United States v. Jermaine Finch

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4199

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

JERMAINE STEPHEN FINCH,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 14-4212

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

JEROME ELLIOTT FINCH,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:13-cr-00311-WO-1; 1:13-cr-00118-
WO-1; 1:13-cr-00311-WO-2)

Submitted: January 13, 2015 Decided: February 6, 2015

Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

George E. Crump, III, LAW OFFICE OF GEORGE E. CRUMP, III,
Rockingham, North Carolina; Craig M. Cooley, COOLEY LAW OFFICE,
PLLC, Cary, North Carolina, for Appellants. Ripley Rand, United
States Attorney, Terry M. Meinecke, Assistant United States
Attorney, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

2
PER CURIAM:

Jermaine Stephen Finch and Jerome Elliott Finch

pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine,

in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2012), conditioned on their

right to appeal the district court’s denial of their motions to

suppress evidence seized following a traffic stop. The district

court sentenced Jermaine Finch to forty-eight months of

imprisonment and sentenced Jerome Finch to fifty-three months,

and they now appeal. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Both Appellants challenge the district court’s

conclusion that the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion

to extend the traffic stop to conduct a narcotics investigation

and a canine sniff. * “We review the factual findings underlying

a motion to suppress for clear error and the district court’s

legal determinations de novo.” United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d

226, 233 (4th Cir. 2012). When the district court has denied a

*
To the extent Jermaine Finch challenges the district
court’s conclusion that the initial stop was valid based on the
officer’s witnessing the vehicle commit several traffic
violations, we conclude that this argument lacks merit. See
United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 335 (4th Cir. 2008)
(“Observing a traffic violation provides sufficient
justification for a police officer to detain the offending
vehicle for as long as it takes to perform the traditional
incidents of a routine traffic stop.”); see also Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (traffic-violation arrest not
rendered invalid “by the fact that it was a mere pretext for a
narcotics search” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

3
defendant’s suppression motion, we construe the evidence in the

light most favorable to the government. Id.

“It is well established that the temporary detention

of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police

constitutes a seizure, no matter how brief the detention or how

limited its purpose.” Branch, 537 F.3d at 335 (internal

quotation marks and alterations omitted). During a routine

traffic stop, an officer may request a driver’s license and

registration, perform a computer check, issue a citation, and

conduct a canine sniff “if performed within the time reasonably

required to issue a traffic citation.” Branch, 537 F.3d at 335.

In order to extend a traffic stop beyond this scope, a police

officer “must possess a justification for doing so other than

the initial traffic violation that prompted the stop in the

first place,” and therefore must have either the driver’s

consent or reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. Id.

The officer must have “at least a minimal level of

objective justification” and “must be able to articulate more

than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of

criminal activity.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24

(2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts assess

whether an officer has articulated reasonable suspicion for a

stop under the totality of the circumstances, giving “due weight

to common sense judgments reached by officers in light of their

4
experience and training.” United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d

317, 321 (4th Cir. 2004). “Judicial review of the evidence

offered to demonstrate reasonable suspicion must be

commonsensical, focused on the evidence as a whole, and

cognizant of both context and the particular experience of

officers charged with the ongoing tasks of law enforcement.”

Branch, 537 F.3d at 337. We have thoroughly reviewed the record

and the relevant legal authorities and conclude that the

district court did not err in finding that the officer had

sufficient reasonable suspicion to extend the stop to conduct a

narcotics investigation.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the district

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before this court and argument would not aid in the decisional

process.

AFFIRMED