default judgment would be void if appellant were not served with the
amended complaint, but they instead contend that appellant was served
with the amended complaint. Nothing in the record, however, supports
this contention.' Thus, we agree with appellant that the default judgment
was void. Because the default judgment was void, we conclude that the
district court abused its discretion in denying appellant's motion to vacate
the default judgment. 2 Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court REVERSED AND
REMAND this matter to the district court for further proceedings
consistent with this order.
fret, J.
1In particular, even accepting respondents' argument that appellant,
via his insurer, had consented to service of process by mail, the district
court minutes from the September 6, 2012, hearing do not support a
conclusion that the amended complaint was served on appellant by mail.
2 We note respondents' argument that appellant's insurer entered
into a binding settlement agreement with respondents on appellant's
behalf wherein appellant agreed that a default judgment would be entered
against him This argument, however, is not directly relevant to the issue
presented in this appeal, which is whether the default judgment was void
for nonservice of process.
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
2
(0) 1947A
cc: Hon. David B. Barker, District Judge
John Walter Boyer, Settlement Judge
Schuetze & McGaha, P.C.
Hutchison & Steffen, LLC
Law Office of David Sampson
Eighth District Court Clerk
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
3
(0) 1947A