NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted February 17, 2015*
Decided February 18, 2015
Before
WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge
JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
No. 14‐2406
RICHARD HODGES, Appeal from the United States District
Plaintiff‐Appellant, Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
v.
No. 14 C 2329
PARTHASARATHI GHOSH, et al.,
Defendants‐Appellees. Samuel Der‐Yeghiayan,
Judge.
O R D E R
Richard Hodges, an Illinois prisoner, claims in this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that
Wexford Health Sources and four prison physicians denied him essential medical care in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. He applied to proceed in forma pauperis,
see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), but the district court denied that request with the explanation
that Hodges had misrepresented his financial status. The court then dismissed the action
* The defendants were not served with process in the district court and are not
participating in this appeal. After examining the appellant’s brief and the record, we
have concluded that the case is appropriate for summary disposition. See Fed. R. App.
P. 34(a)(2).
No. 14‐2406 Page 2
with prejudice when Hodges did not pay the filing fee. We conclude that the court
abused its discretion in denying IFP status, and thus we vacate the judgment and
remand for further proceedings.
In his IFP application, Hodges acknowledged receiving $10 monthly from a prison
job but answered “no” to a question asking whether he had “received more than $200 in
the past twelve months” from any other sources. The administrator of his prison trust
account certified that Hodges had a balance of $86.17 in his account and average
monthly deposits of $44.19 during the previous six months. Account records submitted
with Hodges’s application confirmed that during these months he had received $260
from outside sources.
The district court assumed that Hodges had misrepresented his financial status
because he received these funds despite his “no” answer to the question about other
sources of funds. The court set a deadline for Hodges to pay the filing fee to avoid
dismissal.
Hodges moved for reconsideration. He explained that he had misunderstood the
question asking if he “received more than $200 in the past twelve months” to mean more
than $200 from any source at one time, rather than in total for that period. Hodges also
said he had not understood that money received from family had to be reported. Hodges
amended his IFP application to disclose receipts of $775 in “family support” during the
previous twelve months, including $415 in the final six months. The district court was
not persuaded by Hodges’s explanation and, because the deadline for payment had
passed, dismissed the action. The court asserted that Hodges had not identified any
error in its order denying IFP but did not address Hodges’s contention that he had
misread the question concerning whether he had received more than $200 during the
relevant time frame. The court repeated its earlier assertion that Hodges had
“misrepresented his financial status” but did not invoke 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(A), which
mandates dismissal if the allegation of poverty in an IFP application is found to be
untrue.
On appeal Hodges argues that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing
his lawsuit with prejudice as a sanction. He contends that the inaccuracy in his IFP
application was inadvertent, not an intentional misrepresentation.
A district court may dismiss a complaint with prejudice when a plaintiff
intentionally misrepresents his financial status to gain IFP status. Thomas v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 288 F.3d 305, 306, 308 (7th Cir. 2002); Mathis v. New York Life Ins.
No. 14‐2406 Page 3
Co., 133 F.3d 546, 547 (7th Cir. 1998). But here the district court did not make a specific
finding that Hodges had intentionally misrepresented his financial status, and the
existing record would not support such a finding. Hodges’s explanation of his
misreading of the IFP application—that it asks about single rather than aggregate
payments exceeding $200—is not unreasonable, so it was an abuse of discretion for the
court to reject his explanation without further inquiry. See Thomas, 288 F.3d at 306;
Mathis, 133 F.3d at 547. It is not likely that Hodges was trying to deceive the court. After
all, his IFP application was accompanied by the required records from his prison trust
account showing deposits of $260 from sources outside the prison, as well as the account
administrator’s certification that Hodges had deposited an average of $44.19 monthly
during the previous six months. Moreover, in a different case filed by Hodges ten years
earlier, the district court granted Hodges IFP status after he completed his application in
identical fashion. His interpretation of the question this time was consistent with that
decision. See Hodges v. Briley, No. 04 C 3585, 2005 WL 241466 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 2005). We
cannot conclude from this record that the error in Hodges’s current IFP application here
was intentional, let alone the kind of purposeful omission of a significant source of
income or wealth that might justify dismissal with prejudice. See Thomas, 288 F.3d at 306
(upholding dismissal with prejudice where plaintiff had omitted from IFP application
that he would be receiving more than $50,000 from retirement account); Mathis, 133 F.3d
at 547 (upholding dismissal with prejudice where plaintiff omitted from IFP application
$14,000 in home equity). The district erred in denying IFP without addressing Hodges’s
explanation that his misrepresentation had been unintentional, and thus the court also
erred in dismissing the suit when Hodges did not pay the filing fee.
The judgment dismissing Hodges’s lawsuit is VACATED, and the case is
REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order.