J-S76029-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JARED ALAN MOORE
Appellant No. 1082 WDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order June 30, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0000412-2004
CP-02-CR-0018117-2003
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., and OLSON, J.
JUDGMENT ORDER BY PANELLA, J. FILED FEBRUARY 11, 2015
Appellant, Jared Alan Moore, appeals pro se from the order entered
June 30, 2014, in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. We
affirm.
Moore’s judgment of sentence became final on July 5, 2010, which
date is 90 days after our Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of
appeal. Moore was 19 years old when he committed a murder and was 24
years old when the trial court sentenced him to a term of life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole. Moore filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus on February 6, 2014, which the lower court treated as an untimely
PCRA petition (Moore’s second) and denied relief. This timely appeal
followed.
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On appeal, Moore argues that the PCRA court erred in treating his writ
of habeas corpus as a PCRA petition and that he is entitled to relief under
Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012). In Miller, the
Court recognized a constitutional right for juveniles under the age of
eighteen, and held that “mandatory life without parole for those under the
age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition against ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’” ___ U.S. at ___, 132
S.Ct. at 2460.
The PCRA court correctly treated Moore’s writ of habeas corpus as a
PCRA petition. The PCRA states that it “shall be the sole means of obtaining
collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory
remedies for the same purpose that exist when this subchapter takes effect,
including habeas corpus….” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542. This Court has addressed
Miller claims under the PCRA. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Seskey, 86
A.3d 237 (Pa. Super. 2014).
Moore cannot benefit from the holding in Miller. He was 19 years old
at the time he committed murder. Even if he had been 18 years old or
younger when he committed the murder, our Supreme Court has held that
the right announced in Miller does not apply retroactively. See
Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 10 (Pa. 2013). And this
Court has held that a petitioner cannot rely on Miller or 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
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9545(b)(1)(iii) to establish jurisdiction over an untimely PCRA petition. See
Seskey, 86 A.3d at 243.
Moore argues that the holding in Miller should be extended to persons
who committed offenses under the age of 25 as “[d]evelopmental
neuroscience has now gathered extensive evidence that both structure [sic]
of the adolescent brain and the way it functions, are immature compared to
the adult brain.” Appellant’s Brief, at 18 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). He further argues that Miller (his version that applies to
persons under the age of 25) renders 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6137 unconstitutional.
Despite this novel interpretation, Miller is simply inapplicable.
Moore has filed a patently untimely PCRA petition that does not come
within any of the exceptions to the time bar. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.
9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). The PCRA court correctly determined that it was without
jurisdiction to entertain Moore’s petition.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/11/2015
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