UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
______________________________
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Criminal Action No.94-204 (RWR)
)
SEAN A. EVANS, )
)
Defendant. )
______________________________)
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Defendant Sean Evans moves to expunge the record of his
criminal conviction from 1994. The government opposes Evans’s
motion. Because Evans presents no extreme circumstances that
would warrant expunging his record, his motion will be denied.
In July 1994, Evans pled guilty to count of carrying a
pistol without a license in violation of D.C. Code § 22-3204(a).
See Docket Entry, July 25, 1994. Evans originally was sentenced
to a three year term of probation in October 1994. See Docket
Entry, October 6, 1994. However, in November 1995, Evans’s
probation was revoked and he was sentenced to a nine-month term
of incarceration. See Docket Entry, November 15, 1995. Evans
now moves to expunge his criminal record, alleging that he needs
to “clear [his] name to apply for work” because his criminal
conviction “shows on [his] background check after 20 years.” See
Def.’s Mot. to Expunge at 1. The government opposes Evans’s
motion, arguing that he has not demonstrated that “extraordinary
-2-
circumstances” exist to justify his request to expunge his
criminal record. Govt.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Expunge at 2-5.
“The judicial remedy of expungement is inherent and is not
dependent on express statutory provision, and it exists to
vindicate substantial rights provided by statute as well as by
organic law[.]” Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1023 (D.C. Cir.
1974); see also Chastain v. Kelley, 510 F.2d 1232, 1235 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) (“The federal courts are empowered to order the
expungement of Government records where necessary to vindicate
rights secured by the Constitution or by statute.”). Where a
defendant has not shown a statutory basis justifying expungement,
courts have granted motions to expunge in extreme circumstances
only, such as in cases involving flagrant constitutional
violations - - for example, where the defendants’ arrests were
racially and politically motivated. See Doe v. Webster, 606 F.2d
1226, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“[A]lthough there are indeed many
instances in which courts have ordered expungement of arrest
records in the exercise of their inherent equitable powers, all
of these cases involved either a lack of probably cause coupled
with special circumstances, flagrant violations of the
Constitution, or other unusual and extraordinary circumstances.”
(footnotes omitted)); Carter v. Dist. of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116,
136 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (finding expungement would be appropriate
-3-
where a trial court found that an arrest was without probable
cause).
“Before expunging a criminal record, the Court must find
that, after examining the particular facts and circumstances of
the case, the ‘remedy is necessary and appropriate in order to
preserve basic legal rights.’” United States v. Davis, Criminal
Action No. 342-72 (TFH), 2006 WL 1409761, at *2 (D.D.C. May 23,
2006) (quoting Livingston v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 759 F.2d 74,
78 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). “[R]elief usually is granted only in
extreme circumstances, the finding of which requires a balancing
of the equities between the right of privacy of the individual
and the right of law enforcement officers to perform their
necessary duties.” Davis, 2006 WL 1409761, at *2 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The difficulty that a criminal
conviction poses for a defendant seeking employment is not
regarded as an extreme circumstance. See United States v.
Baccous, Criminal Action No. 99-0596 (DAR), 2013 WL 1707961, at
*2 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2013) (holding that the defendant’s “concerns
regarding his employment and residential opportunities” were not
extreme circumstances justifying expungement); In re Reid, 569 F.
Supp. 2d 220, 222 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding that the “harm of being
unable to obtain employment is insufficient on its own” to
justify expungement).
-4-
Evans seeks to expunge his criminal record so that it does
not appear on background checks run by potential employers.
However, in this Circuit, this does not present an extreme or
unusual circumstance justifying expungement. Evans has not
demonstrated that the remedy he seeks is “necessary and
appropriate in order to preserve basic legal rights.”
Livingston, 759 F.2d at 78 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Specifically, Evans does not challenge the legality of his
conviction on constitutional or statutory grounds, or present any
other cognizable legal injury that the D.C. Circuit would
recognize as justifying granting his motion to expunge his
criminal record. Webster, 606 F.2d at 1231 (“[A]bsent specific
statutory authority it would be wholly inappropriate to order
such an expungement in a case such as this where there has been
. . . a valid conviction.”); Davis, 2006 WL 1409761, at *2 (“The
Court, while not unsympathetic to defendant’s dilemma as
represented by him, can find no basis for expunging his criminal
record. The Defendant has cited no statutory authority for
expunging his conviction, and the Court is aware of none.”).
While it is unfortunate that Evans’s conviction from 20 years ago
poses a barrier to obtaining employment, Evans has presented no
sufficient basis to grant him the relief his motion seeks.
Accordingly, it is hereby
-5-
ORDERED that the defendant’s motion [16] to expunge his
criminal record be, and hereby is, DENIED.
SIGNED this 23rd day of February, 2015.
/s/
RICHARD W. ROBERTS
Chief Judge