FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FEB 13 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GARY L. PHILLIPS, No. 13-36071
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:13-cv-00453-BAT
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Brian Tsuchida, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 13, 2015**
Before: LEAVY, GRABER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Gary Phillips appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for disability insurance
benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 28
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th
Cir. 2012), and affirm.
Phillips contends that when the administrative law judge (“ALJ”)
determined that Phillips had engaged in substantial gainful activity between June
2010 and May 2011, the ALJ failed to consider whether Phillips’s impairment-
related work expenses should have been deducted from his earnings. This issue
was waived by Phillips’s failure to raise it at the administrative level when he was
represented by counsel, and Phillips has not demonstrated manifest injustice
excusing the failure. See Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 1999)
(holding “when claimants are represented by counsel, they must raise all issues and
evidence at their administrative hearings in order to preserve them on appeal[,]”
and failure to comply with this rule is excused only “when necessary to avoid a
manifest injustice”).
The ALJ reasonably concluded that (1) Phillips’s work from June 2010 until
May 2011 demonstrated his ability to perform substantial gainful activity, and (2)
after Phillips stopped working in May 2011, he had the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to continue working within the limits identified in the RFC determination.
See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111 (ALJ’s findings are upheld if they are supported by
inferences reasonably drawn from the record).
2
Contrary to Phillips’s contention, the ALJ accommodated all of Phillips’s
limitations in the RFC assessment and also in the hypothetical questions to the
vocational expert. The ALJ’s determination that Phillips could perform work that
involved “simple, routine and repetitive tasks,” with “superficial contact with the
general public and coworkers,” and a “low-stress environment” was consistent
with the restrictions identified by the examining psychologists. See Stubbs-
Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[A]n ALJ’s assessment
of a claimant adequately captures restrictions related to concentration, persistence,
or pace where the assessment is consistent with restrictions identified in the
medical testimony.”). Moreover, the RFC determination and associated
hypothetical questions posed to the vocational expert “contained all of the
limitations that the ALJ found credible and supported by substantial evidence in
the record.” Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005).
AFFIRMED.
3