13-3288
Zhang v. Holder
BIA
Poctzer, IJ
A200 838 026
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
4 on the 4th day of February, two thousand fifteen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
8 JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
9 SUSAN L. CARNEY,
10 Circuit Judges.
11
12 _____________________________________
13
14 MING ZHANG,
15 Petitioner,
16
17 v. 13-3288
18 NAC
19
20 ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
21 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
22 Respondent.
23 _____________________________________
24
25 FOR PETITIONER: Norman Kwai Wing Wong, New York, New
26 York.
27
28 FOR RESPONDENT: Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney
29 General; Francis Fraser, Senior
1 Litigation Counsel; Kate D. Balaban,
2 Trial Attorney, Office of
3 Immigration Litigation, United
4 States Department of Justice,
5 Washington D.C.
6
7 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
8 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
9 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
10 is DENIED.
11 Petitioner Ming Zhang, a native and citizen of the
12 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an August 14,
13 2013, decision of the BIA, affirming the November 28, 2011,
14 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), denying her
15 application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
16 under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Ming
17 Zhang, No. A200 838 026 (B.I.A. Aug. 14, 2013), aff’g No.
18 A200 838 026 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Nov. 28, 2011). We
19 assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts
20 and procedural history in this case.
21 Under the circumstances of this case, we have
22 considered both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the
23 sake of completeness.” See Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233,
24 237 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). The applicable standards
25 of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C.
2
1 § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513
2 (2d Cir. 2009).
3 Zhang does not challenge the agency’s determination
4 that she failed to demonstrate past persecution.
5 Accordingly, we address only her argument that she has a
6 well-founded fear of future persecution as a practicing
7 Catholic. To establish asylum eligibility based on future
8 persecution, an applicant must show that she subjectively
9 fears persecution and that this fear is objectively
10 reasonable. Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178
11 (2d Cir. 2004). This requires an alien to show a reasonable
12 possibility that authorities in her country are either aware
13 of her activities or are likely to become aware of them.
14 Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2008)
15 (per curiam). An alien may make this showing either by
16 offering evidence that “‘he or she would be singled out
17 individually for persecution’” or by “prov[ing] the
18 existence of ‘a pattern or practice in his or her country of
19 nationality . . . of persecution of a group of persons
20 similarly situated to the applicant.’” Kyaw Zwar Tun v. U.S.
21 INS, 445 F.3d 554, 564 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting 8 C.F.R.
22 § 208.13(b)(2)(iii)).
3
1 The agency reasonably concluded that Zhang did not show
2 that she would be singled out individually for persecution.
3 Zhang presented no evidence that the Chinese government is
4 aware of or will become aware of her Catholicism. Her
5 application and testimony reflect that she was never
6 discovered attending church, and she did not allege that the
7 Chinese government was seeking her out. Instead she argues
8 that, just as the Chinese government raided the underground
9 church she previously attended, it will likely raid any
10 future church she attends, thereby discovering her
11 Catholicism. This argument is, in essence, a pattern or
12 practice claim. As discussed below, the agency reasonably
13 concluded that the evidence did not show a pattern or
14 practice of persecution.
15 To establish a pattern or practice of persecution
16 against a particular group, a petitioner must demonstrate
17 that the harm to that group is “so systemic or pervasive as
18 to amount to a pattern or practice of persecution.” In re
19 A-M-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 737, 741 (BIA 2005); see Mufied v.
20 Mukasey, 508 F.3d 88, 91 (2d Cir. 2007). Zhang argues that
21 the evidence of official harassment of underground Catholics
22 is sufficient to find a pattern or practice because we have
4
1 rejected the “systemic or pervasive” standard. She is
2 incorrect. “Where the BIA explicitly discusse[s] the pattern
3 or practice claim and the record includes substantial
4 documentary evidence regarding the conditions in
5 petitioner’s homeland, we are able to reach the conclusion
6 that the agency’s decision was not erroneous.” See Santoso
7 v. Holder, 580 F.3d 110, 112 n.1 (2d Cir. 2009).
8 As the agency found, the 2010 State Department Report
9 reveals only sporadic, localized harassment of underground
10 Christian groups, with government repression focusing on
11 large congregations in Shanghai and Beijing. The report
12 reflects that in some areas, local authorities approved of
13 underground church activities in spite of the official state
14 ban and that religious freedom may actually be increasing.
15 Based on this evidence of localized harassment, the IJ
16 reasonably required locality-specific evidence of
17 persecution in Fujian, Zhang’s home province. Jian Hui Shao
18 v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 142, 149, 169-72 (2d Cir. 2008)
19 (finding no error in the BIA's evidentiary framework
20 requiring an applicant to demonstrate that similarly
21 situated individuals face persecution in his or her local
22 area when enforcement varies by region). Zhang presented no
5
1 evidence that the Chinese government represses Catholics in
2 Fujian other than two hand-labeled photographs of what
3 purport to be demolished churches. The agency reasonably
4 concluded that this was insufficient evidence of a pattern
5 or practice of persecution in Zhang’s locality. Id.
6 Zhang’s additional evidence does not compel us to
7 conclude otherwise. The 2009 International Religious
8 Freedom Report, issued two years before her hearing,
9 indicates repression of underground Catholics in several
10 provinces, but fails to mention any issues in Fujian. The
11 remainder of Zhang’s evidence relates to incidents
12 surrounding the 2008 Olympics in Beijing. This evidence is
13 of limited relevance to Zhang’s claim that Catholics were
14 being persecuted in Fujian in 2011. Considering the record
15 as a whole, the agency reasonably found that Zhang failed to
16 show that official repression of Catholics would lead to
17 discovery of her Catholicism. Hongsheng Leng, 528 F.3d at
18 143 (requiring showing of “reasonable possibility” of
19 persecution).
20 Because Zhang is unable to show the well-founded fear
21 needed to make out an asylum claim, she is necessarily
22 unable to meet the higher standard required to succeed on
6
1 claims for withholding of removal and CAT relief. See Paul
2 v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 2006); Xue Hong Yang
3 v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 2005).
4 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
5 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of
6 removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
7 is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
8 this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for
9 oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with
10 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second
11 Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
12 FOR THE COURT:
13 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
14
7