately cross-examine the witnesses so as to identify inconsistencies in their testimony.
The State argues to the contrary that all of Chatmon’s claims for a new trial were
deemed denied on September 13, 2013, and, thus, because his motion was deemed denied
before entry of a written order, this court is precluded from reviewing either of Chatmon’s
assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel. Alternatively, the State asserts that this court is
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precluded from reviewing the ineffectiveness claim related to the waiver of his right to speedy
trial because it was not raised until the hearing on his motion for a new trial and because the
circuit court did not provide written findings of fact or a ruling on this issue. The State also
argues that there is no merit to the argument as it relates to the cross-examination of witnesses
because the allegations in Chatmon’s motion for new trial were merely conclusory and cannot
support a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.
Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.3 governs posttrial motions and, pursuant to
subsection (b), requires that the filing of a motion, such as this one for a new trial, must be
filed within thirty days after entry of judgment. Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.3(b) (2014). If the
circuit court neither grants nor denies a posttrial motion within thirty days after the date the
motion is filed, it shall be deemed denied as of the thirtieth day. Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.3(c).
This court has made clear that a defendant may assert a claim based on ineffective assistance
of counsel in a posttrial motion. And, in order for a defendant to argue ineffective assistance
of counsel on direct appeal, he must first have presented the claim to the lower court either
during the trial or in a motion for new trial. E.g., Rounsaville v. State, 374 Ark. 356, 288
S.W.3d 213 (2008) (holding that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is appropriate on
direct appeal only when it is raised before the trial court and the facts and circumstances
surrounding the claim have been fully developed at the trial level). This court has also
explained that a deemed-denied ruling on a posttrial motion for new trial is an insufficient
order from which to raise on direct appeal a claim of ineffectiveness because such a ruling
necessarily precludes any consideration by the trial court of the relevant facts pertaining to the
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claim. E.g., Maxwell v. State, 359 Ark. 335, 197 S.W.3d 442 (2004); Dodson v. State, 326
Ark. 637, 934 S.W.2d 198 (1996); see also Chavis v. State, 328 Ark. 251, 942 S.W.2d 853
(1997).
Here, Chatmon’s sentencing order was entered on August 14, 2013. Chatmon filed
a pro se motion for new trial on August 13, 2013, arguing that his attorney failed to properly
cross-examine witnesses. The circuit court held a hearing on the new-trial motion on
September 10, 2013, and in that hearing, Chatmon mentioned that he believed counsel had
improperly waived his right to a speedy trial. The circuit court entered a written order
denying the new-trial motion on October 2, 2013, but pursuant to Rule 33.3(c), Chatmon’s
motion was actually deemed denied on September 12, 2013, the thirtieth day after the filing
of his new-trial motion. Nevertheless, in its written order, the circuit court found that there
was no merit to Chatmon’s claim that his trial counsel failed to properly cross-examine
witnesses but made no mention of Chatmon’s oral argument that counsel improperly waived
his right to speedy trial.
We agree with the State that this court is precluded from addressing either of
Chatmon’s ineffective-assistance claims because this court has clearly stated that a deemed-
denied ruling is an insufficient order from which to raise ineffective assistance of counsel on
direct appeal. See Maxwell, 359 Ark. 335, 197 S.W.3d 442. Here, although the circuit court
entered a written order denying Chatmon’s motion, it was not entered until after the motion
had already been deemed denied pursuant to Rule 33.3. Accordingly, we affirm on this
point.
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Pursuant to Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-3(i) (2014), the record has been reviewed
for all objections, motions, and requests that were decided adversely to Chatmon, and no
prejudicial error has been found.
Affirmed.
Digby Law Firm, by: Bobby R. Digby II, for appellant.
Dustin McDaniel, Att’y Gen., by: Karen Virginia Wallace, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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