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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
CHARLES SMITH
Appellant No. 1259 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 29, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-26-CR-0000045-2012
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., JENKINS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED FEBRUARY 19, 2015
Appellant, Charles Smith, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Fayette County Court of Common Pleas, following his jury trial
convictions for two (2) counts of persons not to possess firearms and one
(1) count each of criminal conspiracy, possession with intent to deliver
(“PWID”), simple possession, and possession of drug paraphernalia.1 We
vacate and remand for resentencing.
In a prior appeal, this Court set forth the relevant facts and some of
the procedural history of this case as follows:
On November 1, 2011, Detectives Thomas Patton,
Antonio Muniz and Christopher Kozlowski of the
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1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105, 903; 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30), (a)(16), and
(a)(32), respectively.
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Fayette County Drug Task Force arrived at 334
Breakiron Road, Bullskin Township, Fayette County,
Pennsylvania, where they met a confidential
informant (“CI”). The CI had previously informed
the police that crack cocaine could be purchased
from inside one of the two mobile home trailers
located at 334 Breakiron Road.
The CI was then driven to a secure location and
searched by the detectives for money and
contraband. Following the search, the CI was given
$25.00 in marked U.S. currency and was then
returned to 334 Breakiron Road by the detectives.
After a few moments inside 334 Breakiron Road, the
CI reemerged with a small plastic baggie containing
what the detectives suspected to be crack cocaine.
Shortly thereafter, the detectives obtained a search
warrant for 334 Breakiron Road. The detectives
returned to the location along with two additional
police officers and a search warrant that same
night…. Upon entering one of the trailers, the
detectives observed an African American male, later
identified as Leron Brown from Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, retreat to a back bedroom where he
was eventually apprehended. Detective Kozlowski
discovered a plastic baggie containing cocaine only a
few feet away from Brown’s location. [Detective]
Muniz also uncovered a revolver in the trailer’s
ventilation ductwork and a muzzleloader in one of
the closets. The detectives also found spoons,
syringes, a digital scale, two cell phones, $461.00 in
cash, phone numbers and “owe sheets” that night as
well.
[Appellant] was also found inside the trailer. After
being Mirandized[,2 Appellant] admitted that he
knew and permitted Leron Brown to sell drugs from
the trailer.
(Trial Court Opinion, [filed June 20, 2013], at 2-3).
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2
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
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At trial, the Commonwealth did not present the CI as a
witness. Accordingly, Appellant’s counsel requested a
missing witness jury instruction for the CI, which the court
denied. Ultimately, [on November 6, 2012,] the jury
convicted Appellant of all counts with which he was
charged. After the jury returned its verdict, Appellant had
an outburst in the courtroom, for which the judge found
him in contempt and sentenced him to a flat term of six
months’ imprisonment. On December 6, 2012, the court
sentenced Appellant on his other convictions to a total
term of 7 to 14 years’ incarceration,[3] consecutive to the
contempt term. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal
on December 19, 2012.
Commonwealth v. Smith, No. 2006 WDA 2012, unpublished memorandum
at 2-3 (Pa.Super. filed June 16, 2014) (some internal citations to the record
omitted). On appeal, this Court held the trial court did not err when it
denied Appellant’s request for a missing witness instruction. Nevertheless,
this Court determined Appellant’s flat six-month term of incarceration for his
contempt of court conviction was illegal, vacated Appellant’s judgment of
sentence with respect to all of his convictions, and remanded for
resentencing.
On remand, the trial court initially resentenced Appellant on July 29,
2014, to a term of three (3) to six (6) months’ incarceration for the
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3
Appellant’s December 6, 2012 sentence included a mandatory minimum
term for the PWID conviction pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7508(a)(3)(ii)
(mandating minimum of five (5) years’ incarceration for PWID conviction
where weight of drugs is between ten (10) and one hundred (100) grams
and, at time of sentencing, defendant has been convicted of another drug
trafficking offense).
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contempt of court conviction, to run consecutively with the sentence
imposed on December 6, 2012.4 Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on
August 1, 2014. The court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of
errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b); Appellant
timely complied.
While the appeal was pending, the trial court held a resentencing
hearing on October 9, 2014, because the court was concerned that it had
not complied in full with the remand instructions, where the court
resentenced Appellant on the contempt conviction but left the rest of the
December 6, 2012 sentences alone. The court purported to “resentence”
Appellant for his jury trial convictions to an aggregate term of seven (7) to
fourteen (14) years’ incarceration, to run consecutively to the contempt
sentence imposed on July 29, 2014.
Appellant raises a single issue for our review:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT GIVING THE
JURY THE MISSING WITNESS INSTRUCTION WITH
RESPECT TO THE COMMONWEALTH’S CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMANT WHEN THE COMMONWEALTH FAILED TO CALL
ITS CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT AS A WITNESS?
(Appellant’s Brief at 7).
As a prefatory matter, we observe the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
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4
The notice of appeal indicates that Appellant is appealing from the
“[j]udgment of [s]entence dated DECEMBER 6[,] 2014 and JULY 29, 2014.”
We observe that the correct date of the original judgment of sentence for
Appellant’s jury trial convictions is December 6, 2012.
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“resentence” Appellant on October 9, 2014, more than two months after
Appellant had filed his notice of appeal. See Commonwealth v. Archer,
722 A.2d 203 (Pa.Super. 1998) (en banc) (stating challenge to court’s
jurisdiction to impose sentence is non-waivable challenge to legality of
sentence, which this Court can raise sua sponte).
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1701 states in relevant part
as follows:
Rule 1701. Effect of Appeal Generally
(a) General Rule. Except as otherwise prescribed by
these rules, after an appeal is taken or review of a
quasijudicial order is sought, the trial court or other
government unit may no longer proceed further in the
matter.
(b) Authority of a trial court or agency after
appeal. After an appeal is taken or review of a
quasijudicial order is sought, the trial court or other
government unit may:
(1) Take such action as may be necessary to preserve
the status quo, correct formal errors in papers relating to
the matter, cause the record to be transcribed, approved,
filed and transmitted, grant leave to appeal in forma
pauperis, grant supersedeas, and take other action
permitted or required by these rules or otherwise ancillary
to the appeal or petition for review proceeding.
(2) Enforce any order entered in the matter, unless the
effect of the order has been superseded as prescribed in
this chapter.
(3) Grant reconsideration of the order which is the
subject of the appeal or petition, if:
(i) an application for reconsideration of the order is
filed in the trial court or other government unit
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within the time provided or prescribed by law; and
(ii) an order expressly granting reconsideration of
such prior order is filed in the trial court or other
government unit within the time prescribed by these
rules for the filing of a notice of appeal or petition for
review of a quasijudicial order with respect to such
order, or within any shorter time provided or
prescribed by law for the granting of reconsideration.
* * *
(4) Authorize the taking of depositions or the
preservation of testimony where required in the interest of
justice.
(5) Take any action directed or authorized on application
by the appellate court.
(6) Proceed further in any matter in which a non-
appealable interlocutory order has been entered,
notwithstanding the filing of a notice of appeal or a petition
for review of the order.
Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a)-(b). Additionally: “Except as otherwise provided or
prescribed by law, a court upon notice to the parties may modify or rescind
any order within 30 days after its entry, notwithstanding the prior
termination of any term of court, if no appeal from such order has been
taken or allowed.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505. See also Commonwealth v.
Walters, 814 A.2d 253 (Pa.Super. 2002), appeal denied, 574 Pa. 760, 831
A.2d 599 (2003) (stating that barring mistake or fraud, trial court has no
jurisdiction to modify sentence after appeal is taken).
Instantly, on July 29, 2014, the trial court resentenced Appellant on
his contempt of court conviction to a term of three (3) to six (6) months’
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incarceration, to run consecutively to the December 6, 2012 sentence
imposed for Appellant’s jury trial convictions. The court explicitly stated: “In
all other respects, the sentence of this [c]ourt of December 6, 2012 shall
remain in full force and effect.” (N.T. Resentence Proceedings, 7/29/14, at
2-3). Appellant did not file any post-sentence motions. Instead, Appellant
timely filed a notice of appeal on August 1, 2014.
Notwithstanding the pending appeal, the court held a hearing on
October 9, 2014, where it purported to “resentence” Appellant on his jury
trial convictions in accordance with this Court’s remand instructions.
Appellant’s prior filing of a notice of appeal, however, divested the trial court
of jurisdiction over this case. See Pa.R.A.P. 1701; Walters, supra. None
of the exceptions enumerated in Rule 1701(b) endowed the court with the
authority to modify Appellant’s sentence more than two months after
Appellant had filed his notice of appeal. Therefore, the court’s
“resentencing” of Appellant on October 9, 2014, is void.
Nevertheless, Appellant’s appeal from the judgment of sentence
imposed on July 29, 2014 is properly before us.5 When the court
resentenced Appellant on July 29, 2014, however, it failed to follow this
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5
Appellant also purports to appeal from the judgment of sentence dated
December 6, 2012. In the previous appeal, however, this Court vacated the
judgment of sentence imposed on that date. Thus, the current appeal is
properly before us solely with respect to the judgment of sentence imposed
on July 29, 2014.
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Court’s remand instructions to resentence Appellant on all of his convictions.
Additionally, the court ordered Appellant’s new contempt sentence to run
consecutively to the December 6, 2012 sentence this Court had vacated on
appeal. Therefore, we vacate the July 29, 2014 judgment of sentence and
remand for full resentencing on all of Appellant’s convictions. See
Commonwealth v. Goldhammer, 512 Pa. 587, 517 A.2d 1280, (1986),
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 950, 107 S.Ct. 1613, 94 L.Ed.2d 798 (1987) (stating
if appellate court alters overall sentencing scheme, then remand for
resentencing is proper).
Resentencing should be guided by the following principles:
§ 9756. Sentence of total confinement
(a) General rule.—In imposing a sentence of total
confinement the court shall at the time of sentencing
specify any maximum period up to the limit authorized by
law and whether the sentence shall commence in a
correctional or other appropriate institution.
(b) Minimum sentence.—
(1) The court shall impose a minimum sentence of
confinement which shall not exceed one-half of the
maximum sentence imposed.
* * *
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9756.
Criminal contempt is a crime punishable by imprisonment,
so sentences must be imposed according to the Sentencing
Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A § 9701 et seq. See Commonwealth
v. Falkenhan,…452 A.2d 750, 758 ([Pa.Super.] 1982),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 803, 104 S.Ct. 49, 78 L.Ed.2d 69
(1983). The Code mandates that the sentencing court
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impose not only a maximum sentence, but also a minimum
sentence which shall not exceed one-half the maximum[.]
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9756(b). A flat…sentence does not satisfy
this requirement.
Commonwealth v. Williams, 753 A.2d 856, 865 (Pa.Super. 2000), appeal
denied, 567 Pa. 713, 785 A.2d 89 (2000) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Cain, 637 A.2d 656, 658 (Pa.Super. 1994)).
Additionally, with respect to the imposition of a mandatory minimum
sentence per 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7508, we are mindful of the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 133
S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013), in which the Court expressly held that
any fact increasing the mandatory minimum sentence for a crime is
considered an element of the crime to be submitted to the fact-finder and
found beyond a reasonable doubt. Section 7508(a)(3)(ii) mandates a
minimum sentence of five (5) years’ incarceration where a defendant is
convicted of PWID involving at least ten (10) grams but less than one
hundred (100) grams of cocaine and, at time of sentencing, the defendant
has been convicted of another drug trafficking offense. 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
7508(a)(3)(ii). Section 7508(b) states that the statutory provisions shall not
be an element of the crime and applicability of the statute shall be
determined at sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence. Recently, in
Commonwealth v. Newman, 99 A.3d 86 (Pa.Super. 2014) (en banc), this
Court addressed the constitutionality of a similar statute, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9712.1, in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne,
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supra.6 Relying on Alleyne, Newman held that Section 9712.1 can no
longer pass constitutional muster as it “permits the trial court, as opposed to
the jury, to increase a defendant’s minimum sentence based upon a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was dealing drugs and
possessed a firearm, or that a firearm was in close proximity to the drugs.”
Newman, supra at 98. Thus, this Court vacated Newman’s PWID sentence
and remanded for resentencing without imposition of the mandatory
minimum under Section 9712.1. See also Commonwealth v. Valentine,
101 A.3d 801 (Pa.Super. 2014) (involving appeal of sentence arising from
jury trial; extending logic of Alleyne and Newman to Sections 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 9712, 9713 and holding those sections are likewise unconstitutional
insofar as they permit automatic increase of defendant’s sentence based on
preponderance of evidence standard).
Subsequently, this Court directly addressed the constitutionality of
Section 7508 in Commonwealth v. Vargas, ___ A.3d ___, 2014 PA Super
289 (filed December 31, 2014) (en banc), where the trial court imposed a
mandatory minimum sentence for a PWID conviction, pursuant to Section
7508(a)(7)(iii). On appeal, this Court emphasized that Section 7508 “is
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6
This Court also made clear that Alleyne is subject to limited retroactivity;
in other words, Alleyne is applicable to all criminal cases still pending on
direct review. Id. at 90. Because Newman’s case was still pending on direct
appeal, the holding in Alleyne applied to Newman’s case, just as it also
applies to Appellant’s direct appeal now before us.
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structured in the same manner as the statutes at issue in Newman and
Valentine….” Id. at *17. This Court concluded that Section 7508 is also
unconstitutional.
Here, a jury convicted Appellant of PWID and related charges. The
court applied Section 7508 when it initially sentenced Appellant on
December 6, 2012, and again when it purported to resentence Appellant on
July 29, 2014 and on October 9, 2014. Given this Court’s binding decisions
in Newman, Valentine, and Vargas, however, any application of Section
7508 results in an illegal sentence. Accordingly, upon remand, the trial
court must resentence Appellant on all of his convictions without imposition
of a Section 7508 mandatory minimum term. Additionally, each sentence of
total confinement must consist of a maximum term and a minimum term
which does not exceed one-half of the maximum term imposed. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9756; Williams, supra.
Finally, with regard to his sole issue raised on this appeal, Appellant
argues the CI—if called to testify—could have corroborated Appellant’s claim
that Appellant was not in the trailer earlier in the day when the CI purchased
drugs, but went inside the trailer later only to order the occupants to leave.
Likewise, according to Appellant, the CI could have testified that other
individuals were present in the trailer at the time of the transaction and
Leron Brown was in exclusive possession of the firearms Appellant was
convicted of possessing. Appellant asserts the CI’s testimony would not
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have been cumulative, given the complete lack of evidence regarding what
transpired inside the trailer when the CI entered it. Because the CI did not
testify at trial, Appellant claims he was entitled to a missing witness
instruction. Appellant concludes the trial court’s denial of his request for a
missing witness instruction entitles Appellant to a new trial. We cannot
agree.
In an appeal following a limited remand, an appellant may not raise
new issues wholly unrelated to the issues on remand. Commonwealth v.
Lawson, 789 A.2d 252, 253 (Pa.Super. 2001). Also, under the law of the
case doctrine, “a court involved in the later phases of a litigated matter
should not reopen questions decided by another judge of that same court or
by a higher court in the earlier phases of the matter.” Commonwealth v.
Starr, 541 Pa. 564, 574, 664 A.2d 1326, 1331 (1995).
Among the related but distinct rules which make up the
law of the case doctrine are that: (1) upon remand for
further proceedings, a trial court may not alter the
resolution of a legal question previously decided by the
appellate court in the matter; (2) upon a second appeal,
an appellate court may not alter the resolution of a
legal question previously decided by the same
appellate court; and (3) upon transfer of a matter
between trial judges of coordinate jurisdiction, the
transferee trial court may not alter the resolution of a legal
question previously decided by the transferor trial court.
The various rules which make up the law of the case
doctrine serve not only to promote the goal of judicial
economy (as does the coordinate jurisdiction rule) but also
operate (1) to protect the settled expectations of the
parties; (2) to insure uniformity of decisions; (3) to
maintain consistency during the course of a single case;
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(4) to effectuate the proper and streamlined administration
of justice; and (5) to bring litigation to an end.
Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Nevertheless,
the law of the case doctrine might not apply under
exceptional circumstances, including: an intervening
change in the law, a substantial change in the facts, or if
the prior ruling was “clearly erroneous” and “would create
a manifest injustice if followed.”
Commonwealth v. McCandless, 880 A.2d 1262, 1268 (Pa.Super. 2005)
(en banc) (quoting Starr, supra at 1332).
Instantly, in Appellant’s prior appeal, this Court remanded this case for
resentencing because the trial court had imposed an illegal flat six-month
term of incarceration for Appellant’s contempt conviction. Correction of
Appellant’s illegal sentence was the sole purpose for the limited remand.
Therefore, Appellant’s single issue in the current appeal regarding the
missing witness jury instruction is outside the scope of this Court’s previous
remand order and, on that basis, we will not consider it. See Lawson,
supra.
Significantly, Appellant raised this exact issue in his previous appeal,
and this Court already addressed and rejected Appellant’s claim concerning a
missing witness instruction as follows:
Here, Appellant contends that the CI was only available to
the Commonwealth as a witness, the CI had special
information material to the issue of Appellant’s guilt, and
this information would not encompass merely cumulative
evidence. Appellant argues that the CI—if called to
testify—could have corroborated Appellant’s claim that he
was not at the trailer earlier in the day when the CI
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purchased drugs, but was present when detectives arrived
later because he was trying to evict the occupants involved
with selling drugs. Further, Appellant contends that the CI
could have confirmed that Leron Brown was exclusively
responsible for the contraband and activities taking place
in the trailer. Because the CI possessed this information
and did not testify at trial, Appellant asserts that the trial
court should have given the missing witness instruction to
the jury.
However, as discerned by the trial court, Appellant’s
charges resulted from knowingly permitting individuals to
sell illegal drugs from his trailer. The Commonwealth only
sought to prove that Appellant was a part of the
conspiracy. Thus, the CI’s testimony would have been
immaterial because the Commonwealth prosecuted
Appellant for permitting the sale of drugs from his trailer,
not for directly selling drugs to the CI. In fact, there was
no allegation that Appellant sold drugs to the CI. Further,
the CI’s testimony would have been cumulative because
there was other testimony offered that Appellant was not
present at the trailer for very long before police arrived,
and that Appellant went to the trailer to evict the
occupants. Moreover, other testimony was offered that
police found several pieces of evidence in the possession of
Leron Brown, not Appellant.
Additionally, in light of this Court’s standard of review for
jury instructions discussed supra, Appellant has not
sufficiently established that he was prejudiced by the trial
court’s refusal to give the missing witness jury instruction
to such an extent that a new trial is warranted. Appellant
confessed to police that he permitted Leron Brown to use
his trailer to sell drugs in exchange for narcotics; thus,
Appellant cannot prove that he was prejudiced given the
overwhelming evidence of his participation in the
conspiracy. The trial court, therefore, did not err in
denying Appellant’s request for the missing witness jury
instruction.
Smith, supra at 5-6 (internal citations to the record omitted). Appellant
does not suggest any exceptional circumstances to compel reconsideration
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of this Court’s previous decision regarding Appellant’s question on appeal.
Absent exceptional circumstances, we decline to alter this Court’s previous
resolution of Appellant’s issue. See Starr, supra. Accordingly, we give this
substantive issue no further attention.
Based on the foregoing, we continue to affirm Appellant’s convictions,
but we vacate the judgment of sentence in its entirety, and remand solely
for resentencing without imposition of any mandatory minimum or flat term
of incarceration.
Judgment of sentence vacated; case remanded for resentencing.
Jurisdiction is relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/19/2015
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Com. v. Smith, C.
Combined Opinion