UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4199
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JERMAINE STEPHEN FINCH,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 14-4212
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JEROME ELLIOTT FINCH,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:13-cr-00311-WO-1; 1:13-cr-00118-
WO-1; 1:13-cr-00311-WO-2)
Submitted: January 13, 2015 Decided: February 6, 2015
Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
George E. Crump, III, LAW OFFICE OF GEORGE E. CRUMP, III,
Rockingham, North Carolina; Craig M. Cooley, COOLEY LAW OFFICE,
PLLC, Cary, North Carolina, for Appellants. Ripley Rand, United
States Attorney, Terry M. Meinecke, Assistant United States
Attorney, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Jermaine Stephen Finch and Jerome Elliott Finch
pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2012), conditioned on their
right to appeal the district court’s denial of their motions to
suppress evidence seized following a traffic stop. The district
court sentenced Jermaine Finch to forty-eight months of
imprisonment and sentenced Jerome Finch to fifty-three months,
and they now appeal. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Both Appellants challenge the district court’s
conclusion that the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion
to extend the traffic stop to conduct a narcotics investigation
and a canine sniff. * “We review the factual findings underlying
a motion to suppress for clear error and the district court’s
legal determinations de novo.” United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d
226, 233 (4th Cir. 2012). When the district court has denied a
*
To the extent Jermaine Finch challenges the district
court’s conclusion that the initial stop was valid based on the
officer’s witnessing the vehicle commit several traffic
violations, we conclude that this argument lacks merit. See
United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 335 (4th Cir. 2008)
(“Observing a traffic violation provides sufficient
justification for a police officer to detain the offending
vehicle for as long as it takes to perform the traditional
incidents of a routine traffic stop.”); see also Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (traffic-violation arrest not
rendered invalid “by the fact that it was a mere pretext for a
narcotics search” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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defendant’s suppression motion, we construe the evidence in the
light most favorable to the government. Id.
“It is well established that the temporary detention
of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police
constitutes a seizure, no matter how brief the detention or how
limited its purpose.” Branch, 537 F.3d at 335 (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted). During a routine
traffic stop, an officer may request a driver’s license and
registration, perform a computer check, issue a citation, and
conduct a canine sniff “if performed within the time reasonably
required to issue a traffic citation.” Branch, 537 F.3d at 335.
In order to extend a traffic stop beyond this scope, a police
officer “must possess a justification for doing so other than
the initial traffic violation that prompted the stop in the
first place,” and therefore must have either the driver’s
consent or reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. Id.
The officer must have “at least a minimal level of
objective justification” and “must be able to articulate more
than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of
criminal activity.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24
(2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts assess
whether an officer has articulated reasonable suspicion for a
stop under the totality of the circumstances, giving “due weight
to common sense judgments reached by officers in light of their
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experience and training.” United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d
317, 321 (4th Cir. 2004). “Judicial review of the evidence
offered to demonstrate reasonable suspicion must be
commonsensical, focused on the evidence as a whole, and
cognizant of both context and the particular experience of
officers charged with the ongoing tasks of law enforcement.”
Branch, 537 F.3d at 337. We have thoroughly reviewed the record
and the relevant legal authorities and conclude that the
district court did not err in finding that the officer had
sufficient reasonable suspicion to extend the stop to conduct a
narcotics investigation.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid in the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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