J-S09044-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
WILLIAM EARL MURRAY, JR.,
Appellant No. 1694 WDA 2014
Appeals from the Judgment of Sentence entered September 24, 2014,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County,
Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-26-CR-0000611-2014
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BOWES, and ALLEN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 11, 2015
William Earl Murray, Jr. (“Appellant”) appeals from the judgment of
sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to three counts of distribution of
child pornography, five counts of possession of child pornography, and one
count of criminal use of a communication facility.1 We affirm.
The pertinent facts and procedural history may be summarized as
follows: On November 9, 2013, agents from the Pennsylvania Office of the
Attorney General’s Bureau of Criminal Investigations conducted an internet
investigation to identify individuals involved in the sharing of child
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1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6312(c)(1) and (d)(1), and 7512(a).
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pornography. Affidavit of Probable Cause, 1/14/14. The investigation led
the agents to Appellant’s Internet Protocol (“IP”) address and a search
warrant was subsequently executed at Appellant’s residence. Id. A search
of Appellant’s computer yielded various files containing child pornography.
Appellant was arrested and charged with the aforementioned crimes. Id.
At a hearing commenced on July 2, 2014 and concluded on July 4,
2014, Appellant pleaded guilty and the trial court ordered an assessment by
the Sexual Offender Assessment Board in accordance with the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.10 et seq.2
On September 24, 2014, the trial court sentenced Appellant at Count 1 to a
term of imprisonment of 1 - 2 years, with no further penalty imposed at the
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2
The Pennsylvania General Assembly passed SORNA as Act 111 of
2011, signed December 20, 2011. In so doing, it provided for
the expiration of prior registration requirements, commonly
referred to as Megan's Law, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9791– 9799.9, as of
December 20, 2012, and for the effectiveness of SORNA on the
same date. The General Assembly set forth its purposes in
adopting SORNA, which included bringing Pennsylvania into
substantial compliance with the Adam Walsh Act and providing a
mechanism for the general public and law enforcement to obtain
information concerning sexual offenders. Id. § 9799.10.
SORNA also includes legislative findings and a declaration of
policy instructing that “[t]he Adam Walsh Child Protection and
Safety Act of 2006 provides a mechanism for the Commonwealth
to increase its regulation of sexual offenders in a manner which
is nonpunitive but offers an increased measure of protection to
the citizens of this Commonwealth.” Id. § 9799.11(a)(2)…
In re J.B., --- A.3d ----, 2014 WL 7369785, at 1 (Pa. 2014).
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remaining counts, and ordered Appellant to lifetime registration pursuant to
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.23.
Appellant presents two constitutional issues for our review:
I. IS IT UNCONSTITUTIONAL TO REQUIRE AN APPELLANT TO
REGISTER FOR A LIFETIME WHEN SAID REGISTRATION
REQUIREMENT EXCEEDS THE STATUTORY MAXIMUM
PENALTY FOR APPELLANT’S OFFENSE?
II. IS THE ADAM WALSH STATUTE UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN
REQUIRING AN APPELLANT TO REGISTER FOR TWENTY
FIVE (25) YEARS?3
Appellant’s Brief at 7. Appellant’s issues are interrelated. Therefore, we
discuss them together.
Appellant argues that SORNA is unconstitutional because the lifetime
registration requirement exceeds the statutory maximum sentence for the
crimes to which he pleaded, and because the lifetime registration
requirement constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Appellant’s Brief at
11. Preliminarily, we note that the argument portion of Appellant’s brief in
which he asserts that SORNA is unconstitutional consists of less than four
full pages, and does not reference the constitutional provisions upon which
Appellant bases his argument. Nor does Appellant in his brief direct this
Court to the specific provisions of SORNA that he seeks to have declared
unconstitutional. It is Appellant’s responsibility to develop arguments in his
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3
Appellant was subject to lifetime registration requirement pursuant to 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.23, and not twenty-five (25) years of registration he
suggests in his statement of questions.
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brief and where he has not done so we will find the claim waived. See
Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d 274, 284 (Pa. Super. 2009), appeal
denied, 3 A.3d 670 (Pa. 2010) (“It is Appellant's obligation to sufficiently
develop arguments in his brief by applying the relevant law to the facts of
the case, persuade this Court that there were errors below, and convince us
relief is due because of those errors [and if] an appellant does not do so, we
may find the argument waived.”). Thus, we find that based upon Appellant’s
failure to sufficiently develop his constitutional argument, the claim is
waived.
Futhermore, even if Appellant had not waived his constitutional claims,
they are devoid of merit. With regard to Appellant’s claim that the lifetime
registration requirement constitutes excessive punishment and is
unconstitutional because it exceeds the statutory maximum sentence, our
Courts have found such claims unavailing. Our Supreme Court has
repeatedly held, under the now-expired provisions of Megan’s Law, that
lifetime registration requirements are not punitive but remedial in nature,
and “[b]ecause we do not view the registration requirements as punitive but,
rather, remedial, we do not perceive mandating compliance by offenders
who have served their maximum term to be improper.” Commonwealth v.
Gaffney, 733 A.2d 616, 622 (Pa. 1999) and Commonwealth v. Williams,
832 A.2d 962 (Pa. 2003). See also Commonwealth v. Benner, 853 A.2d
1068 (Pa. Super. 2004).
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In reliance on Gaffney, Williams and Benner, this Court in
Commonwealth v. McDonough, 96 A.3d 1067, 1070-1710 (Pa. Super.
2014) recently explained that “[w]hile Gaffney and Benner were decided
prior to the effective date of SORNA, the same principles behind the
registration requirements for sexual offenders under Megan's Law apply to
those subject to SORNA. Namely, to effectuate, through remedial
legislation, the non-punitive goal of public safety.” Accordingly, because
SORNA is a non-punitive remedial scheme, and not a punishment, we
concluded in McDonough that the appellant’s claims – that his registration
requirements constituted excessive punishment, and that SORNA was
unconstitutional for requiring an individual to register for many years longer
than the maximum penalty – failed. Id.
In the present case, Appellant advances arguments identical to those
raised in McDonough, in which we declined to find SORNA unconstitutional.
Although McDonough pertained to a 15-year registration requirement, the
rationale in McDonough is equally applicable to the lifetime registration
requirement at issue in the present case. Consonant with McDonough,
Appellant’s constitutional claims fail.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/11/2015
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