Filed 2/9/15 P. v. Yost CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E061731
v. (Super.Ct.No. CR67330)
AARON CLAUDE YOST, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Becky Dugan, Judge.
Affirmed.
Cindi B. Mishkin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
Defendant and appellant Aaron Claude Yost appeals from an order denying his
petition for recall of his indeterminate life term under Penal Code section 1170.126,
subdivision (f).1 We will affirm the order.
I
BACKGROUND
On May 2, 1997, a jury found defendant guilty of manufacturing
methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379.6, subd. (a); count 1) and possession of
pseudoephedrine (Health & Saf. Code, former § 11383, subd. (c); count 2). The jury also
found true that the amount of methamphetamine exceeded 10 gallons/three pounds
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11379.8, subd. (a)(2)) and 25 gallons/10 pounds (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11379.8, subd. (a)(3) [the weight enhancement]). In a bifurcated proceeding, the
trial court found true that defendant had suffered two prior serious and/or violent strike
convictions (former §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and two prior prison
terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
On June 27, 1997, the trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of
25 years to life plus a determinate term of 10 years for the weight enhancement on
count 1 to state prison with credit for time served; count 2 was stayed pursuant to
section 654.
1 All future statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
2
Defendant subsequently appealed. In an unpublished opinion, this court ordered
the lesser weight enhancement stricken and remanded the matter to the trial court for
resentencing. On April 27, 1999, the trial court struck the lesser weight enhancement and
resentenced defendant to 25 years to life plus 10 years for the greater weight
enhancement on count 1.
On November 6, 2012, the electorate passed Proposition 36, also known as the
Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (the Reform Act). Among other things, this ballot
measure enacted section 1170.126, which permits persons currently serving an
indeterminate life term under the “Three Strikes” law to file a petition in the sentencing
court seeking to be resentenced to a determinate term as a second striker. (§ 1170.126,
subd. (f).) If the trial court determines, in its discretion, that the defendant meets the
criteria of section 1170.126, subdivision (e), the court may resentence the defendant.
(§ 1170.126, subds. (f), (g).)
On July 7, 2014, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1170.126 with supporting exhibits. The trial court denied the petition on
July 17, 2014, finding defendant ineligible for resentencing under section 1170.126,
subdivision (e), due to the weight enhancement. Defendant filed a timely notice of
appeal on August 15, 2014.
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II
DISCUSSION
We appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. After examination of the
record, counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d
436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, setting forth a statement of the case, a
summary of the facts and potential arguable issues, and requesting this court conduct an
independent review of the record.
We offered defendant an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, and he
has done so.
As previously stated, on November 6, 2012, the voters approved Proposition 36,
the Reform Act, which amended sections 667 and 1170.12, and added section 1170.126.
The Reform Act changes the requirements to sentence a third strike offender to 25 years
to life in prison. (People v. Yearwood (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 161, 167 (Yearwood).)
Under the Three Strikes law as it existed prior to the Reform Act (former §§ 667,
subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12), a defendant who had previously been convicted of two or more
serious or violent felonies was subject to an indeterminate sentence of 25 years to life
upon his or her conviction of any new felony. The Reform Act changed the Three Strikes
law by reserving indeterminate life sentences for cases where the new offense is also a
serious or violent felony, unless the prosecution pleads and proves an enumerated
disqualifying factor. In all other cases, a recidivist defendant will be sentenced as a
second strike offender, rather than a third strike offender. (Yearwood, at pp. 167-168,
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citing §§ 667, 1170.12; People v. Superior Court (Kaulick) (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1279,
1286.)
The Reform Act also created a post-conviction release proceeding whereby a three
strikes prisoner who is serving an indeterminate life sentence for a crime that was not a
serious or violent felony—and who is not otherwise disqualified—may have his or her
sentence recalled and be resentenced as a second strike offender, unless the court
“determines that resentencing . . . would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety.” (§ 1170.126, subds. (a), (f), (m); Yearwood, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 168.)
As the court explained in Yearwood, a “prisoner is eligible for resentencing as a
second strike offender if all of the following are shown: (1) the prisoner is serving an
indeterminate life sentence for a crime that is not a serious or violent felony; (2) the life
sentence was not imposed for any of the offenses appearing in sections 667,
subdivision (e)(2)(C) and 1170.12, subdivision (c)(2)(C); and (3) the inmate has no prior
convictions for any of the offenses appearing in clause (iv) of section 667,
subdivision (e)(2)(C) or clause (iv) of section 1170.12, subdivision (c)(2)(C).”
(Yearwood, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 170, citing § 1170.126, subd. (e).) If the
prisoner satisfies these criteria, “the prisoner shall be resentenced as a second strike
offender ‘unless the court, in its discretion, determines that resentencing the petitioner
would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.’ (§ 1170.126, subd. (f).)”
(Yearwood, at p. 170.)
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It is undisputed that defendant’s current offenses are “not defined as serious
and/or violent felonies” and that he otherwise meets the eligibility requirements of
subdivision (e)(1) of section 1170.126. The eligibility criterion in subdivision (e)(3) and
the dangerousness finding under subdivision (f) of section 1170.126 are likewise not at
issue in this case. The only eligibility criterion at issue is the second criterion set forth in
subdivision (e)(2) of section 1170.126, which provides in relevant part: “An inmate is
eligible for resentencing if: [¶] . . . [¶] (2) The inmate’s current sentence was not
imposed for any of the offenses appearing in clauses (i) to (iii), inclusive, of
subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667 or clauses (i) to (iii),
inclusive, of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of Section 1170.12.”
In other words, if defendant’s third strike sentence was imposed for one of the
offenses listed in section 667, subdivisions (e)(2)(C)(i)-(iii) or section 1170.12,
subdivisions (c)(2)(C)(i)-(iii), he is ineligible for resentencing under section 1170.126.
Section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(i) provides: “The current offense is a
controlled substance charge, in which an allegation under Section . . . 11379.8 of the
Health and Safety Code was admitted or found true.” Since defendant’s third strike
conviction was a controlled substance charge (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379.6,
subd. (a) [manufacturing methamphetamine]) for which the Health and Safety Code
section 11379.8 weight enhancement was found true as to that count, his offense is one of
the offenses listed in section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(i). Thus, under the plain
language of section 1170.126, subdivision (e)(2), he is ineligible for resentencing.
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Pursuant to the mandate of People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, we have
independently reviewed the record for potential error and find no arguable issues.
III
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s petition to recall his sentence is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ
P. J.
We concur:
HOLLENHORST
J.
McKINSTER
J.
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