In re: Mark Christian Tarczynski

FILED
FEB 19 2015
1 NOT FOR PUBLICATION
2 SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK
U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL

3 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL
4 OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
5 In re: ) BAP No. CC-14-1307-PaTaKu
)
6 MARK CHRISTIAN TARCZYNSKI, ) Bankr. No. 13-38642-BB
)
7 Debtor. ) Adv. Proc. 14-01149-BB
______________________________)
8 )
1100 WILSHIRE BLVD., LLC, )
9 )
Appellant, )
10 )
v. ) M E M O R A N D U M1
11 )
MARK CHRISTIAN TARCZYNSKI; )
12 1100 WILSHIRE PROPERTY OWNERS )
ASSOCIATION, )
13 )
Appellees. )
14 ______________________________)
15 Argued and Submitted on November 20, 2014
at Los Angeles, California
16
Filed - February 19, 2015
17
Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court
18 for the Central District of California
19 Honorable Sheri Bluebond, Chief Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding
20
Appearances: Joshua Ruben Furman argued for appellant 1100
21 Wilshire Blvd., LLC; Mark M. Sharf of Merritt,
Hagen & Sharf LLP argued for appellee Mark
22 Christian Tarczynski.
23
Before: PAPPAS, TAYLOR, and KURTZ, Bankruptcy Judges.
24
25
26 1
This disposition is not appropriate for publication.
27 Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may
have (see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), it has no precedential value.
28 See 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8013-1.
 1 1100 Wilshire Blvd., LLC (“Appellant”) appeals the order of
2 the bankruptcy court dismissing its § 523(a)2 adversary
3 proceeding against chapter 7 debtor Mark Tarczynski (“Debtor”)
4 for failure to state a claim for relief. We REVERSE that order
5 and REMAND this matter to the bankruptcy court for further
6 proceedings.
7 FACTS
8 The building known as 1100 Wilshire Boulevard is a thirty-
9 eight story structure located in downtown Los Angeles, consisting
10 of mixed-use residential and commercial condominium units (the
11 “Property”). Management of the Property is controlled by the
12 1100 Wilshire Property Owners’ Association (the “POA”), a
13 California mutual benefit corporation composed of the owners of
14 the condominium units in the Property. The POA acts through a
15 five-member board of directors (the “POA Board”).
16 Appellant, a California limited liability company owned by
17 Joel and Spencer Kassimir, owns two residential condominium units
18 situated on the south side of the thirty-seventh and thirty-
19 eighth floors of the Property. At all relevant times Appellant
20 was a member of the POA but not a member of the POA Board.
21 Debtor is a real estate consultant and a former member of
22 the POA Board. Adam Tischer is a former member of the POA Board.
23 John Mackey is a current member of the POA Board. Debtor and
24
25
2
Unless otherwise indicated, all chapter and section
26 references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532, all
27 Rule references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure,
Rules 1001–9037, and all Civil Rule references are to the Federal
28 Rules of Civil Procedure 1–86.

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 1 Mackey together own Wilshire Commercial, LLC, a corporation that
2 owns a commercial condominium unit in the Property, and is a
3 member of the POA.
4 In June 2013, JP Morgan Chase Bank (“Chase”) announced that
5 it would open a branch office on the first floor of the Property
6 in space leased from Wilshire Commercial. Shortly thereafter,
7 the POA Board and Chase announced that Chase would install a
8 large sign on the exterior of the Property. Among other
9 features, the sign would spell out “CHASE” in nine-foot
10 illuminated letters mounted directly outside Appellant’s units.
11 The lease for placement of the sign provided for approximately
12 $3.5 million in annual payments from Chase to 1100 Wilshire
13 Boulevard.
14 Concerned with these developments, on June 18, 2013, counsel
15 for Appellant sent to the POA Board president a “Pre-litigation
16 Demand for Action by the Board” (the “Demand Letter”). Among
17 other things, the Demand Letter requested that the POA Board not
18 grant any signage rights on the Property without an authorizing
19 vote of the POA membership and that the POA Board investigate
20 certain allegedly improper self-dealings by some POA Board
21 members regarding the Property.
22 Counsel for the POA Board provided a lengthy response to the
23 Demand Letter on July 5, 2013. In it, he defended the POA
24 Board’s authority to enter into, and their strategy in
25 negotiating, the Chase sign lease. He pointed out that without
26 the lease income, the POA members’ “assessments would need to
27 increase substantially in order to pay for necessary repairs and
28 improvements to the building.” As to Appellant’s allegations

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 1 about improper activities by POA Board members, POA counsel
2 demanded proof of Appellant’s claims and cautioned Appellant’s
3 counsel that these allegations could be considered “defamatory
4 and subject both you and your clients to damages for such
5 defamation.”
6 Apparently dissatisfied with this response, Appellant filed
7 a lawsuit against the POA, Tischer, Tarczynski, and Chase in Los
8 Angeles Superior Court on August 20, 2013 (the “State Court
9 Action”). In its original complaint, Appellant sought a
10 declaratory judgment that, because of the conflicting interests
11 of POA Board members, the lease for the sign between the POA and
12 Chase was void. Appellant also requested that a restraining
13 order and an injunction be entered preventing construction of the
14 sign.3 It also sought an order directing the election of a new
15 POA Board.
16 Appellant’s application for a temporary restraining order
17 and preliminary injunction to stop construction of the sign was
18 denied by the state court on September 4, 2013. Thereafter,
19 Appellant filed a First Amended Complaint deleting the request
20 for injunctive relief, but now asserting, as a representative of
21 the POA, several derivative causes of action against Debtor and
22 Tischer as POA Board members for their alleged breach of
23 fiduciary duty, conspiracy to breach fiduciary duty, intentional
24
25
3
Three successive versions of the complaint were filed in
26 state court, in each of which Appellant argues that the POA Board
27 and Debtor were not properly elected, and alleging other
violations of the Davis-Sterling Common Interest Development Act,
28 Cal. Civ. Code §§ 4000-4070 (2013).

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 1 interference with prospective economic advantage, and
2 constructive fraud.
3 On December 2, 2013, Debtor filed a petition for relief
4 under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. As a result, the State
5 Court Action was stayed as to Debtor. Appellant, ostensibly
6 acting as a representative on behalf of the POA under
7 Rule 7023.1/Civil Rule 23.1, filed an adversary complaint against
8 Debtor seeking an exception to discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A),
9 (a)(4), and (a)(6) for the debts arising from the claims asserted
10 in the State Court Action (the “First Adversary Complaint”).
11 On April 10, 2014, Debtor filed a motion to dismiss the
12 First Adversary Complaint under Rule 7012/Civil Rule 12(b)(6).
13 In the motion, Debtor argued that Appellant was not an adequate
14 representative of the POA for purposes of pursuing the discharge
15 exception action because Appellant had sued the POA in the State
16 Court Action. Debtor also alleged that the First Adversary
17 Complaint failed to allege fraud with specificity as required by
18 Rule 7009/Civil Rule 9. Appellant responded to the motion, and
19 on April 9, 2014, filed an amended adversary complaint (the
20 “Amended Adversary Complaint”) pleading more facts regarding
21 Debtor’s alleged improper conduct.4
22
23 4
On April 16, 2014, Appellant also filed a Second Amended
Complaint in the State Court Action, adding Mackey and Wilshire
24
Commercial as defendants, adding new causes of action against the
25 POA and Chase for public nuisance (i.e., diminishing the value of
the individual owner's interests in the Property) and private
26 nuisance (i.e., for light pollution and excessive electromagnetic
27 radiation) (the “Second Amended State Complaint” or “SASC”). The
Amended Adversary Complaint indicates that a copy of the SASC was
28 (continued...)

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 1 The bankruptcy court heard Debtor’s motion to dismiss on
2 May 13, 2014. Before the hearing, the court had issued a
3 tentative ruling indicating that it was inclined to:
4 [g]rant [the] motion without leave to amend.
[Appellant] lacks standing to prosecute this action and
5 cannot do so in a derivative capacity. [Appellant] is
not an appropriate representative in light of
6 antagonism between the interests of the plaintiff and
the homeowners association. Further, directors are
7 entitled to exercise their business judgment as to
whether or not to sue on behalf of the corporation and
8 it appears that they have done so and have concluded
that no action against the debtor is appropriate or
9 warranted. Further, [the Amended Adversary Complaint]
fails to state a claim under sections 523(a)(2)(A), (4)
10 or (6). What representations did the debtor make to
the plaintiff on which the plaintiff relied? Amended
11 complaint pleads that debtor was not a member of the
board of directors at the time the signage lease was
12 signed. How did the debtor owe the plaintiff a
fiduciary duty? What did he do that breached it? If
13 debtor was not on the board when the lease was signed,
what did he do that was a wrongful, intentional and
14 malicious act?
15 After hearing arguments from counsel for Appellant and
16 Debtor, the bankruptcy court granted the motion to dismiss,
17 explaining:
18 Well, I’m going to grant the motion to dismiss because
I don’t think it works for you to assert these claims
19 derivatively, particularly not when you’re also
alleging that the corporation was controlled by parties
20 who were in conspiracy with this. . . . You’ve got to
have misrepresentation that was relied on to the
21 detriment [of the POA] — and if you’re making these
. . . misrepresentations [to] parties he’s conspir[ing]
22 with, then he didn’t defraud Mackey and the gang. . . .
I don’t think this works to have you step into those
23 shoes derivatively on these facts. And, as I say, I
don’t think the corporation has got a claim in light of
24 the way you’ve framed the nature of the misconduct
here. So I’m going to grant the motion without leave
25
26 4
(...continued)
27 attached as an exhibit. It was not. However, a copy of the SASC
was attached to the Debtor’s reply brief in support of the motion
28 to dismiss.

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 1 to amend[.]
2 Hr’g Tr. 23:19-24:11, May 13, 2014.
3 The bankruptcy court entered an order dismissing Appellant’s
4 Amended Adversary Complaint without leave to amend on May 30,
5 2014 “for the reasons set forth on the record at the time of the
6 hearing on the motion and other good cause appearing therefor.”
7 Appellant filed a timely appeal on June 12, 2014.
8 JURISDICTION
9 The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
10 §§ 1334 and 157(b)(2)(I). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
11 § 158.
12 ISSUES
13 Whether the bankruptcy court erred in dismissing the
14 Appellant’s Amended Adversary Complaint under Rule 7012/Civil
15 Rule 12(b)(6).
16 Whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in
17 deciding that Appellant was not an adequate representative of the
18 POA for the purposes of Rule 7023.1/Civil Rule 23.1.
19 STANDARDS OF REVIEW
20 A trial court’s dismissal of an action under Civil
21 Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim is reviewed de novo.
22 N.M. State Inv. Council v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 641 F.3d 1089,
23 1094 (9th Cir. 2011); Barnes v. Belice (In re Belice), 461 B.R.
24 564, 572 (9th Cir. BAP 2011). A trial court's determination as
25 to the adequacy of representation under Civil Rule 23.1 is
26 reviewed for abuse of discretion. Kayes v. Pac. Lumber Co.,
27 51 F.3d 1449, 1464 (9th Cir. 1995). A bankruptcy court abuses
28 its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, or

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 1 misapplies the correct legal standard, or if its factual findings
2 are illogical, implausible, or without support from evidence in
3 the record. United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262 (9th
4 Cir. 2009) (en banc)).
5 DISCUSSION
6 Under Civil Rule 12(b)(6), made applicable in adversary
7 proceedings by Rule 7012, a bankruptcy court may dismiss an
8 adversary complaint if it fails to "state a claim upon which
9 relief can be granted." In reviewing Debtor’s Civil
10 Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the bankruptcy court was required to accept
11 as true all facts alleged in Appellant’s Amended Adversary
12 Complaint and to draw all reasonable inferences in Appellant’s
13 favor. Newcal Indus., Inc. v. Ikon Office Solutions, 513 F.3d
14 1038, 1043 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008). An inference is reasonable “in
15 light of the competing inferences” that might show contrary
16 results. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
17 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986). However, the bankruptcy court was not
18 required to accept as true conclusory allegations in Appellant’s
19 complaint, nor to accept any legal characterizations cast in the
20 form of factual allegations. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
21 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007); Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide,
22 Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003).
23 To survive a Civil Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal motion, a
24 complaint must present cognizable legal theories and sufficient
25 factual allegations to support those theories. See Johnson v.
26 Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (9th Cir.
27 2008). As the Supreme Court has explained:
28 a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

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 1 accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. . . . A claim has facial
2 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
3 that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. . . . Threadbare recitals of the elements of
4 a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.
5
6 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). By definition, a
7 claim cannot be plausible when it lacks any legal basis. Cedano
8 v. Aurora Loan Servs. (In re Cedano), 470 B.R. 522, 528 (9th Cir.
9 BAP 2012). A dismissal under Civil Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on
10 either the lack of a cognizable legal theory, or on the absence
11 of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.
12 Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., 534 F.3d at 1121.
13 In deciding a Civil Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the
14 trial court may consider the existence and content of documents
15 attached to and referenced in the complaint. Lee v. City of
16 L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). Even when a document is
17 not physically attached to the complaint, the court may consider
18 its existence and contents when its authenticity is not contested
19 and when it necessarily is relied upon by the plaintiff in its
20 complaint. See United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907–08
21 (9th Cir. 2003).
22 Here, the bankruptcy court dismissed Appellant’s Amended
23 Adversary Complaint because it concluded that the claims it
24 asserted had no legal basis. The bankruptcy court determined
25 that the legal theory espoused in that complaint — that Appellant
26 could prosecute a § 523(a) exception to discharge action against
27 Debtor as a representative under Rule 7023.1/Civil Rule 23.1 on
28 behalf of an alleged creditor, the POA — lacked merit because

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 1 Appellant was antagonistic to the interests of the other members
2 of the POA. Hr'g Tr. 3:22–4:2.5 In the alternative, the
3 bankruptcy court concluded that dismissal was justified because:
4 (1) The “Business Judgment Rule” supported the apparent decision
5 by the POA Board not to prosecute a § 523(a) claim in its own
6 right, Hr’g Tr. 4:2-7; and (2) assuming that Appellant’s claim
7 that the POA Board members conspired with Debtor were true, then
8 Appellant’s derivative claims against Debtor were barred by the
9 equitable doctrine of in pari delicto, Hr’g Tr. 23:1-5.
10 After a de novo review of the record, we disagree with the
11 bankruptcy court’s determination that dismissal of Debtor’s
12 complaint was appropriate.
13 I.
14 The bankruptcy court erred in granting the motion to
dismiss by drawing inferences in favor of Debtor to conclude
15 that Appellant was not an adequate representative of the POA.
16 It is not disputed in this appeal that, because Appellant is
17 not a creditor of Debtor, it lacks standing to prosecute an
18 exception to discharge action against him in its own right. See
19 § 523(c)(1) (providing that a debt excepted from discharge under
20 subsections (2), (4) or (6) shall be discharged “unless, on
21 request of the creditor to whom such debt is owed” the bankruptcy
22 court determines such debt to be excepted from discharge);
23 Rule 4007(a) (providing that “[a] debtor or any creditor may file
24
5
25 The bankruptcy judge recited the full text of the
tentative decision on the record at the hearing. Although the
26 bankruptcy judge did not expressly indicate that she intended to
27 adopt the tentative, we assume, as have the parties in their
briefs in this appeal, that the tentative ruling explains the
28 reasons for its ruling.

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 1 a complaint to obtain a determination of the dischargeability of
2 any debt). Rather, Appellant’s action is based on its alleged
3 capacity to sue Debtor as a representative of the POA under
4 Rule 7023.1. Rule 7023.1 makes Civil Rule 23.1 applicable in
5 adversary proceedings. Civil Rule 23.1 provides in relevant
6 part:
7 Derivative Actions
8 (a) Prerequisites. This rule applies when one or more
shareholders or members of a corporation or an
9 unincorporated association bring a derivative action to
enforce a right that the corporation or association may
10 properly assert but has failed to enforce. The
derivative action may not be maintained if it appears
11 that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately
represent the interests of shareholders or members who
12 are similarly situated in enforcing the right of the
corporation or association.
13
(b) Pleading Requirements. The complaint must be
14 verified and must: (1) allege that the plaintiff was a
shareholder or member at the time of the transaction
15 complained of, or that the plaintiff's share or
membership later devolved on it by operation of law;
16 (2) allege that the action is not a collusive one to
confer jurisdiction that the court would otherwise
17 lack; and (3) state with particularity: (A) any effort
by the plaintiff to obtain the desired action from the
18 directors or comparable authority and, if necessary,
from the shareholders or members; and (B) the reasons
19 for not obtaining the action or not making the effort.
20 The Ninth Circuit recently discussed the history and purpose
21 of derivative suits under Civil Rule 23.1:
22 The derivative form of action permits an individual
shareholder to bring “suit to enforce a corporate cause
23 of action against officers, directors, and third
parties." Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S.
24 90, 95, 111 S. Ct. 1711, 114 L. Ed. 2d 152 (1991)
(quoting Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534, 90 S. Ct.
25 733, 24 L. Ed. 2d 729 (1970)) (emphasis omitted).
"Devised as a suit in equity, the purpose of the
26 derivative action [is] to place in the hands of the
individual shareholder a means to protect the interests
27 of the corporation from the misfeasance and malfeasance
of 'faithless directors and managers.'" Id. (quoting
28 Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548,

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 1 69 S. Ct. 1221, 93 L. Ed. 1528 (1949)).
2 Rosenbloom v. Pyott, 765 F.3d 1137, 1147-48 (9th Cir. 2014).
3 In its Amended Adversary Complaint, Appellant alleges that
4 it is and was at all relevant times a member of the POA, and that
5 it “will adequately and fairly represent the interests of the POA
6 and members in enforcing and prosecuting its rights.” The
7 complaint asserts that Appellant made a demand on the POA Board
8 to take action against Debtor and other parties, and the POA
9 Board “has taken no steps to enforce its rights against these
10 Board members and former Board members.” Appellant then alleges
11 in the complaint, with particularity, the reasons why the POA
12 Board was so dominated by Debtor that any further demand on the
13 POA Board to take action against Debtor would be futile. Based
14 upon these allegations, Appellant asserts that it should be
15 allowed to pursue an exception to discharge of the POA’s claims
16 against Debtor under § 523(a)(2)(A), (a)(4), and (a)(6).
17 Neither the bankruptcy court nor Debtor disputes Appellant’s
18 status as a member of the POA, nor that the POA has not pursued
19 an exception to discharge action in Debtor’s bankruptcy case.
20 However, Debtor hotly disputes the factual assertions in the
21 complaint. To support its dismissal motion, Debtor focuses on
22 its procedural objections under Civil Rule 23.1: that, based
23 upon this record, Appellant cannot appropriately act as a
24 representative of the interests of the POA in the adversary
25 proceeding; that Appellant did not make an adequate demand on the
26 POA Board to act in advance of commencing this action; and that
27 the business judgment rule applies to foreclose Appellant’s
28 action. Appellant disagrees with these contentions.

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 1 In our view, the issues raised by Debtor in its motion to
2 dismiss all present fundamentally factual disputes. In general,
3 a trial court may not rule on disputed factual matters in
4 resolving a Civil Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal motion. Penilla v.
5 City of Huntington Park, 115 F.3d 707, 710 (9th Cir. 1997). As
6 discussed below, in resolving the motion to dismiss, the
7 bankruptcy court appears to have drawn several critical
8 inferences in favor of Debtor, the moving party, something which
9 is not appropriate in this context. Ikon Office Solutions,
10 513 F.3d at 1043 n.2. We must therefore reverse the bankruptcy
11 court’s order.
12 A. Adequate Representation.
13 For purposes of Civil Rule 23.1, "[a]n adequate
14 representative must have the capacity to vigorously and
15 conscientiously prosecute a derivative suit and be free from
16 economic interests that are antagonistic to the interests of the
17 class." Larson v. Dumke, 900 F.2d 1363, 1367 (9th Cir. 1989)
18 (citing Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 788-89 (3rd Cir. 1982)).
19 The Ninth Circuit has held that a disqualifying conflict does not
20 necessarily exist when a party asserts both a derivative claim on
21 behalf of a corporation, and a personal claim against the
22 corporation. Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)
23 ("The mere presence of an injury to the corporation does not
24 negate the simultaneous presence of an individual injury . . .
25 [because] an action may lie both derivatively and individually
26 based on the same conduct"). While a trial court must consider
27 any conflicts of interest in determining the adequacy of
28 representation, "[t]he prevailing view appears to be that there

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 1 is no per se rule prohibiting shareholders from simultaneously
2 bringing both direct and derivative actions," and that the
3 better-reasoned and predominant rule is to look behind the
4 surface duality of the two types of actions, and to allow them to
5 proceed unless an actual conflict emerges. Natomas Gardens Inv.
6 Group, LLC v. Sinadinos, 2009 WL 1363382, *15 (E.D. Cal. 2009)
7 (applying both California and federal derivative law); see also
8 Field Turf Builders, LLC v. Fieldturf USA, Inc., 2010 WL 817628,
9 at *12 (D. Ore. 2010) (no per se rule); In re Rasterops Corp.
10 Sec. Litig., 1993 WL 476651, at *13 (N.D. Cal Sept. 10,
11 2010)(same); First Am. Bank and Trust by Levitt v. Frogel, 726 F.
12 Supp. 1292, 1298 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (simultaneous direct and
13 derivative claims could proceed); Keyser v. Commonwealth Nat.
14 Fin. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 489, 492 n.8 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (in holding
15 that the plaintiff's simultaneous direct and derivative claims
16 could proceed, the court stated, "[i]f and when plaintiffs prove
17 their allegations and the remedy stage is reached, the court may
18 take corrective measures to resolve any actual conflicts which
19 arise at that time"). In short, the case law instructs that a
20 derivative claim should not be dismissed solely because the
21 plaintiff is also asserting direct claims against the
22 corporation.
23 In granting Debtor’s motion to dismiss, the bankruptcy court
24 noted in its tentative ruling that Appellant could not adequately
25 and fairly represent the POA “in light of [the] antagonism
26 between the interests of the plaintiff and the homeowners
27 association.” However, the bankruptcy court did not explain in
28 its tentative ruling or final order the conflict or antagonism to

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 1 which it was referring. The relief sought in the Amended
2 Adversary Complaint is an exception to Debtor’s ability to
3 discharge what Appellant alleges are $3,471,814 in cumulative
4 damages owed to the POA. Plaintiff seeks no relief in the
5 Amended Adversary Complaint against the POA or the POA Board.
6 Apparently, the bankruptcy court was concerned that, given
7 the claims being asserted by Appellant in the State Court Action,
8 its interests were antagonistic to the POA. In particular,
9 Appellant’s SASC asserts three non-derivative claims: one to void
10 the sign lease between the POA and Chase; another in favor of
11 both Appellant and the POA to recover $5 million in public
12 nuisance damages from Debtor; and another to recover $200,000 in
13 damages from the POA and Debtor for private nuisance.6 Of these,
14 it is a matter of disputed fact whether voiding the sign lease
15 would prejudice the interests of the POA and its members. And
16 the claim for $5 million for public nuisance also arguably favors
17 all POA members, not just Appellant.
18
19 6
Cal. Civ. Code § 3479 defines a nuisance as "anything
20 which is injurious to health, or is indecent or offensive to the
senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to
21 interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property
22 . . . ." Newhall Land & Farming Co. v. Super. Ct., 19 Cal. App.
4th 334, 341 (1993). A nuisance may be a public nuisance, a
23 private nuisance, or both. Venuto v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas
Corp., 22 Cal.App.3d 116, 124 (1971). "A public nuisance is one
24
which affects at the same time an entire community or
25 neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons, although the
extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon individuals may
26 be unequal." Cal. Civ. Code § 3480. Every other nuisance is
27 private. Cal. Civ. Code, § 3481. However, "[a] private person
may maintain an action for a public nuisance, if it is specially
28 injurious to himself, but not otherwise." Cal. Civ. Code § 3493.

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 1 Of the causes of action asserted in the SASC, only
2 Appellant’s private nuisance claim against the POA and Debtor, on
3 its face, potentially favors Appellant to the detriment of the
4 POA. But even this is disputed. At oral argument, counsel for
5 Appellant explained that the POA was named as a defendant as to
6 the nuisance claims in state court only because it was the owner
7 of the Property. Hr'g Tr. 17:2–5.7 If that is correct, whether
8 the private nuisance claim gives rise to a disqualifying conflict
9 of interest between Appellant and the POA is matter for debate
10 and proof. Instead, the bankruptcy court concluded that
11 Appellant’s assertion of the nuisance claim against the POA
12 prevented Appellant from fairly and adequately representing the
13 POA in the adversary proceeding. While such a conclusion may
14 ultimately prove correct after a fuller development of the
15 relevant facts, it was premature for the bankruptcy court to
16 adopt that conclusion based solely on inferences drawn from the
17 allegations of the Amended Adversary Complaint and the SASC.
18 In sum, here, the bankruptcy court appeared to determine
19 that Appellant was not an adequate representative of the POA
20 under Civil Rule 23.1 to prosecute the § 523(a) exception to
21 discharge claims against Debtor by relying upon disputed facts,
22 and by drawing inferences from the alleged facts against
23
24 7
The owner of real property is ordinarily a necessary
25 party to be joined in any litigation affecting that property.
However, this is a discretionary rule of fairness under
26 California law and may not be applicable where the owner’s
27 interest is adequately represented by another party. People ex
rel. Lungren v. Cmty. Redevelopment Agency, 56 Cal.App.4th 868,
28 876 (1997).

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 1 Appellant. This was impermissible in resolving a motion to
2 dismiss and, as a result, an abuse of discretion.
3 B. The Business Judgment Rule and Demand Futility
4 The United States Supreme Court has described the Business
5 Judgment Rule as a "deferential” common law principle applicable
6 in most states that implements "the basic principle of corporate
7 governance that the decisions of a corporation — including the
8 decision to initiate litigation — should be made by the board of
9 directors or the majority of shareholders." Kamen, 500 U.S. at
10 101. The California Supreme Court has explained that "[t]he
11 common law business judgment rule has two components — one which
12 immunizes [corporate] directors from personal liability if they
13 act in accordance with its requirements, and another which
14 insulates from court intervention those management decisions
15 which are made by directors in good faith in what the directors
16 believe is the organization's best interest." Lamden v. LaJolla
17 Clubdominium Homeowners Ass'n, 980 P.2d 940, 948 (Cal. 1999).
18 The Business Judgment Rule is implemented in this context by
19 the "demand requirement" set forth in Civil Rule 23.1(b)(3).
20 Kamen, 500 U.S. at 101. That Rule requires that a
21 representative's complaint "state with particularity: (A) any
22 effort by the plaintiff to obtain the desired action from the
23 directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from the
24 shareholders or members; and (B) the reasons for not obtaining
25 the action or not making the effort." The Supreme Court has
26 instructed that the demand requirements for a derivative suit are
27 determined by the law of the state of incorporation. Kamen,
28 500 U.S. at 96-97. In this case, California's law nearly

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 1 duplicates Civil Rule 23.1(b)(3), providing in relevant part
2 that:
3 No action may be instituted or maintained in right of
any domestic or foreign corporation by any holder of
4 shares . . . of the corporation unless both of the
following conditions exist: . . . (2) The plaintiff
5 alleges in the complaint with particularity plaintiff's
efforts to secure from the board such action as
6 plaintiff desires, or the reasons for not making such
effort[.]
7
8 Cal. Corp. Code § 800 (b). California case law links the
9 reasoning for this requirement to the Business Judgment Rule.
10 Where a board of directors, in refusing to commence an
action to redress an alleged wrong against a
11 corporation, acts in good faith within the scope of its
discretionary power and reasonably believes its refusal
12 to commence the action is good business judgment in the
best interest of the corporation, a stockholder is not
13 authorized to interfere with such discretion by
commencing the action.
14
15 Findley v. Garrett, 109 Cal.App.2d 166, 174 (1952).
16 Appellant, in the Amended Adversary Complaint, asserted that
17 it made a demand on the POA Board to pursue actions against
18 Debtor and his alleged accomplices, and that the POA Board had
19 taken no action. Appellant then alleged with particularity
20 several reasons that it would be a futile gesture for it to
21 request any further action from the POA Board. In our view,
22 assuming the facts asserted by Appellant were proven to be true,
23 the Amended Adversary Complaint satisfied the pleading
24 requirements of Civil Rule 23.1(b) and Cal. Corp. § 800 (b).
25 The bankruptcy court, as an alternative grounds for
26 dismissal, explained its view that the POA Board was entitled to
27 exercise its business judgment to conclude that no action against
28 Debtor was “appropriate or warranted.” Hr’g Tr. 4:2-7. Based on

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 1 this record, however, it is difficult to understand whether the
2 POA Board actually took any action on the Demand Letter. Indeed,
3 since there is no evidence in the record regarding any board
4 action, it was error for the bankruptcy court to infer that the
5 POA Board “concluded that no action against the debtor is
6 appropriate or warranted.”
7 More specifically, the Demand Letter was sent by Appellant’s
8 lawyer to counsel for the POA Board on June 18, 2013, and
9 provided a four-page litany of grievances by Appellant against
10 the POA Board. The specific allegations of conflicts of interest
11 among the POA Board members is contained in Paragraph 8.
12 8. Conflict of interest among the board members who
retain significant personal interest in the commercial
13 property and/or the profitability of the commercial
property. The Board has been dominated by persons
14 whose interests are intertwined with the commercial
lots. Not surprisingly, the Board has made innumerable
15 decisions that favor the commercial owners over the
interests of the residential owners — and i[n] many
16 cases to the detriment of the residential owners. The
Board has continued to perpetuate the unconscionable
17 cost-splitting agreement in the CC&Rs between
commercial and residential owners, and the
18 unconscionable nature of the commercial owners’
guaranteed board positions and voting powers.
19
These concerns are serious. The conduct by the
20 Board described herein demonstrates repeated, reckless
breaches of the Board’s fiduciary duties to the
21 residential owners. While all parties recognize that
the building includes commercial use, and that
22 commercial uses may sometimes be less convenient for
residents, that does not permit the property rights and
23 safety of the residential owners to be compromised in
the name of total commercial exploitation. . . . We
24 further demand that the Board immediately . . .
investigate those Board members involved in the
25 aforementioned commercial dealings, and take such legal
action against those persons as is necessary to
26 preserve the rights of the Association.
27 Although the Demand Letter was sent to counsel for the POA
28 Board, neither the Demand Letter nor other excerpts of the record

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 1 indicate that the POA Board members were provided with copies of
2 the Demand Letter. Counsel for the POA responded to the Demand
3 Letter twice. The first response was on June 21, 2013 (the
4 "First Response Letter"). In the Demand Letter, counsel for
5 Appellant had indicated that he and his client would attend an
6 “open board meeting” on June 24, 2013. In the First Response
7 Letter, counsel for the POA Board forbade Appellant’s counsel to
8 attend the meeting because the POA Board’s counsel could not
9 attend. There is no indication in the record that Appellant
10 attended the open meeting without counsel. Further, the First
11 Response Letter does not indicate if the members of the POA Board
12 were copied.
13 Counsel for the POA provided a more detailed response on
14 July 5, 2013 (the “Second Response Letter”). Counsel’s specific
15 response concerning Appellant’s allegations about the alleged
16 conflict of interest by members of the POA Board was:
17 You state that the board is “dominated by persons whose
interests are intertwined with the commercial lots.” I
18 have no idea where you are taking this information
from. It is true that the commercial owner, who is
19 guaranteed representation and a single space on the
board, has elected a representative to the board.
20 However, to my knowledge, no other member of the board
has any financial interest in the commercial owner.
21 Since the board is composed of five individuals,
elected by the entire Association, exactly how is it
22 that the commercial owner is dominating the decisions
of the board of directors? The CC&Rs pre-date each and
23 every owner’s interest in the building and bind each
and every owner. The CC&Rs are clear that the board of
24 directors has no right to interfere with the commercial
owners’ lawful use of the commercial spaces in the
25 building. Moreover, the CC&Rs state that they may not
be amended to change the commercial owners’ interest in
26 the building without the commercial owners’ approval.
This is simply a fact; this does not show any sort of
27 conflict of interest. . . .
28 You state that the Association should recover any

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 1 funds “misappropriated or improperly disposed of by the
relevant board members.” However, you have never
2 stated once in your letter that any funds were
misappropriated or “improperly disposed of.” The board
3 knows of no such instance, and I know of no such
instances. If you have evidence of misappropriation,
4 then I hereby demand that you provide them to me, in
writing, immediately. If you do not, then I strongly
5 suggest that you cease this spurious claim since it is
defamatory and subjects both you and your clients to
6 damages for such defamation.
7 Fairly interpreted, the letters show that Debtor made demand
8 on the POA Board as required by Civil Rule 23.1 (“The complaint
9 must be verified and must . . . (3) state with particularity:
10 (A) any effort by the plaintiff to obtain the desired action from
11 the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from the
12 shareholders or members)[.]”); and Cal. Civ. Code 800(b)(2) (“The
13 plaintiff alleges in the complaint with particularity plaintiff's
14 efforts to secure from the board such action as plaintiff
15 desires[.]”).
16 After further proceedings, Debtor may be able to demonstrate
17 sufficient facts to show that the POA's actions justify the
18 protections of the Business Judgment Rule. However, here the
19 bankruptcy court inferred that the POA made a business decision
20 not to pursue a § 523(a) action against Debtor based solely on
21 the POA Board's failure to join in Debtor's action or to file its
22 own action. In resolving the motion to dismiss, on this record,
23 such an inference was improper under Civil Rule 12(b)(6).
24 Debtor thus satisfies the first part of the federal and
25 California procedural rules for derivative actions. However, as
26 noted, the POA Board does not appear to have taken any action in
27 state court against Debtor, nor has it sought a claim against
28 Debtor in this appeal. Appellant has not sought any further

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 1 action from the POA Board because, as argued in the First Amended
2 Complaint, such requests would be “futile.” Thus, the second
3 part of the federal and California derivative rules attach: Civil
4 Rule 23.1(b)(2)(B) (“The complaint must . . . state with
5 particularity: . . . (B) the reasons for not obtaining the action
6 or not making the effort.”); Cal. Corp. Code § 800(b)(2) (“The
7 plaintiff alleges in the complaint with particularity plaintiff's
8 efforts to secure from the board such action as plaintiff
9 desires, or the reasons for not making such effort[.]”).
10 The “reasons for not making such effort” is known as the
11 demand futility rule. "Although jurisdictions differ widely in
12 defining the circumstances under which demand on directors will
13 be excused, demand typically is deemed futile when a majority of
14 the directors have participated in or approved the alleged
15 wrongdoing, or are otherwise financially interested in the
16 challenged transactions." Kamen, 500 U.S. at 101–102 (citations
17 and quotation marks omitted). In California, courts look to the
18 derivative law of Delaware for instruction. Bader v. Anderson,
19 179 Cal.App.4th 775 (2009).
20 The test commonly employed in determining the adequacy of
21 the pleading of demand futility was articulated in Aronson v.
22 Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984); see Bader, 179 Cal.App.4th at
23 482 (citing Aronson). The Aronson court observed that "the
24 entire question of demand futility is inextricably bound to
25 issues of business judgment and the standards of that doctrine's
26 applicability." Id. at 812. Aronson held that a court, in
27 deciding whether a plaintiff will be excused from making a demand
28 on the board, must evaluate "whether, under the particularized

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 1 facts alleged, a reasonable doubt is created that: (1) the
2 directors are disinterested and independent and (2) the
3 challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid
4 exercise of business judgment." Id. at 814; Oakland Raiders v.
5 NFL, 93 Cal.App.4th 572, 587 (2001) (applying the Aronson test].)
6 "[F]utility is gauged by the circumstances existing at the
7 commencement of a derivative suit." Aronson, 473 A.2d at 810.
8 And the two-prong test under Aronson is disjunctive; thus, demand
9 is excused if either prong is satisfied. Brehm v. Eisner,
10 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 2000).
11 Appellant pleaded sufficient facts in the Amended Adversary
12 Complaint, which we must accept as true under Civil
13 Rule 12(b)(6), to establish that Debtor and his alleged co-
14 conspirators controlled a majority of the POA Board at the time
15 of the lease signing and at the time Appellant asserted the
16 derivative claims in the bankruptcy court. From the allegations
17 of the Amended Adversary Complaint, the bankruptcy court could
18 infer that a majority of the POA Board members would favor the
19 commercial interests represented by Debtor and would be adverse
20 to the requests for the POA Board to prosecute an action against
21 Debtor in either the state or bankruptcy courts. Because the
22 Business Judgment Rule is unavailable to the POA Board when a
23 demand is made on the board and the futility of a further demand
24 is shown, the bankruptcy court erred in dismissing the Amended
25 Adversary Complaint on the basis of the Business Judgment Rule.
26 C. In Pari Delicto.
27 Based upon the Amended Adversary Complaint, the bankruptcy
28 court concluded, as a matter of law,, that application of the

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 1 doctrine of in pari delicto barred Appellant’s claims against
2 Debtor. We disagree.
3 The Supreme Court discussed the doctrine’s application:
4 The common-law defense at issue in this case derives
from the Latin, in pari delicto potior est conditio
5 defendentis: "In a case of equal or mutual fault . . .
the position of the [defending] party . . . is the
6 better one." The defense is grounded on two premises:
first, that courts should not lend their good offices
7 to mediating disputes among wrongdoers; and second,
that denying judicial relief to an admitted wrongdoer
8 is an effective means of deterring illegality of
wrongdoing as defendants.
9
10 Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 303
11 (1985). The Ninth Circuit has endorsed the application of the
12 in pari delicto doctrine in civil litigation. See Kardoh v.
13 United States, 572 F.3d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 2009) (although a
14 criminal case, the doctrine was applied to resolve a civil issue,
15 that a party could not seek approval from the district court to
16 recover fees voluntarily paid in furtherance of an illegal
17 agreement). Application of in pari delicto is governed by state
18 law. Hagan v. Baird (In re B&P Baird Holdings, Inc., 2015 U.S.
19 App. LEXIS 30, at *15 (6th Cir. Jan. 2, 2015). California
20 recognizes in pari delicto as an equitable defense in civil
21 litigation. Mailand v. Burckle, 572 P.2d 1142, 1147 (Cal. 1978).
22 Traditionally, the defense was limited to situations where
23 both parties bore "at least substantially equal responsibility”
24 for their acts." Berner, 472 U.S. at 307; 1 J. Story, Equity
25 Jurisprudence 399-400 (14th ed. 1918). This requirement of equal
26 responsibility for the wrong continues in current California case
27 law. Mountain Air Enterprises, LLC v. Sundowner Towers, LLC,
28 231 Cal.App.4th 805, 847 (2014) (explaining that in pari delicto

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 1 applies when parties are in "equal wrong").
2 Here, the bankruptcy court reasoned that, accepting the
3 allegations of Appellant’s Amended Adversary Complaint as true,
4 the POA and the POA Board were in pari delicto with Debtor in
5 entering into the lease, and Appellant, as the representative of
6 the POA, could not seek relief for what amounted to the
7 collective misconduct of Debtor and the POA Board. Again,
8 however, this conclusion is founded upon inferences.
9 In dismissing it, the bankruptcy court relied upon the
10 allegations in the Amended Adversary Complaint, which included
11 that: (1) Debtor and his “co-conspirators” on the POA Board set
12 up the governing documents of the POA so as to allow them to
13 leach from the residential owners; (2) Debtor and these members
14 of the Board acted with the express intention to damage the POA
15 and to enrich themselves; (3) “The [POA Board] that made the
16 decision to enter into the sign lease was elected through a
17 flawed election that did not conform with the constitutional
18 documents of the POA, because, in part, Debtor and his
19 coconspirators orchestrated undisclosed changes in the voting
20 rules . . . in order to stack the board with directors whom he
21 and his coconspirators could control”; and (4) “The board is
22 dominated by Debtor and his co-conspirators.”
23 Standing alone, these allegations do not support application
24 of the equitable doctrine. At worst, the allegations suggest
25 that Debtor and the POA Board were possibly in pari delicto.
26 There are no facts alleged in the Amended Adversary Complaint or
27 otherwise appearing in the record to support the bankruptcy
28 court’s inference that the POA, as opposed to the POA Board,

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 1 participated in the alleged wrongdoing. We have located no case
2 law that would allow the bankruptcy court to attribute the
3 wrongdoing of a board to the corporation for purposes of a
4 derivative action.8 On the other hand, the well-pled facts of
5 the Amended Adversary Complaint support an inference that the POA
6 was a victim of the fraud and fiduciary breaches of Debtor and
7 members of the POA Board. It was therefore error for the
8 bankruptcy court to infer that the claims alleged in the Amended
9 Adversary Complaint were barred by in pari delicto.
10 CONCLUSION
11 The bankruptcy court erred in dismissing Debtor’s Amended
12 Adversary Complaint under Civil Rules 12(b)(6) and 23.1. We
13 therefore REVERSE the bankruptcy court’s order and REMAND this
14 matter to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings.9
15
16
17
18
19 8
Indeed, we have found no published cases where a
20 bankruptcy court has considered the in pari delicto defense in
the context of a Civil Rule 23.1 or Rule 7023.1 action. However,
21
district courts considering shareholder derivative actions under
22 Civil Rule 23.1 have allowed the in pari delicto defense when the
corporation is in equal fault with its board. Miller v.
23 Interfirst Bank Dallas, N.A., 608 F. Supp.169, 171-72 N.D. Tex
24 1985) (“fault of the parties must be clearly mutual,
simultaneous, and relatively equal”). Here, as discussed above,
25 there is nothing in the record to show that the POA participated
in the alleged wrongdoing by the Debtor and the POA Board.
26
9
27 Because we reverse the dismissal order, we need not
address whether the bankruptcy court erred in dismissing
28 Appellant’s Amended Adversary Complaint without leave to amend.

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