UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
ROBIN R. MCFARLAND, DOCKET NUMBER
Appellant, PH-315H-14-0578-B-1
v.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND DATE: February 13, 2015
HUMAN SERVICES,
Agency.
THIS FINAL ORDER IS NO NPRECEDENTIAL 1
Robin R. McFarland, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, pro se.
Roger L. Gumbs, Jr., Baltimore, Maryland, for the agency.
BEFORE
Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman
Anne M. Wagner, Vice Chairman
Mark A. Robbins, Member
FINAL ORDER
¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the remand initial decision,
which dismissed her termination appeal for lack of jurisdiction and denied her
request for corrective action under the Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (codified at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4333)
1
A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
sign ificantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2
(USERRA). Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only when: the initial
decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based
on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application
of the law to the facts of the case; the judge’s rulings during either the course of
the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or
involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of
the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite
the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. See
Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, and based on the
following points and authorities, we conclude that the petitioner has not
established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision,
which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).
BACKGROUND
¶2 The appellant filed a Board appeal challenging her termination and
requesting corrective action under USERRA. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1.
The administrative judge dismissed the appeal for failure to prosecute. IAF, Tab
13, Initial Decision. The appellant filed a petition for review of that decision.
The Board vacated the decision and remanded the case for further adjudication
because there had been an issue with mailed service of Board orders (and possibly
the agency file) due to an incorrect address for the appellant in Board records.
Petition for Review File, Tab 4, Remand Order. On remand, the appellant waived
any right she had to a hearing. Remand Appeal File (RAF), Tab 20 at 4. Thus,
the administrative judge based the remand initial decision solely on the written
record. RAF, Tab 23, Remand Initial Decision (RID). He dismissed the
appellant’s termination appeal for lack of jurisdiction and denied corrective
action under USERRA. RID. The appellant has filed a petition for review
3
challenging the remand initial decision. Remand Petition for Review (RPFR)
File, Tab 1. The agency has not filed a response.
DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
The administrative judge properly dismissed the appellant’s termination appeal
for lack of jurisdiction.
¶3 The Board’s jurisdiction is not plenary; it is limited to those matters over
which it has been given jurisdiction by law, rule or regulation. Maddox v. Merit
Systems Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The appellant bears
the burden of proving, by preponderant evidence, that the Board has jurisdiction
over her appeal. 2 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(a)(2)(i). In order to establish Board
jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75, an individual must, among other things,
show that she satisfies one of the definitions of “employee” in 5 U.S.C.
§ 7511(a)(1). 5 U.S.C. § 7513(d); Walker v. Department of the
Army, 119 M.S.P.R. 391, ¶ 5 (2013). For an individual in the competitive service,
this means that she must either: (1) not be serving a probationary or trial period
under an initial appointment; or (2) have completed 1 year of current continuous
service under other than a temporary appointment limited to 1 year or less. 3 5
U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A); Walker, 119 M.S.P.R. 391, ¶ 5. The administrative judge
properly found that the Board lacks jurisdiction over the appeal because the
appellant was serving a probationary period and she had not completed at least 1
year of federal service. RID at 6-7.
2
A preponderance of the evidence is the degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable
person, considering the record as a whole, wou ld accept as sufficient to find that a
contested fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(c)(2).
3
Individuals in the competitive service who do not satisfy the definition of “employee”
under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A) may nevertheless have the right to appeal a term ination
to the Board under 5 C.F.R. § 315.806 based upon assertions that: (1) the employee was
discriminated against based on her marital status; (2) the agency action was based on
partisan political reasons; or (3) the agency action was based (in whole or part) on pre-
appointment reasons and the agency did not follow the procedures of 5 C.F.R.
§ 315.805. Walker, 119 M.S.P.R. 391, ¶ 5. However, the appellant makes no such
assertions and we therefore need not address this regulatory right to appeal.
4
¶4 On review, the appellant contends, as she did below, that she was not a
probationary employee because: (1) her Standard Form (SF) 50 previously
showed that she was a permanent employee, but was illegally changed; (2) she
was told by an agency employee that she would not have to serve a probationary
period; and (3) the job announcement for her position did not necessarily require
a probationary period. RPFR File, Tab 1 at 3-4; see RAF, Tab 20 at 3-4. The
appellant also argues that the probationary period should be waived because she
has prior state government service. RPFR File, Tab 1 at 3.
¶5 First, regarding the appellant’s argument concerning her SF-50, an
employee’s SF–50, although the customary document used to memorialize a
personnel action, is not controlling as to the nature of the employee’s
appointment. Scott v. Department of the Air Force, 113 M.S.P.R. 434, ¶ 8 (2010).
Rather, the Board looks to the totality of the circumstances in determining the
nature of the appointment. Id. The appellant argues that one of the copies of her
SF-50 stated that her tenure group was “permanent.” RPFR File, Tab 1 at 3. The
SF-50’s submitted by the agency, including the appointment SF-50, RAF, Tab 6
at 10, and the corrected general adjustment SF-50, id. at 11, reflect that the
appellant’s tenure group was “conditional.” The appointment SF-50 also reflects
that the appellant had no prior federal civilian service. Id. at 10. Accordingly,
based upon the totality of the circumstances, and regardless of any apparent
mistaken SF-50, we find that the appellant was a probationer.
¶6 Next, the appellant again argues that she should not be required to serve a
probationary period both because the job announcement for her position stated
that the position “may” require a probationary period and because an agency
employee told her that her position did not require a probationary period. We
agree with the administrative judge that these arguments are not persuasive. RID
at 6-7; see, e.g., RPFR File, Tab 1 at 3-4. Where a probationary period is
required, it cannot be waived by the parties. Cunningham v. Department of the
Army, 119 M.S.P.R. 147, ¶ 5 (2013). Therefore, regardless of the appellant’s
5
interpretation of the job announcement or the alleged statement of an agency
employee, the appellant was required to serve a probationary period.
See 5 C.F.R. § 315.801(e).
¶7 Lastly, the appellant asserts that the probationary period should be waived
because of her prior state government service. RPFR File, Tab 1 at 3. However,
there is nothing in the law that allows for waiver of the probationary period based
upon nonfederal service. The Board therefore lacks jurisdiction over the
appellant’s termination appeal.
The administrative judge properly denied corrective action under USERRA.
¶8 In order to prevail on the merits in a USERRA claim, there must be an
initial showing by the employee, by preponderant evidence, that the employee’s
military status was at least a motivating or substantial factor in the agency action.
Strausbaugh v. Government Printing Office, 117 M.S.P.R. 566, ¶ 11, aff’d, 493 F.
App’x 61 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Here, the appellant asserts that a coworker stated that
management officials believed they were forced to hire combat veterans, planned
on getting rid of these individuals as quickly as possible, and believed that
combat veterans were “damaged goods.” RPFR File, Tab 1 at 5; see RAF, Tab 5
at 3, Tab 12 at 3-4, Tab 20 at 4. We agree with the administrative judge that
these allegations alone do not meet the appellant’s burden of proof concerning her
USERRA claim, and we therefore find that the administrative judge properly
denied corrective action under USERRA. Strausbaugh, 117 M.S.P.R. 566,
¶¶ 12-13 (finding that the appellant presented no evidence that his military
service was a motivating factor in his termination).
NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS
You have the right to request review of this final decision by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. You must submit your request to
the court at the following address:
6
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, DC 20439
The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar
days after the date of this order. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff. Dec.
27, 2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court has
held that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory deadline
and that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed. See
Pinat v. Office of Personnel Management, 931 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to
court, you should refer to the federal law that gives you this right. It is found in
Title 5 of the United States Code, section 7703 (5 U.S.C. § 7703) (as rev. eff.
Dec. 27, 2012). You may read this law as well as other sections of the United
States Code, at our website, http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode.htm.
Additional information is available at the court's website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov.
Of particular relevance is the court's "Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and
Appellants," which is contained within the court's Rules of Practice, and Forms 5,
6, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for your court
appeal, you may visit our website at http://www.mspb.gov/probono for a list of
attorneys who have expressed interest in providing pro bono representation for
Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the court. The Merit Systems
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Protection Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor
warrants that any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________
William D. Spencer
Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.