FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 30 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JORGE L. CORONA, No. 14-15707
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 1:13-cv-01581-LJO-MJS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ROBERT CRABTREE; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Lawrence J. O’Neill, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 21, 2015**
Before: CANBY, GOULD, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Jorge L. Corona, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate
indifference to his safety and serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Cir. 2000) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d
1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). We
affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Corona’s action because Corona failed
to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his
safety at work or to his leg burns. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837
(1994) (a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he or she “knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety”); Gibson v. County of
Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002) (“If a person should have been
aware of the risk, but was not, then the person has not violated the Eighth
Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.”); see also Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d
1051, 1058-60 (9th Cir. 2004) (a difference of opinion concerning the course of
medical treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Corona’s first
amended complaint without leave to amend after providing Corona with one
opportunity to amend and concluding that further amendment would be futile. See
Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (setting forth
standard of review and explaining that leave to amend should be given unless
amendment would be futile); see also Chodos v. West Publ’g Co., 292 F.3d 992,
2 14-15707
1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen a district court has already granted a plaintiff leave
to amend, its discretion in deciding subsequent motions to amend is particularly
broad.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
AFFIRMED.
3 14-15707