14-310
Kallas v. Fiala
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC
DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held
at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New
York, on the 30th day of January, two thousand fifteen.
PRESENT:
DENNIS JACOBS,
GUIDO CALABRESI,
RICHARD C. WESLEY,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
Danos Kallas,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. 14-310
Barbara J. Fiala, as Commissioner of the
Department of Motor Vehicles of the State of
New York,
Defendant-Appellee.
_____________________________________
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Danos Kallas, pro se, Cliffside Park, NJ.
FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: David Lawrence III, Barbara D.
Underwood, Steven C. Wu, for Eric T.
Schneiderman, Attorney General of the
State of New York, New York, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York (Daniels, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Appellant Danos Kallas, pro se, appeals the judgment of the district court, dismissing his
complaint sua sponte as frivolous. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts,
the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
A district court has inherent authority to “dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even
when the plaintiff has paid the required filing fee.” Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants
Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000). Although we have not resolved whether such
dismissals are reviewed de novo or for abuse of discretion, we need not reach that issue to affirm
the district court’s decision “because [it] easily passes muster under the more rigorous de novo
review.” Id. at 364 n.2.
A complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim will have “facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009). By contrast, a claim “is frivolous when either: (1) the factual contentions are
clearly baseless, such as when allegations are the product of delusion or fantasy; or (2) the claim
is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141
F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Pro se complaints
should be liberally construed, and district courts should generally not dismiss a pro se complaint
without granting the plaintiff leave to amend, unless it would be futile. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu,
222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).
The district court properly dismissed Kallas’ complaint as frivolous. Kallas’ claims
challenging a state court judgment are clearly barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, see Dist.
of Columbia Ct. App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263
U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923), and his due process claims are frivolous because (among other reasons)
he has challenged the alleged deprivation through state remedies and does not challenge the
adequacy of those available remedies, see Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). We
therefore affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the district court. We further note that
amendment of the complaint would have been futile.
We have considered all of Kallas’ arguments and find them to be without merit.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk