UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4454
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RYAN CHRISTOPHER FULTZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Newport News. Henry Coke Morgan, Jr.,
Senior District Judge. (4:13-cr-00026-HCM-DEM-1)
Submitted: January 30, 2015 Decided: February 4, 2015
Before WILKINSON and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Edwin S. Booth, SHUTTLEWORTH, RULOFF, SWAIN, HADDAD & MORECOCK,
PC, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente,
United States Attorney, Robert E. Bradenham, II, Assistant
United States Attorney, Newport News, Virginia; Lindsay C.
Sfekas, Second Year Law Student, William & Mary Law School,
Williamsburg, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ryan Christopher Fultz appeals his convictions for
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012); possession with the intent to
distribute a quantity of a mixture and substance containing a
detectable amount of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) (2012); possessing, brandishing, and discharging a
firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2012); and aiding and abetting the
latter two offenses, 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). At trial, the
district court excluded a portion of the testimony of Fultz’
proffered expert witness, Carl Rone. Rone was prepared to
testify that Fultz could not have been the shooter of the AR-15
Bushmaster because of where the .223 caliber shell casings were
discovered at the crime scene. On appeal, Fultz argues that the
district court abused its discretion by excluding Rone’s
testimony and by failing to grant a new trial on the ground that
Rone’s testimony was wrongfully excluded. See Fed. R. Crim. P.
33. We affirm.
We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s
decisions to exclude expert testimony, United States v. Garcia,
752 F.3d 382, 390 (4th Cir. 2014), and to deny a motion for a
new trial. United States v. Bartko, 728 F.3d 327, 334 (4th Cir.
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1043 (2014). “Federal Rule of
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Evidence 702 serves as [a] guidepost” for district courts when
determining the admissibility of an expert opinion. United
States v. Wilson, 484 F.3d 267, 274 (4th Cir. 2007). Under the
Rule, the district court serves as a gatekeeper, “ensuring that
an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is
relevant” to the fact at issue. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
The primary issue in the district court and on appeal
is whether Rone’s opinion was reliable. Because “expert
witnesses have the potential to be both powerful and quite
misleading,” it is crucial that the district court conduct a
careful analysis into the reliability of the expert’s proposed
opinion. Cooper v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d 194, 199 (4th
Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Daubert, the
Supreme Court provided a list of five factors a district court
may consider when evaluating the reliability of scientific
expert testimony. See United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104,
130 (4th Cir.) (listing Daubert factors), cert. denied, 135 S.
Ct. 157 (2014). This list of factors, however, is not
“definitive or exhaustive,” United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d
261, 266 (4th Cir. 2003), as “the law grants a district court
the same broad latitude when it decides how to determine
reliability as it enjoys in respect to its ultimate reliability
determination.” Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 142
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(1999). Thus, “the particular factors [bearing on the
reliability of the opinion] will depend upon the unique
circumstances of the expert testimony involved.” Westberry v.
Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 261 (4th Cir. 1999).
Ultimately, “[t]he proponent of the testimony” bears the burden
of proving that it is reliable. Cooper, 259 F.3d at 199.
After reviewing the record, we conclude that Fultz did
not meet his burden to prove that Rone’s opinion was reliable.
First, Fultz did not provide support for the validity of Rone’s
method — that the position of the shooter could be determined by
examining only the location of the shell casings. Although
Fultz provided additional support for Rone’s method in his
motion for a new trial, there is no reason why that support
could not have been provided at or before trial, especially
considering that the Daubert factors are well-established.
Second, even if Rone’s method of determining the location of the
shooter is accepted in the relevant scientific community, the
crime scene in this case was so compromised that any opinion on
the location of the shooter based on the physical evidence would
be pure guesswork.
In sum, we conclude that, because Rone’s testimony had
“a greater potential to mislead than to enlighten,” Westberry,
178 F.3d at 261, the district court did not abuse its discretion
by excluding it. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
4
judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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