MEMORANDUM DECISION
ON REHEARING
Feb 05 2015, 10:38 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William Temple Gregory F. Zoeller
New Castle, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Kathy Bradley
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
William Temple, February 5, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Cause No.
33A01-1408-MI-336
v. Appeal from the Henry Circuit
Court.
The Honorable Kit C. Dean Crane,
New Castle Correctional Facility, Judge.
Appellee-Plaintiff Cause No. 33C02-1209-MI-110
Baker, Judge.
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[1] In our prior memorandum decision in this case, we reversed and remanded
because the case had not been transferred to the Marion Superior Court as an
earlier panel of this Court had ordered. Temple v. State, No. 33A01-1211-MI-
533 (Ind. Ct. App. July 3, 2013) [“Temple I”]. However, we inadvertently erred
in our research process and failed to discover that a decision on rehearing had
reversed the requirement of the transfer to the Marion Superior Court. Temple
v. State, No. 33A01-1211-MI-533 (Ind. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2013) [“Temple II”].
As a result, we grant the State’s petition for rehearing and will now consider the
merits of Temple’s arguments.
[2] Temple appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.1 He
argues that the Parole Board erroneously revoked his parole. The underlying
facts, as previously described by this Court, are as follows:
In 2007, Temple was sentenced to ten years on a conviction of child
molesting, as a Class C felony, and he was released on parole in
January 2011. In October 2011, Temple was arrested and charged
with failure to register as a sex offender. And in February 2012,
Temple pleaded guilty to failure to register as a sex offender and was
sentenced accordingly.
Thereafter, on March 23, Temple verified that he had received a form
entitled “Notification of Parole Violation Hearing,” which notified
him that he was accused of violating the following rule of his Parole
Release Agreement: “# 7 Criminal Conduct.” Appellant’s App. at 1.
1
Although Temple titled his motion “Petition for Writ of State Habeas Corpus Relief,” this Court ordered
that his petition be treated as a petition for post-conviction relief. Temple I, at *2.
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Temple pleaded guilty at the hearing on March 29, and his parole was
revoked.
On September 6, 2012, Temple, pro se, filed a “Petition for Writ of
State Habeas Corpus Relief” against the Superintendent of the New
Castle Correctional Facility wherein he sought “immediate discharge
from arbitrary revocation of parole, and all other just and proper relief
in the premises.” Id. at 16. The Superintendent filed a motion to
dismiss the petition, and Temple filed a motion for default judgment.
On October 24, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and
Temple filed a motion to correct error. The trial court denied
Temple’s motion to correct error.
[3] Temple I, at *1. On remand, on November 19, 2013, the Superintendent of the
New Castle Correctional Facility filed a motion for summary disposition. On
July 21, 2014, the trial court granted the motion for summary disposition and
denied Temple’s petition for post-conviction relief. Temple now appeals.
[4] We apply a de novo standard of review to a trial court’s order granting a
motion for summary disposition in post-conviction proceedings. Komyatti v.
State, 931 N.E.2d 411, 415 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Summary disposition should
be granted only if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and we resolve all doubts in favor of the
non-movant. Id. at 415-16; see also Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(g).
[5] In this case, Temple’s parole was revoked after he pleaded guilty to a new
criminal offense. Temple argues, essentially, that the Parole Board did not
follow proper procedures in the revocation process. First, he argues that he was
denied due process because the parole officer did not file a parole violation
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report with the Parole Board. The applicable statute, however, does not make
such a report mandatory: “If an employee of the department assigned to
supervise and assist parolees believes that a parolee has violated a condition to
remaining on parole, he may submit a written report of the violation to the
parole board.” Ind. Code § 11-13-3-8(a) (emphasis added). Inasmuch as there
is no requirement that the report be submitted, we find no error on this basis.
[6] Although it is not entirely clear, Temple also seems to argue that the Parole
Board did not comply with the procedures outlined in Indiana Code sections
11-13-3-8 and -9. This argument is without merit. Temple seems to be arguing
that he was denied due process because there was no preliminary hearing to
determine probable cause before the revocation hearing took place. It is true
that, under certain circumstances, a preliminary probable cause hearing may be
required before the revocation hearing takes place. I.C. § 11-13-3-9. Here,
however, Temple pleaded guilty to failure to register as a sex offender on
February 7, 2012—a crime he committed while on parole. Indiana Code
section 11-13-3-9(d) explicitly states that a preliminary hearing is not required
“[i]f the alleged violation of parole is the parolee’s conviction of a crime while
on parole[.]” Consequently, the Parole Board did not err in failing to hold a
preliminary hearing in this case.
[7] The Parole Board may issue an order for the parolee to appear for a revocation
hearing upon a showing of probable cause that a violation occurred. I.C. § 11-
13-3-8(b). Here, Temple admitted to committing a new crime while on parole.
That certainly constitutes probable cause to hold a hearing.
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[8] Temple received the required notice of parole violation hearing on March 23,
2012, and makes no argument that the notice itself was deficient. Six days
later, a hearing was held, and Temple makes no argument that the process
followed at that hearing was deficient. Furthermore, we note that at the parole
violation hearing, Temple admitted to the violation.
[9] Once the statutory procedural requirements have been met, the Parole Board
“has almost absolute discretion in making its decision” to revoke parole.
Komyatti, 931 N.E.2d at 419. We see no evidence in this case that the Parole
Board abused that discretion, nor do we see evidence that the statutory
procedures were not followed. Inasmuch as there are no genuine issues of
material fact and New Castle Correctional Facility is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law, we find that the trial court properly granted the motion for
summary disposition and denied Temple’s petition for post-conviction relief.
[10] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Riley, J., concur.
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