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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
VINCENT CAMPBELL
Appellant No. 2023 EDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order of July 7, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County
Criminal Division at Nos.: CP-15-CR-0001329-2001
CP-15-CR-0001401-2001
CP-15-CR-0001616-2001
BEFORE: DONOHUE, J., WECHT, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 03, 2015
Vincent Campbell appeals the July 7, 2014 order dismissing his second
petition for relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42
Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46, as untimely. We affirm.
The PCRA court summarized the procedural history of this case as
follows:
On September 25, 2001, [Campbell] entered a negotiated guilty
plea to aggravated assault, resisting arrest, flight to avoid
apprehension and driving under the influence. He was
sentenced that day to serve a term of imprisonment of six to
twelve years[’ imprisonment]. [Campbell] did not appeal his
sentence. Approximately eleven years later, on July 30, 2012,
[Campbell] filed his first [PCRA] petition [], and was appointed
PCRA counsel. On February 19, 2013, [the PCRA court]
dismissed his PCRA petition as untimely. On November 13,
2013, [this Court] affirmed the dismissal, also finding
[Campbell’s] PCRA petition untimely. [See Commonwealth v.
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Campbell, No. 712 EDA 2013, slip op. at 1, 6 (Pa. Super. Nov.
13, 2013).]
On March 14, 2014, [Campbell] filed a second PCRA petition.
Again, [the PCRA court] reviewed the petition and the record,
found that the petition was also untimely, and on June 19, 2014,
notified [Campbell] of [the court’s] intent to dismiss his petition
[pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907]. Although [Campbell] responded
to [the Rule 907 notice,] his response established entitlement to
no PCRA timeliness exception. Accordingly, [the PCRA court]
dismissed his PCRA petition on July 7, 2014.
PCRA Court Opinion, 9/4/2014, at 1-2.
On July 17, 2014, Campbell filed a notice of appeal. In response, the
PCRA court directed Campbell to file a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On August 18,
2014, Campbell timely complied. On September 4, 2014, the PCRA court
issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
Campbell raises the following issues for our consideration:
1. Whether the lower trial courts followed the sentencing code?
2. Whether the sentence imposed is illegal and unconstitutional
under the United States Constitution and [the] Pa.
Constitution?
3. Whether [Campbell’s] sentence left him therefor unlawfully
imprisoned?
4. Did [Campbell] show just cause for review pursuant to 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii)/42 Pa.C.S. [§ 9545](b)(i)(ii)?
5. Whether [Campbell’s second] PCRA was timely?
Brief for Campbell at 3 (commas omitted for clarity).
Our standard of review for an order denying PCRA relief is well-settled:
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This Court’s standard of review regarding a PCRA court’s order is
whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported by the
evidence of record and is free of legal error. Great deference is
granted to the findings of the PCRA court, and these findings will
not be disturbed unless they have no support in the certified
record. Moreover, a PCRA court may decline to hold a hearing
on the petition if the PCRA court determines that a petitioner’s
claim is patently frivolous and is without a trace of support in
either the record or from other evidence.
Commonwealth v. Carter, 21 A.3d 680, 682 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations
and quotation marks omitted).
Before we can consider the merits of Campbell’s issues, we first must
determine whether his second PCRA petition was timely filed, thereby
conferring jurisdiction upon the PCRA court to rule upon the petition in the
first instance. In Commonwealth v. Jackson, we articulated the
timeliness standards under the PCRA as follows:
The PCRA “provides for an action by which persons convicted of
crimes they did not commit and persons serving illegal sentences
may obtain collateral relief.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542. When an
action is cognizable under the PCRA, the PCRA is the “sole
means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other
common law and statutory remedies for the same purpose[.]”
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542.
In order for a court to entertain a PCRA petition, a petitioner
must comply with the PCRA filing deadline. See
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157, 1161 (Pa.
2003). The time for filing a petition is set forth in
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b), which provides in relevant part:
(b) Time for filing petition.—
(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second
or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the
date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition
alleges and the petitioner proves that:
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(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the
result of interference by government officials with the
presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution
or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or
laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States
or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time
period provided in this section and has been held by
that court to apply retroactively.
***
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b).
“[T]he time limitations pursuant to . . . the PCRA are
jurisdictional.” Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 222
(Pa. 1999). “[Jurisdictional time] limitations are mandatory and
interpreted literally; thus, a court has no authority to extend
filing periods except as the statute permits.” Id. “If the petition
is determined to be untimely, and no exception has been pled
and proven, the petition must be dismissed without a hearing
because Pennsylvania courts are without jurisdiction to consider
the merits of the petition.” Commonwealth v. Perrin, 947
A.2d 1284, 1285 (Pa. Super. 2008).
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 518-19 (Pa. Super. 2011).
Instantly, Campbell was sentenced on September 25, 2001. Campbell
did not file a direct appeal. Thus, his judgment of sentence became final on
or about October 25, 2001. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3) (“a judgment
becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary
review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.”). To be
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timely, Campbell had to file a PCRA petition within one year of that date, on
or before October 25, 2002. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1) (“[a]ny petition
under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be
filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final.”). Campbell
filed the instant petition on March 14, 2014. Consequently, Campbell’s
second PCRA petition is facially untimely by approximately eleven and one-
half years.
Nonetheless, as noted above, an untimely PCRA petition will be
deemed to be timely filed if the petitioner has pleaded and proven in his
PCRA petition one of the three enumerated exceptions to the PCRA’s time
bar. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1) (“[a]ny petition under this subchapter,
including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of
the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the
petitioner proves [one of the three exceptions.]) (emphasis added). The
PCRA court noted in its opinion that Campbell has failed to demonstrate that
one of the exceptions applies. See PCRA Court Opinion, supra at 2. We
agree with the PCRA court.
The crux of Campbell’s claim for relief, as set forth in his PCRA petition
and in his brief to this Court, is his contention that he was illegally sentenced
on his DUI conviction. In his PCRA petition, Campbell argued that, as a
result of research in the prison law library, his discovery that his sentence
was illegal constituted a newly discovered fact for purposes of the relevant
exception to the PCRA’s time limits. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). The
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newly discovered fact exception “requires [a] petitioner to allege and prove
that there were ‘facts’ that were ‘unknown’ to him” and that he could not
have ascertained those facts by the exercise of “due diligence.”
Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1270-72 (Pa. 2007). The
focus of the exception is “on [the] newly discovered facts, not on a newly
discovered or newly willing source for previously known facts.”
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 863 A.2d 423, 427 (Pa. 2004) (emphasis in
original), abrogation on different grounds recognized by Commonwealth v.
Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264 (Pa. 2007).
Campbell has failed to explain, either in his PCRA petition or in his
brief to this Court, why he could not have ascertained the purported illegality
of his sentence at an earlier date, or how he nonetheless acted with due
diligence in the eleven and one-half years between the date that the
sentence was imposed and the date that he filed his PCRA petition. Indeed,
Campbell proffers no analysis of the necessary elements of the exception,
and offers no meaningful discussion as to how he has satisfied those
elements. Hence, we agree with the PCRA court that Campbell has not
established that he is entitled to the application of the exception.
Campbell also argues that the jurisdictional elements of the PCRA have
been satisfied because his claim represents a challenge to the legality of his
sentence, which is a non-waivable challenge. However, it is well-settled that
such a claim does not, ipso facto, provide a PCRA court with jurisdiction.
Although it is true that claims regarding the legality of a sentence generally
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cannot be waived, Commonwealth v. Foster, 960 A.2d 160, 163 (Pa.
Super. 2008), waiver and jurisdiction are separate matters. “Though not
technically waivable, a legality [of sentence] claim may nevertheless be lost
should it be raised for the first time in an untimely PCRA petition for which
no time-bar exception applies, thus depriving the court of jurisdiction over
the claim.” Commonwealth v. Slotcavage, 939 A.2d 901, 903 (Pa. Super.
2007) (citing Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (Pa. 1999)
(“Although legality of sentence is always subject to review within the PCRA,
claims must still first satisfy the PCRA’s time limits or one of the exceptions
thereto.”)).
Campbell cannot establish the PCRA court’s jurisdiction to grant relief
on his untimely PCRA petition. The petition at issue herein was filed
approximately eleven and one-half years after Campbell’s judgment of
sentence became final. Campbell has not proved the applicability of any of
the enumerated exceptions to the PCRA time limits. Thus, the PCRA court
lacked jurisdiction over his petition, and did not err or abuse its discretion in
dismissing the petition on that basis.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/3/2015
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