MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Feb 20 2015, 8:17 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. Burns Gregory F. Zoeller
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Lyubov Gore
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Kevin Watson, February 20, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1408-CR-536
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable David Cook, Judge
Case No. 49F07-1402-CM-5423
Appellee-Plaintiff
Vaidik, Chief Judge
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1408-CR-536 | February 20, 2015 Page 1 of 6
Case Summary
[1] Kevin Watson was convicted of Class A misdemeanor battery after a fight with
his half-sister. On appeal, Watson argues that the State failed to rebut his self-
defense claim. Because we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to rebut
Watson’s self-defense claim, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Kevin Watson’s mother died in January 2014. Watson’s mother had another
child, Krisheena Watts, Watson’s half-sister. Shortly after her death, Watson
began making funeral arrangements at Indiana Funeral Care in Indianapolis.
He did not tell Krisheena that their mother had died, nor did he tell her about
the funeral arrangements. See Tr. p. 8, 15, 29, 99. In fact, Watson told the
funeral-home employees that he was his mother’s only child. Id. at 14, 16-17,
48, 52.
[3] Krisheena eventually learned that her mother had died, and she called local
funeral homes in an attempt to learn where her mother’s funeral would be held.
Id. at 8-9, 29. When she learned that Watson had made funeral arrangements
at Indiana Funeral Care, she arranged to meet with the funeral home’s director,
Felicia Dillette. Id. at 48. Dillette called Watson and informed him that
Krisheena had contacted her. Id. Dillette asked Watson to attend her meeting
with Krisheena. Id. at 48-49.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1408-CR-536 | February 20, 2015 Page 2 of 6
[4] A number of Watson’s and Krisheena’s family members attended the meeting.
Id. at 11, 34-35, 49. The meeting did not go well; Watson and Krisheena
exchanged words, and Watson struck Krisheena. Watson was arrested and
charged with Class A misdemeanor battery. See Appellant’s App. p. 12
(charging information). Watson’s bench trial was held on June 5, 2014.
[5] At trial, Krisheena testified about the meeting at the funeral home. She
described Watson as “aggressive, hostile, and shocked that she found out where
[her] mother’s remains were at.” Tr. p. 10. Krisheena described what
happened next:
What happened was in the room I showed them my birth certificate,
my social security card, my identification, my father showed his
identification and his social security card, and then Mr. Watson
shouted, uh, “she’s my half-sister, she’s my half-sister” and I stated
“yes, I’m your half-sister because your father f**** little girls and my
father doesn’t,” and that’s when he struck me.
[6] Id. at 11-12. Watson struck Krisheena with “his open hand, his palm hit [her]
bottom jaw, clinched [her] jaw, and [she] fell out of the chair hitting . . . [her]
right elbow.” Id. at 12.
[7] Two witnesses—Dillette and another funeral-home employee—also testified
that Watson struck Krisheena. See id. at 36 (Sara Thompson: “[Watson], at one
point, [Watson], uh, pushed Krisheena.”), 41 (Felicia Dillette: “[Watson]
pushed his sister Krisheena and she fell over . . . .”). Although Dillette and
Thompson confirmed that Krisheena “got up in [Watson’s] face,” they testified
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1408-CR-536 | February 20, 2015 Page 3 of 6
that Krisheena never touched Watson, and Watson was the aggressor. Id. at
11-12, 36, 41, 56.
[8] Watson claimed self-defense. He testified that Krisheena attacked him, saying
that she “came at [him] swinging” and that he “automatically went into defense
mode” and began “blocking her hits.” Id. at 95, 100.
[9] At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court stated that
the only individual who indicated that Krisheena Watts was the initial
aggressor was uh, Mr. Watson, the defendant. No other person that
witness[ed] this from whatever view or angle . . . saw . . . the events
that Mr. Watson says, this hitting and fighting and then the block[ing]
a bunch of blows and swings. [N]one of the other State’s witnesses or
the Defense’s witnesses saw that as a . . . fact. Um, [Krisheena] may
have jumped up in [Watson’s] face, after hearing her testimony I
believe that’s probably true. [B]ut the law [looks] to who is the initial
aggressor and the criminality begins when someone lays their hands on
another person. Words don’t justify the physical action [] and [] the
court doesn’t find that there’s any credible evidence of self-defense
here.
Id. at 114-15.
[10] The Court found Watson guilty of Class A misdemeanor battery and sentenced
him to 365 days in the Department of Correction, with 297 days suspended and
credit for 68 days served. Appellant’s App. p. 9 (Abstract of Judgment).
[11] Watson now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1408-CR-536 | February 20, 2015 Page 4 of 6
[12] Watson argues that the State failed to rebut his self-defense claim. We disagree.
[13] The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to rebut a
claim of self-defense is the same as the standard for any sufficiency-of-the-
evidence claim. Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 801 (Ind. 2002). We neither
reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Id. If there is
sufficient evidence of probative value to support the conclusion of the trier of
fact, then the judgment will not be disturbed. Id.
[14] A valid claim of self-defense is legal justification for an otherwise criminal
act. Coleman v. State, 946 N.E.2d 1160, 1165 (Ind. 2011). In order to prevail on
his claim of self-defense, Watson had to show that he was protecting himself
from what he “reasonably believe[d] to be the imminent use of unlawful
force,” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(c), and that he was in a place where he had a right
to be and he acted without fault. Coleman, 946 N.E.2d at 1165. Once a
defendant claims self-defense, the State bears the burden of disproving at least
one of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt for the defendant’s claim to
fail. Miller v. State, 720 N.E.2d 696, 700 (Ind. 1999). The State may meet this
burden by rebutting the defense directly, by affirmatively showing the defendant
did not act in self-defense, or by simply relying upon the sufficiency of
its evidence in chief. Id. Whether the State has met its burden is a question of
fact for the trier of fact. Id. Self-defense is generally unavailable to a defendant
who is the initial aggressor. Id.; see also I.C. § 35-41-3-2(g)(3).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1408-CR-536 | February 20, 2015 Page 5 of 6
[15] The State disproved Watson’s self-defense claim by establishing that he was the
initial aggressor and therefore at fault. Krisheena testified that she and Watson
exchanged words and then he struck her. Two funeral-home employees who
witnessed the altercation testified that Watson struck Krisheena and knocked
her down. The funeral-home employees testified that Watson, not Krisheena,
was the initial aggressor. Although Watson testified that Krisheena struck him
first, see Tr. p. 115, the trial court concluded that his testimony was not credible,
and we will not reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. See
Wilson, 770 N.E.2d at 801. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to rebut
Watson’s self-defense claim.
Affirmed.
Baker, J., and Riley, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1408-CR-536 | February 20, 2015 Page 6 of 6